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I have a particular pleasure in having the opportunity of
speaking here tonight at this conference on human rights.
There have been many such conferences recently, which I can
only applaud, for I can remember the period, which you might
call the Kissinger era, where the very subject of human rights
was not one to be mentioned in polite company. My remarks
tonight will be a lawyer's perspective on Global Human
Rights-Challenges and Perspectives.
First, we might turn to the two basic theoretical problems
in global human rights; and turn to them not so much because
they are particularly interesting from a theoretical standpoint,
but because they relate to the principal unfinished business of
international human rights, which is effective implementation.
The first of these problems is simply whether or not there
is a global basis for a consensus on human rights as appears,
* Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School. President, American Society
of International Law. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, U.S. State Department,
1972; U.S. Ambassador, U.S. Mission to the U.N., 1973-75.
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for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
What strikes one about the Declaration is its unparalleled proclamation that these are, in fact, universal rights which exist
on a global leval and which, by implication, exist solely by
virtue of fact that these rights attach to human beings simply
because they are human.
One of the major theoretical difficulties in this field is
whether or not there is a basis for universality. An academic
colleague of mine has been looking for some years at the ethical
and religious dimensions of human rights as they appear in the
Universal Declaration and in some seventeen United Nations
instruments. Searching for a commonality among the major
religious systems in the world, she has unfortunately concluded, in a forthcoming book, that she can find no such common theme in the major religious systems that would serve as
a consensual basis for the rights which are put forth in the
Universal Declaration, in the covenants, and in other international human rights instruments. This finding is rather disheartening because it certainly runs counter to what we hear
from the religious establishment, and to what we want to believe.
This conclusion, of course, may not be so dire a finding,
for we rarely pay much attention to history; however, what is
made of the past may be crucial. Therefore, the ethical basis
of human rights might turn out to be of some use. The fact
remains, however, that it is not easy to say that, on an ethical
dimension, there exists uniformly around the world a global
consensus which would support those declarations of rights
included in the Universal Declaration and in other United
Nations instruments.
There is a second, more critical problem which also has
political overtones: the question of whether or not the very
nature, form, and definition of these universal rights are essentially a reflection of the North Atlantic Basin (using the North
Atlantic Basin in the sense to include not only the products of
the Enlightenment, principally of Locke, but to include the
doctrine of Marxism, which is also an emanation of the North
Atlantic Basin, Western Europe, and North America). In other
words, the very definition of these rights may be so culturally
biased that it is impossible to find a consensual basis in other
cultures and other philosophies that would make effective implementation possible.
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From the lawyer's perspective, we look at international law
as a system, as possibly the basis upon which the structure of
internationally recognized and implemented rights might rest.
Unfortunately, my own work in this field leads me to rather
pessimistic conclusions. First, in terms of traditional international law, it appears certain that there is no global consensus
which would support declarations of human rights.
In traditional international law, prior to the developments
in the U.N. system, there existed some restricted areas of fundamental rights, limited though they may be to protection by
a sovereign. For example, the whole passport system rests on
the doctrine of one sovereign asking another, "Please do not do
anything terrible to my citizen while he is in your territory." If
you read a passport you will see that a vestige of this doctrine
remains where the Secretary of State says, "To whom it may
concern, please give protection to my citizen while he sojourns
in your land:" that is, rudimentary recognition of an obligation
but based on request. This system has now become very, very
much subject to erosion-erosion mainly because of the United
States' attempt to use a passport system to deal with protection of certain political interests. Thus, there are the prohibited
countries: you cannot go to Cuba; you cannot go to Vietnam;
you cannot go to Albania. This erosion of traditional international law has made this doctrine suspect in the rest of the
world, for the doctrine has been twisted by those who issue
passports to serve the political purpose of keeping citizens of
one country from having any contact with citizens of another
country who have different ideological views.
More critical has been the problem of protection of property. Out of the North Atlantic Basin, and principally based on
Locke, property protection has been an essential element of the
conception of basic human rights in the Western world. For
example, Locke starts with the conception that a man owns
property in himself and in his labor. An extension follows from
this basic assumption to all of the rights and freedoms that
were established during the Enlightment: the rights and freedoms that had so much to do with the formulation of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.
The conception that the property of foreigners is protected
by an international system, by an international regime of law,
however, is under attack, especially from the Third World.
This attack revolves around the disputes about permanent
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sovereignty over natural resources. The Third World has said
that every state has permanent sovereignty over its own natural resources. The First World and the Second World agree,
but there the agreement with the Third World ends. That is,
the Third World says, "If we take ownership of our natural
resources away from alien owners and nationalize it, or transfer
it to citizens of our state, we will compensate you under domestic law." But the First World answers, "That cannot be.
This property is protected; it is a right protected internationally, and international law says you have to give us prompt,
adequate, and reasonable compensation for any taking. Consequently, you are violating a fundamental human right if you
nationalize under domestic law."
The Third World, however, takes the position that there
is no such international law, traditional or otherwise. First,
they say that these rules grew up at a time when most of the
Third World were not members of the international community; therefore, anything that they did not participate in
making is not binding. Consequently, there is a rejection of the
basis for an international consensus reflected in law for very
rudimentary human rights, that is, one of property in one's
person and out of one's person. Second, there is the argument
that, in fact, international law is severely flawed. If you read
any international law text published before 1940, the introductory paragraph will open by saying that international law is the
distillation of practice among Christian sovereigns. Given the
structure and nature of the world today, the objection to the
substantive context of international law is that this law essentially represents the views of the North Atlantic Basin.
There was a doctrine which provided for protection of
human rights in traditional international law called the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention. The theory was that if a
sovereign so mistreated its citizens that it shocked the conscience of Christian sovereigns, every sovereign not only had a
right, but had a duty to intervene to protect those subjects
against tyranny. As formulated, it was obviously an enormous
advance before the U.N. era in terms of minimum protection
of basic human rights. But what happened? It is alleged that
humanitarian intervention, in many cases, really masked intervention for economic and political reasons. For example, the
French intervened in the Middle East, in what is now Syria
and Lebanon, allegedly to protect Christian communities
against oppression, harassment, and massive violations of
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fundamental human rights. It took almost a hundred years to
get the French out.
Consequently, there has been a feeling in many quarters
of the world that this distortion of the very substance and
nature of what purports to be universal international law, again
appears to be, upon examination, an emanation from the North
Atlantic Basin. Therefore, to rely upon those doctrines of classic international law as a foundation for this new superstructure of rights generated by the United Nations is a reliance on
false premises. This premise is a fundamental, theoretical
problem of whether or not there is a basis for a global consensus
on human rights. We do not find it in religion; we do not find
it in traditional international law; we do not find it in the
historical origins of the period of the Enlightenment. The problem is, what possible substitute exists for this lack of consensus
(since as a lawyer one looks to a certain kind of consensus that
would make effective implementation possible)?
Absent a global consensus, one might say that implementation of recognized international human rights may very well
appear to be impossible. But, as I suggested earlier, the uses
of history are many.
History is purposeful, and it would appear that what we
say about the past, even though it may be inaccurate, may very
well perform a useful function of legitimizing what we have
now. We must look to another factor when we consider from a
legal perspective the problem of whether or not there is indeed
a consensus.
We have heard very much in the words of Ambassador
Andrew Young of the problem of the rising tide of hope, which
I think accurately describes what is happening in the world
community in regard to human rights. But one must see this
hope in a particular context: the rising tide of hope is the hope
of people, not the hope of the sovereign entities we call nation
states and governments. This distinction, however, exposes a
very crucial problem: Our whole international system is based
on relations among states. As late as 1946 the classic texts in
international law stated that individuals have no place in international law; international law is what one sovereign talks
about to another sovereign. Therefore, if we have a system in
which one sovereign only talks to another sovereign about what
they want, they obviously do not talk about what they are
doing to their subjects. Thus, the rising tide of hope focuses on
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what is really one of the most hopeful signs in this whole field
of internationally protected human rights, that is, in several
areas, the sovereign is being bypassed. And for my mind, this
is a very good development.
For example, the complaint procedures adopted by the
United Nations, imperfect though they may be, recognized
that human beings on this planet have a right to talk to someone in the international community-the U.N.-about the inequities perpetrated by their sovereign. This certainly has provided courage, for example, to Soviet citizens to complain
about their sovereign and to American citizens to complain
about their sovereign to the international community. This
procedure is the beginning of something very, very new: It is
the beginning of the recognition that an individual has certain
inalienable rights, and that even his sovereign cannot forbid
him from making a complaint - a startling revelation given
the background of traditional international law and traditional
international relations where the sovereigns could only talk to
each other. The origin of this right is mainly the result of a
particular factual situation, the problem of South Africa. What
South Africa has contributed is the political will for sovereigns
to break through these old boundaries, these old theoretical
constructs.
The sovereigns, however, have not been passive. Opposition has shown up as resistance to the United Nations in its
lawmaking function. This resistance can be seen historically;
for example, the Western powers in the early years of the U.N.
insisted that the Universal Declaration be merely a statement
of goals and aspirations. Clearly, it was not to be international
law but merely a recommendation to the nation states for the
shaping of their policies. The erosion of this concept now has
reached the point that most lawyers at least assert that the
Universal Declaration is, in and of itself, international law.
But, remember the resistance of all the sovereigns: the Soviet
Union abstained on the Universal Declaration; Saudi Arabia
abstained because they could not conceive of women having
equal rights with men; the United States voted for the Declaration but made clear that it was only a statement of aspirations.
We have come, however, a long way in recognizing that
there is an irreducible minimum of rights which attach to one
as a human being, and that sovereigns do not have the power
to derogate or to say that these rights are granted to them by
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virtue of their sovereignty. This conclusion, however, leads us
to a number of technical problems. These problems inhere in
the covenants and several other instruments in which there is
an ascertainable tension between the claim of the sovereign as
being the fountain of all rights and the claim of individuals
that there are certain rights inherent in being human.
There is a second theoretical problem, relative to the organizing principle, in declaring the substance of these rights
which are to attach to humans. This problem is sometimes
phrased in terms of the principle of individuality against the
authority of the state, that is, the problem of defining the rights
of individuals as opposed to the rights of groups. We have seen
this conflict historically. For example, the first serious international effort to deal with protecting rights on an international
scale grew out of Wilson's fourteen points in which he dealt
with the question of protection of minorities as one of the
causes of war. On an international level, one protected the
rights of people by looking to the group characteristic, and
looking to the group characteristic required an understanding
of a certain level of conduct pertaining to the group. A prime
example is the Polish convention of 1919 in which rights were
looked at in terms of group characteristics, as opposed to a
second principle, that of individuality. This principle is embedded in the U.N. Charter.
The tensions generated by group-individual problems remain. For example, in the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention), there
is a theoretical inconsistency which demands concern for the
individual and for the individual's protection from having his
skin color or race used as a basis for disparate treatment; yet,
in the center of the Race Convention is a provision which states
that if one is a member of a group which has been subject to
racial discrimination in the past, the government is obligated
to take special measures in order to make reparation for that
damage. This clause is a group characteristic.
Thus, in terms of organizing principles, we also have to
return to the problem of the difference between civil and political rights, as they are specified in the Covenant and in the first
twenty articles of the Universal Declaration, and the problem
of economic, cultural, and social rights. The classic analysis,
contributed mainly by political scientists, is that there are
some inherent differences between these two classes of rights.
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Civil and political rights classically have grown up as limitations on the power of sovereigns, limits on what a government
can do or cannot do to you, but not in terms of bestowing a
right on an individual because he is an individual. It reminds
me, for example, of the formula by which my university confers
J.D. degrees on our graduates. The president says to the graduate, "You are now qualified to go practice those wise restraints
which make men free." This statement reflects the civil and
political arenas. The president does not say to a graduate anything about being "now qualified to go advise the government
on policies of allocation of economic resources, which might
make society more equitable." Consequently, when we look to
that linkage between economic rights and civil and political
rights, the problem of the relationship between these two sets
of rights is really not the crucial issue. Rather, the crucial issue
is the relationship between both sets of rights, civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights, as they
appear in the covenants and in the demands for the new international economic order. If one examines these economic specifications, one finds that what split the United States from the
Soviet Union in the era of the Cold War is reflected in the
Universal Declaration: the first twenty articles are civil and
political, while the next nine are economic, cultural, and social.
Nonetheless, when one examines economic, social, and cultural
rights, one finds that the drafters assumed that they were dealing with an industrial society. Every single one of these rights
- from the most explicit, that is, the right to days off, the right
to leisure, the right to paid vacations - indicates that the
Declaration was talking about an industrial society. It was not
talking about a subsistence society where a farmer knows
nothing about days off. Therefore, what you are dealing with,
really, is a distinction that those in the industrial world can
argue about, relative to the conflict of East against West,
without addressing the problems of 90% of the world's populations, which are in a subsistence economy. In this sense, the
demands for the new international economic order, which is a
blueprint for a new world order, become highly relevant to the
question of human rights.
What kind of a global economic system is going to evolve
that will make it possible to enjoy these particular rights?
What is the world going to evolve into after this era of "Pax
Americana"? Is there room within a global model for this North
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Atlantic conception of rights which attach to humankind simply by being humankind? These being the theoretical problems, I would like to discuss some of the problems of strategy
within this context, particularly as they relate to the Carter
Administration.
First, the Administration certainly has put human rights
on the global agenda. That, in and of itself, is a first step in
moving eventually toward some system of implementation.
For example, I examined every speech in the general debate of
the past U.N. General Assembly looking for human rights and
found, for the first time, that every speaker in the general debate devoted some time to human rights, even though many of
them stated: "My country has no problems, but those others
have a few human rights problems." Even to this extent, an
enormous advance in putting human rights on the global
agenda has been achieved.
However, one of the responses which greatly troubles me
is the Administration's submission of four treaty conventions
to the Senate for ratification: the two covenants on human
rights, the Race Convention, and the Inter-American Convention. The problem is that lawyers have riddled them with
reservations: "these are things we will not accept." Therefore,
the conventions, as presented, are filled with the resurrection
of discarded doctrines that were used a hundred years ago.
For example, the so-called State-Federal Clause: "We are the
United States but we are not Texas or Colorado, and therefore
we cannot make them do anything; we will use our best efforts
to tell them, please do not violate people's human rights, but
you must recognize we are a federal system." I am greatly
troubled by this attitude, primarily in terms of the credibility
of the Administration.
To take one example of a reservation, there is an article in
the political covenant which says you cannot undertake to execute pregnant women or people under eighteen. The United
States reservation says that we reserve the right to impose
capital punishment on pregnant women and people under
eighteen in present or future law. Can you imagine the incredulity of someone reading this reservation and then saying,
"We are promoting human rights?" The same thing is true
throughout the other conventions. For example, the United
States says we do not accept any obligations under the Race
Convention, which is really a replication of the Civil Rights Act
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of 1965 (the reason being that some people who were drafting
the Civil Rights Act of 1965 were also drafting the Race Convention). In technical lawyer's language, the Race Convention
is not self-executing. To accept those obligations, then, Congress essentially has to re-pass the Civil Rights Bill. In other
words, the Administration has stumbled into an incredibly disastrous position in terms of its credibility and its leadership in
the world. In prior instances, there were challenges to Taiwan's
ratification of the Conventions from the People's Republic of
China; there were challenges to the Federal Republic of Germany's ratifications of the Conventions because they were extended to West Berlin. Now, the United States has put itself
in the position that if it does ratify these Conventions, it is
clear that the United States, the leader of human rights, is
going to be challenged on the ratification on the basis of bad
faith.
Another problem is the treaty-making power as a way of
making domestic law in the United States under our Constitution. However, it seems that we leave ourselves *open in this
context because the United States and the Administration
have put themselves into the position of saying that they will
not take this route for the improvement of the human rights
condition, which appears to be a remnant of the old Bricker
Amendment days.
Finally, in terms of strategies, there is the problem of what
to do about South Africa. Certainly, it is easy to describe conditions there in terms of massive, consistent, persistent patterns
of gross, outrageous violations of human rights. Here, there is
some disappointment in the Administration's handling of the
South African situation.
Briefly, the first problem is the National Security Advisor
who keeps pointing out that we are trying to settle Zimbabwe
(Southern Rhodesia). Therefore, a constraint on our South African policy arises from the fact that we need South Africa's
help to settle the Rhodesian question. This policy is not effective human rights leadership because the problem in southern
Africa is really South Africa; and South Africa must be dealt
with on its own terms. However, looking now to the real problem of effective implementation, we have already seen that the
recognition of the right of an individual to file complaints with
the U.N. system is beginning to erode. In the interim, until we
achieve "Utopia," when in fact we might have international
jurisdiction to deal with human rights violations such as we
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had at Nuremburg, perhaps the problem is an effective national implementation of these international rights. To its
credit, the Carter Administration, under the leadership of Congress, has begun to fashion some effective national remedies for
the violation of human rights: a necessary measure until there
exists an international jurisdiction.
The problem is how, and what forces you use, to get nation
states to react properly. Certainly, we could use the carrot and
stick approach, as is being used in our aid legislation. We also
should not overlook the problem of international publicity. We
have seen some power there, even with the most recalcitrant of
regimes. Once word reaches the people, you have created pressure on nation states to do something. Therefore, just the publication of information becomes crucial to implementation.
I will conclude by saying that obviously there are enormous problems, both theoretical and practical. Some lawyers
fear that maybe we are on the way to world government, that
sovereigns are no longer the be-all and the end-all. Nonetheless, looking back ten or fifteen years, there is an enormous
basis to justify the feeling that this rising tide of hope in the
world is indeed going to make a difference.

ARTICLES
The European Court of Justice Judgment in
United Brands: ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
and Abuse of Dominant Position
JOSEPH JUDE NORTON*

The objective of this article is to examine two legal aspects
of the European Community antitrust system which are of
growing concern to the multinational enterprise doing business
in Western Europe: (1) extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction
of Community antitrust laws, and (2) the notion of "abuse of
a dominant position" under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome.'
The recent judgment of the European Court of Justice in
United Brands,2 along with other judgments of the Court and
decisions of the European Commission will be used as a focal
point for analysis.
* Partner, Locke, Purnell, Boren, Laney & Neely, Dallas. A.B., 1966, Providence
College; LL.B., 1969, University of Edinburgh; LL.M., 1970, University of Texas at
Austin; LL.M., 1972, University of Michigan; S.J.D., 1973, University of Michigan;
Dipl6me de droit international priv6, 1976, Acaddmie de Droit International de ]a
Hague.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter referred to as the Treaty of Rome].
In a strict sense the "European Community" is comprised of (i) the European Coal
and Steel Community established in 1952, (ii) the European Economic Community
(EEC or Common Market) established in 1958, and (iii) the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), also established in 1958. For purposes of this article, however,
"European Community" will be synonymous with the EEC. At present the European
Community is comprised of nine member states: the six original members (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and the three acceding
members as of 1973 (Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom). For a consideration
of the Community law in general, see inter alia E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELROECK,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976); H. SMITH & P.
HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY (5
vols. 1976); and A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW (1969) (3 vols. with annual supplements). For a general consideration of the impact of EEC laws on American business,
see inter alia Norton, Overview of European Community Law: A Primer for Business
and Attorneys, 29 Sw. L. J. 347 (1975).
2. United Brands Co. and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission of the
European Communities, [1978] 3 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429. The judgment was
a result of an appeal by United Brands Company from a prior decision by the European
Commission, [19761 [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH)
9800.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Treaty of Rome
During the past twenty years, the antitrust laws of the
European Community have evolved, at least from the perspective of the multinational enterprise, into the primary system of
antitrust regulation in Western Europe, being generally applicable (with certain limited exceptions) to all sectors of the Community economy, private or public.3 While Community antitrust laws do not preclude the continuing existence and vitality
of national counterparts (Germany's, for example),4 the national authorities are precluded from acting when the Community has asserted its authority or when national rules serve
objectives different from those of the Community. 5 One of the
fundamental objectives of the Community, as embraced by the
Treaty of Rome, is "the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted."' This
system is an integral key to the overall objective of
"establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States."7 In any event,
whether in antitrust matters or otherwise, where there is a
conflict between Community and national rules, the Community rules shall prevail. 8
3. See generally W.

ALEXANDER, EEC RULES OF COMPETITION (1973); C. BELLAMY
CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPErrITION (2d ed. 1978); J. BARouNos, D. F.
HALL & J. R. JAMES, EEC ANTI-TRuST LAW (1975); J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION
LAW or THE EEC, A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1973) (with supplement); A. DERINGER, THE
COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1968); EEC COMMISSION,
PRACTICAL GUIDE OF THE COMMISSION, ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE EEC TREATY AND
RELEVANT REGULATIONS: A MANUAL FOR FIRMS (1962); and C. OBERDORFR, A. GLEISH &
M. HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW (2d ed. 1971).

& G.

4. For a discussion of national antitrust laws within the EEC, particularly respecting dominant positions, see REGULATING THE BEHAVIOR OF MONOPOLIES AND DOMINANT
UNDEIRTAKINGS IN COMMUNITY LAW ( J. A. van Damme ed. 1977). For statutory laws of
each Member State, see O.E.C.D., GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTmCIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES (4 vols. 1970).

5. See Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellemt, [1969] [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
REP. (CCH) 8056.
6. Treaty of Rome, Art. 3(f).
7. Id., art. 2.
8. For a classic statement on the nature of Community law, see Costa v. ENEL,
[19641 [1961-1965 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8023, at 7390. Also,
see generally Bebr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts, 11 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 3 (1974); Bebr, Law of the European Communities and Municipal Law,
34 MOD. L. REV. 481 (1971); and Warner, Relationship between European Community
Law and the National Laws of Member States, 93 LAW Q. Rpv. 349 (1977).
COMM. MKT.
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The main prohibitions of Community antitrust laws are
contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,' both of
which are directly applicable (i.e., fully self-executing) within
the Member States. 0 Article 85 prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition" within the Community." Article 86 expressly prohibits any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the Community or in a substantial part of it.12 Activities violative of
9. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome dealing with antitrust matters are articles
85-94. Briefly, article 85 pertains to restrictive trade practices; article 86 to abuses of
a dominant position; articles 87-89 to the implementation of articles 85 and 86; article
90 to rules concerning public enterprises; article 91 to transitional antidumping rules;
and articles 92-94 to rules on state aids.
10. The significance of a Community provision being self-executing is that such
provision is automatically incorporated into the national legal order (i.e., it becomes
part of the law of the land) without further intervention of law or of any governmental
authority: thus legal rights and obligations under Community law (which could give
rise to individual claims before national courts) are directly created within the national
legal order. See generally Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisionsof Community Law: the
Development of a Community Concept, 19 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 257 (1970); and Winter,
Direct Applicability and Direct Effect-Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMM. MKT. L. Rav. 425 (1972).
11. Article 85(1) contains certain illustrative, but not exhaustive, examples of
particular restrictive trade activities which would be incompatible with the establishment of a common market, if the general requirements of article 85(1) are met, especially those activities which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supplies;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
agreements.
12. Article 86, which will be the primary concern of this study, reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect
trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
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article 85, which are not subject to a discretionary exemption
from the European Commission, are automatically void. 3 Activities violative of article 86 are absolutely null and void without exception.'
Council of Ministers Regulation 17 outlines the procedure
for implementing and enforcing articles 85 and 86 by essentially providing for an administrative process whereby the European Commission is granted wide discretion to investigate
and determine violations or to grant or deny negative clearances and specific exemptions under article 85.11 While the
rules of civil procedure in a relevant Member State determine
the ultimate enforcement procedure of a Commission decision, 6 the Commission possesses the power to sanction an offending undertaking by requiring the termination of the illegal
activity. It can also exact fines for specific violations and periodic penalty payments for continuing violations. 7 Thus, the
Commission can be viewed as both the primary interpreter and
enforcer of the Community antitrust rules. The Court of Justice, however, retains the ultimate and unlimited power of review, both with respect to the legal interpretation of such rules
and to the propriety of Commission antitrust decisions. 8
The American observer of the Community antitrust system may be quick to conclude that the drafters of Community
antitrust laws are undoubtedly astute students of the American
counterpart. 9 Nevertheless, a flippant comparison of the two
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
13. Treaty of Rome, Art. 85(2). Under article 85(3) the Commission is granted
discretionary authority through the use of a balancing test of good and bad effects to
grant specific or group exemptions for activities otherwise violative of article 85(1).
14. Id., art. 86.
15. EEC Council of Ministers Regulation 17/62, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401
et seq. [hereinafter referred to as Regulation 171.
16. Id., art. 15, at 2542.
17. Id., art. 3, at
2422, and art. 16, at
2551; see generally Graupner,
Commission Decisionmaking on Competition Questions, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 291
(1973).
18. Treaty of Rome, Art. 172; and Regulation 17, art. 9, at 2482, and art. 17, at
2561.
19. For a comparison of EEC and U.S. antitrust laws, see inter alia COMMON
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antitrust systems is fraught with danger, as both systems must
be analysed within the context of their own respective milieu.
For example, the historical and economic conditions which
gave birth to the Community laws are wholly different from
those which inspired the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In its
formation, the Community was confronted with two major dilemmas: first, the attainment of the capacity to achieve economies of scale conducive to European industrial and commercial growth, and second, the amalgamation of the separate
economies of the Member States to the extent necessary to
form a unified common market. Accordingly, Community law
and practice have shown no built-in reflex against size or
against large "European" business combinations (cartels).
Quite the contrary, Community practice has actively encouraged mergers, combinations, and cooperative groupings of genuinely "European" firms, particularly those of small and medium size, which are conducive to overall economic growth.2"
However, where such activities have been deemed to run
counter to the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission has been most vigorous in enforcing Community antitrust laws.2'
Prior to 1970, Article 86 was a dormant provision of the
Treaty of Rome, discussed by academics, but neglected by the
European Commission and Court of Justice. 22 It was not until
the Commission's decision in Continental Can in 1971,21 and
the Court of Justice's landmark judgment in this case in 1973,24
that the legal potential of article 86 to attack mergers and
acquisitions became apparent. Since 1973, there has been a
MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST, OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (J. A. Rahl ed. 1970); A.
CROrT, TRADING UNDER EEC AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS (1977); and Jones, American

Antitrust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative Perspective, 90 LAW Q. REv. 191
(1974).
20. For a discussion of the economic objective behind the Community antitrust
system, see D. McLACHLAN & D. SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1967); and D. SWANN & D. LEES, ANTITRUST POLICY IN EUROPE (1973).
21. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, which
has been published annually since 1972.
22. Prior to 1970, the Commission had not instituted proceedings under article 86.
23. For the Commission decision in Continental Can, see U.S. Container Firm
Held to Violate Antitrust Rules [1971] (1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9481.
24. Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, [1973] [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8171.
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series of decisions and judgments (the latest of which is United
Brands) which have endeavored to put legal meat on the bare
bones of article 86, although the Commission and Court of
Justice have not always seen eye to eye on the matter. These
decisions and judgments, many of which involve Americanrelated multinationals, will be considered.
B. ExtraterritorialExtension of Jurisdiction
Extraterritorial extension of antitrust laws by administrative and judicial organs has been increasing recently.15 Of particular note are the jurisdictional claims of the European Community. This matter is of concern to the U.S. multinational
from several perspectives. First, there is the aspect of direct
economic activity within the Community through subsidiaries
and branches; second, there is the aspect of multinational activity outside the Community which may be deemed to have
an effect within the Community.26
Traditionally, one of the basic principles for determining
jurisdiction is the territorial principle, which makes reference
to the place where the offense is committed. 27 Over the years,
however, the territorial principle has been expanded by various
jurisdictions. First, the so-called subjective territorial principle
has been developed to establish the jurisdiction of a state and
its judicial organs to prosecute and punish offenses commenced within the state and completed abroad. Second, the
objective territorial principle has been established, which gives
jurisdiction to a state and its judicial organs to prosecute an
offense commenced outside the state but consummated within
its territory.2 8 For example, under U.S. practice the objective
territorial principle has been expanded to cover "conduct that
occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory," if such conduct is a constituent element of the offense,
is "substantial," is "a direct and foreseeable result of the con25. See Yazawa, ExtraterritorialApplicationof Antitrust and Securities Laws, to
be published in RECEUIL DES COUPS (Hague 1976); and Kronstein, Conflicts Resulting
from the ExtraterritorialEffects of the Antitrust Legislation of Different Countries,
XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 432 (K. Nadelmann et al., eds. 1961).
26. See inter alia Allen, The Development of European Economic Community

Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Alien Undertakings, 2
INTEGRATION

LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN

35 (1974); and Goldman, Les effets juridiques extraterritoriauxde Ia

politique de Ia concurrence, 1972

REV. MARCHt COMMUN

612 (1972).

27. See Harvard Research Study in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect
to Crimes, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435, 439 (1935).

28. See

BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS,

299-304 (6th ed. 1963).
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duct outside the territory," and is not "inconsistent with the
principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems. '29 This exposition of the
so-called "effects" doctrine of territorial jurisdiction has developed considerable controversy in international legal circles,"
and has been the subject of heated discussion within the Community.3 The question of extraterritorial jurisdiction as it has
been developed by the Court of Justice in cases before United
Brands will be discussed.
C. The United Brands Case
For present purposes, a factual background to United
Brands is needed for a better understanding of the matters to
be discussed. The United Brands Company (UBC), a New Jersey corporation, came into existence in 1970 through the
merger of the United Food Company and the American Seal
Kap Corporation. UBC represents the largest group on the
world banana market and had been successful at maintaining
somewhere between a 40-45% share of the relevant EEC market. UBC parents a European subsidiary, United Brands Continentaal BV (Continentaal), which maintains a registered
office in Rotterdam, and which is responsible for coordinating
banana sales in all Community Member States, except the
United Kingdom and Italy (where separate affiliates Fyffes and
C.I.F. operate). UBC maintains a highly vertically-integrated
operation, owning vast banana plantation acreage. It maintains one of the world's largest banana boat fleets (including
refrigerator ships), and operates ripening facilities in many of
its importing countries. It also controls an elaborate distribution system of banana imports throughout the world (including
the EEC), marketing its bananas through a common sales policy, and organizing and paying for advertising and sales promotion itself under the "Chiquita Banana" label. Only bananas
satisfying certain quality standards are permitted to bear the
Chiquita label; however, these products are sold at a price 3029. AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, SECOND, FOREIGN RELA§ 18 (1965).
30. See, e.g., AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS, 1962, at 1843; 1964, at 124-54; 1972, at 14-22; 1974, at 250-65; and Mann, Anglo-American Conflict of InternationalJurisdiction, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 1460 (1964).
31. Harding, Jurisdictionin EEC Competition Law: Some Recent Developments,
11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 422 (1977); and Jacquemin, Application to Foreign Firms of
European Rules of Competition, 19 ANTITRUST BuLL. 157 (1974).
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
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40% above that of unbranded bananas. Despite this price differential, UBC sales at the time of the Commission's investigation accounted for 40% of total banana sales in the Netherlands, 50% in Belgium and Luxembourg, 45% in Germany and
Denmark, over 40% in the United Kingdom (through its Fyffes
subsidiary), 40% in Italy (through its Italian subsidiary,
C.I.F.), 20% in France, and 25% in Ireland. UBC's main worldwide and EEC competitors, Castle & Cook Company and Del
Monte Company (both American corporations), could only
account for 9% and 5% respectively of the total EEC market.12
UBC fixed prices weekly, and these prices appeared to
vary significantly from country to country within the Community. For example, the average maximum weekly difference
between Germany, the Benelux countries, and Denmark was
13.5% in 1974, with differences being even greater between
these countries and Ireland, where UBC had only recently penetrated the market. With respect to conditions of sales to distributor/ripeners, UBC imposed prohibition on resale of UBC
bananas to competing ripeners, on the resale of green bananas,
and on the sale of non-UBC bananas. In addition, UBC dealers
in one country were not permitted to sell bananas to dealers in
other countries, which, according to the Commission, led to a
segregation of markets within the Community.
In 1969, UBC's second largest distributor/ripener in Denmark, Olesen, acquired the exclusive distributorship for
"Dole" (the trade name for Castle & Cook) bananas in Denmark. It then appeared that UBC began undersupplying the
orders placed by Olesen. In particular, in 1973, when Castle &
Cook embarked upon a major sales promotion campaign in
Denmark, UBC notified Olesen that it was discontinuing supplies of Chiquita bananas altogether. Olesen then endeavored
to obtain products from other Danish and German customers
of UBC, but was unable to acquire any green bananas for ripening from these sources. In February 1974, Olesen submitted a
complaint to the Commission; however, in February 1975, an
agreement was reached between Olesen and UBC, with supplies to Olesen being resumed. Olesen withdrew its complaint
to the Commission in March 1975. In May 1974, certain Irish
32. For background information regarding United Brands Co. see Litvak & Maule,
TransnationalCorporationsand Vertical Integration: The Banana Case, 11 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 537 (1977).
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to the Commission
petitioners also submitted an application
33
complaining of UBC activities.
On March 19, 1975, six days after the Olesen complaint
was withdrawn, the Commission initiated proceedings against
UBC on the basis that UBC was engaging in abuse of its dominant position. After an administrative hearing on the matter,
the Commission, on December 17, 1975, decided that UBC had
in fact infringed Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 34 As a consequence of this violation, the Commission assessed a fine of one
million units of account against UBC. UBC appealed to the
Court of Justice to set aside the Commission's decision and to
order the Commission to pay UBC moral damages in the
if the
amount of one unit of account, and in the alternative,
35
decision be upheld, cancel or at least reduce the fine.
On February 14, 1978, the Court of Justice rendered its
judgment in the case by:
(i) annulling that part of the Commission's decision which
found that UBC had imposed unfair prices for the sale of its
bananas;
(ii) reducing the amount of the fine to 850,000 units of
account;
33. For a general discussion of the facts, see [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New
Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800, at 9775-85.
34. The Commission based its conclusion on the findings that UBC:
(i) required its distributor/ripeners not to sell green bananas;
(ii) charged its distributor/ripeners in various Member States prices which differed considerably, without any objective justification, for bananas of the same quality, even though the conditions of the market were to all intents and purposes the
same;
(iii) applied differing prices to its distributor/ripeners, the difference sometimes
amounting to 138%; and
(iv) refused to supply Chiquita brand bananas to Olesen on the ground that Olesen
had taken part in an advertising campaign for bananas of a competing brand.
Id. at 9785-92.
35. UBC based its appeal on the following contentions:
(i) it challenged the Commission's finding and analysis of the relevant market, the
product market, and the geographic market;
(ii) it denied that it was in a dominant position within the Community for purposes of article 86;
(iii) it considered the clause related to the conditions of sales of green bananas to
be justified in order to safeguard the quality of the product sold to the consumer;
(iv) it purported to show that the refusal to continue to supply Olesen was justified;
(v) it asserted that it had not charged discriminatory prices, nor that the prices
charged were unfair; and
(vi) it complained that the Commission's administrative procedure was irregular.
3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8429, at 7704.
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(iii) dismissing the rest of UBC's application; and
3
(iv) ordering each party to bear its own cost. 1
A discussion of the merits of the case will be made subsequently in this article.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
What is significant about United Brands and the question
of extraterritorial jurisdiction is that neither. UBC nor the
Court of Justice ever raised the issue. This silence, in this
writer's view, indicates that, at least for the moment, the Commission and the Court have struck upon a common approach
to which plaintiffs, such as UBC, will acquiesce. The underpinnings for this approach are derived from earlier jurisprudence
of the Court.
A. The ICI Case: The Search for a NoncontroversialTheory
The references in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
with respect to "effect" upon trade between Member States or
within the Common Market provide a literal basis for exposition of an "effects" doctrine respecting extraterritorial extension of subject matter jurisdiction by the European Community in antitrust cases. The Commission has been quite
amenable to expound such a theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction and from an early stage has made clear that "the fact that
several or all of the undertakings involved have their principle
head offices outside the Community is no obstacle to the application of this rule insofar as the agreements, decisions or concerted practices have effects extending to the Common Market."37 The Commission took solace in earlier language of the
Court of Justice in its 1971 judgment in Bkguelin (which language was not critical to the outcome of the case), wherein the
Court gratuitously noted that "the fact that one of the enterprises participating in an agreement is located in a third country does not prevent the appliction of Article 85 . . . where the
effects of the agreement extend to the territory of the Common
Market. 3 8 However, as will be seen, the Court of Justice has
36. Id. at 7721-22.
37. European Commission, Opinion relating to imports into the Community of
Japanese products covered by the Treaty of Rome, Clll OmClAL J. EuR. ECON.
COMMUNrrY 13 (Nov. 21, 1972).
38. Bbguelin Import Co. v. G. L. Import Export 119721 [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8149, at 7697.
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been reluctant to date to espouse explicitly the "effects" concept.
The 1972 decision of the Court of Justice concerning Imperial Chemical Industries of Great Britain (ICI) was the first
clear exposition by the Court of its views on the extraterritorial
applicability of Community antitrust laws. 3 One of the main
issues in this case was the extent of the Commission's authority
to fine a non-EEC enterprise for alleged violations of Community antitrust law. ICI, which at the time of the suit was a
non-Community enterprise, had been fined in 1969 by the
Commission, along with nine other dye stuff manufacturers,
pursuant to article 85(1) for price fixing. ICI challenged the
EEC's jurisdiction to impose such fines merely because of the
effect produced in the EEC by acts it may have committed
outside the Community. ICI further asserted before the Court
of Justice that the acts in question, which may have been committed within the Community, were those of its subsidiary
within the Community and not the parent company.
The Commission in its 1969 decision in ICI stated:
In view of these circumstances, there is no doubt that the
price increases which the Commission found had taken place are
at least the result of concerted practices within the meaning of
Article 85, paragraph 1. There is therefore no need to examine
whether these price increases are the result of an agreement."0

The Commission avoided proof that the effects were a direct
and causal offshoot of the concerted practices in question, that
is, whether the concerted practices were "an essential constituent element of the offense" as is traditionally required by the
objective territorial principle. While the facts of the case appear to indicate that there were concrete effects occurring
within the EEC which were traceable to the concerted practices
in question, the Commission apparently wished to avoid meeting this burden of proof."
The Commission's decision was sharply criticized for a
variety of reasons. First, the exposition of the effects doctrine
by the Commission has been characterized as lacking the limi39. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities [1972] [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161.
40. Commission Rules Against Dyestuff Manufacturers [1969] [1965-1969
Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9314, at 8691.
41. See Allen, supra note 26, at 51.
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tations required by international law under the objective territorial principle. 2 Moreover, one writer has questioned whether
or not the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC could have a
binding effect upon nonsignatory states and their nationals.',:
The answer to this latter question depends entirely upon the
legal status of the EEC itself.
From the point of view of the Court of Justice, the EEC is
not analogous to an international organization but constitutes
a separate, distinct, and autonomous legal order in and of itlegal order provides the
self.4 This concept of the Community
5
basis for the Commission's actions.4
On appeal before the Court of Justice, however, the Commission offered the Court an alternative argument to support
jurisdiction. This alternative argument was based on the fact
that ICI as well as certain other foreign firms had acted within
the EEC inasmuch as the foreign parent and its EEC subsidiaries were a "single enterprise" and as such, acts of a subsidiary
could be imputed as actions of the foreign parent. The offering
of this alternative, which ironically had previously been used
to exclude activities between a parent and its subsidiaries from
the Community antitrust laws,'4 appears to have been made on
strategic grounds, perhaps based on a fear by the Commission
that the "effects" concept might be rejected by the Court of
Justice, particularly since this concept was not well received
among European legal experts. 47
42. Steindorff, Annotation on the Decisions of the European Court in the Dyestuff
Cases of July 14, 1972, 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 502 (1972).
43. Mann, The Dyestuffs Cases in the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 22 INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 35 (1973).
44. [1961-1965 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8023, at 7390.
45. The rules of competition of the Treaty are therefore applicable
to all restrictions of competition that produce within the Common Market effects to which Article 85, paragraph 1, applies. There is therefore
no need to examine whether the enterprises that originated such restraints of competition have their head office within or outside of the
Community.
[1965-1969 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9314, at
8694.
46. See Commission Decision, Relating to a Request for Negative Clearance
(Christiani & Nielsen), 11965-1969 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT.
REP 9308, in which a genuine parent-subsidiary relationship was held to preclude the
application of EEC antitrust laws to the intracorporate activities of the two corporations.
47. See Allen, supra note 26, at 53.
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The most lucid exposition in this case of the "effects"
concept in light of the objective territorial doctrine was made
in the submissions of the Advocate General to the Court.' The
Advocate General submitted a persuasive argument in favor of
the "effects" concept, his position being grounded on the following reasoning:
(i) Article 85 presents as criteria the anticompetitive effect
in the EEC, without taking into account either the nationality
or the locality of the headquarters of the undertaking responsible for the breaches of competition;
(ii) The statutes and case law of the Member States of the
EEC prohibit or penalize interference with competition, the
effects of which are produced on a territory, "irrespective of the
nationality or place of residence of the infringer;"
(iii) As to nonmembers of the EEC, the acceptance of the
"effects" doctrine is recognized in statutes and laws of such
countries as the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Switzerland, the Advocate General placing particular emphasis upon American case law and the U.S. Restatement on Foreign Relations; and
(iv) According to both EEC and international law, the
Community, as constituting a separate legal order, has the
same powers as a state to apply its competition laws to undertakings, even if foreign to the EEC."
The ultimate conclusions reached by the Advocate General approximate those contained in Section 18(b) of the
Restatement: the concerted practices in question must cause a
direct and immediate restriction within the EEC and must be
of a foreseeable character with substantial effect.5 In addition,
the Advocate General suggested that the effect of the infringement would be one of its constitutive elements and probably
even the essential element. The Advocate General did concede
that, while the EEC does have subject matter jurisdiction, the
Community would not have executory or enforcement jurisdiction inasmuch as the Commission would not be entitled to take
coercive measures against the foreign undertakings within ter48. For the function of the Advocate General, see Treaty of Rome, Art. 166.
49. Discussion of Advocate General Mayras, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. 8161, at 8049-58.
50. Note 29 supra.
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ritory where the EEC could assert no authority."'
In spite of the lengthy debate of the "effects" doctrine, the
Court of Justice, in reaching its decision, made no reference to
the Advocate General's submissions, but instead accepted the
Commission's alternative basis of jurisdiction (i.e., the single
enterprise theory).52 On the basis of the facts, particularly that

binding telex instructions had been sent by ICI to its subsidiary
and that ICI held all, or at least a majority of, its subsidiary's
stock, the Court concluded that ICI and its subsidiaries constituted a single economic unit.53 This single enterprise theory
appears to be an aberrant version of the corporate law "alter
ego" concept, which hinges not on legal criteria, but on economic considerations.54
Although circumventing the "effects" doctrine, the Court
reached the same conclusion with its single enterprise doctrine.
Moreover, the Court avoided major international reactions
against a broad extension of the extraterritorial jurisdiction
doctrines. The Court did not, however, reject the "effects" doctrine: it never formally considered it.
B. From "Continental Can" to "United Brands"
The European Commission, apparently sensing that it was
not worth the battle to press the "effects" doctrine when the
single enterprise doctrine would suffice, primarily applied this
latter theory in its 1971 Continental Can decision. 55 For pur51. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 8161, at 8056.
52. Id. at 8031.
If the subsidiary does not in fact have autonomy in determining its course
of conduct on the market, the prohibition of Article 85, paragraph 1, is
inapplicable to the relationship between it and the parent company, with
which it forms an economic unity. Since an affiliated group so structured
forms a unity, the parent company can, under certain circumstances, be
held responsible for the actions of the subsidiary. . . . Under these circumstances, the separation between parent firm and subsidiaries arising
out of the fact that each has a distinct legal personality does not prevent
their conduct on the market from being viewed as a unity for purposes of
the application of the rules of competition. For this reason, it is the
plaintiff that brought about the concerted practice within the Common
Market.
53. Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational:Lifting the Veil
in the European Economic Community and the United States, 6 L. & PoL'v INT'L Bus.
375 (1974).
54. For further discussion of the case, see Acevedo, The EEC Dyestuffs Case:
TerritorialJurisdiction,36 MoD. L. Rzv. 317 (1973); and Mann, note 43 supra.
55. For the Court of Justice decision, see [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8171; for the Commission decision, see [1970-1972 Transfer
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poses of finding jurisdiction, the Commission spent little time
analyzing the facts and concluded that, primarily because of
stock ownership, Continental Can controlled its subsidiary,
Europemballage, and accordingly, the behavior of the subsidiary could be imputed to the parent. The Advocate General
provided further elaboration by noting that Continental Can's
subsidiary did not display any autonomous behavior, nor did
it have any economic independence. This conclusion was
drawn partly from the fact that the funds for the acquisition
of a Dutch corporation were made available by Continental
Can. At the time that Continental Can caused Europemballage
to make an offer to purchase, the latter company was still not
fully organized.5" Moreover, the Advocate General justified jurisdiction on both the subjective and objective territorial principles, since certain conduct (i.e., the consummation of the
acquisition) had occurred within the EEC and the acts of the
enterprises involved had effects within the EEC. While affirming the single enterprise theory, the Court did use further language which would appear to indicate that even if Continental
Can did not have a "controlled" EEC subsidiary, jurisdiction
could have been exercised."?
In its 1972 decision against Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC), 55 another U.S. corporation, the Commission again
Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9481.
56. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. RP. (CCH) 8171, at 8284-85.
57. Id. at 8298.
Plaintiffs cannot deny that Europemballage, which was formed by
Continental on February 20, 1970, is a subsidiary of Continental. The fact
that the subsidiary has its own legal personality is not sufficient to rule
out the possibility that its conduct can be imputed to the parent company. This applies particularly where the subsidiary does not determine
its market conduct autonomously but in the main follows the instructions
of the parent company. . . . Such an acquisition, which affects market
conditions within the Community, is the type to which Community law
applies. The fact that Continental does not have its seat in the territory
of one of the Member States is not sufficient to remove this enterprise
from the application of Community law.
For further discussion of the case, see inter alia, Chandelle, Common MarketAntitrust-Use of Article 86 to Invalidate Mergers, 15 HARv. INT'L L. J. 333 (1974);
Hurwitz, The Impact of the Continental Can Case on Combinations and Concentrations Within the Common Market, 25 HASTINGs L. J. 469 (1974); Singley, Abuse of
a Dominant Position by Acquisition in the Common Market: The Continental Can
Cases, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1973); and Haubert, Continental Can-New
Strength for Common Market Anti-Trust, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 227 (1973).
58. Commercial Solvents Corporation Fine Announced, [1973-1975 Transfer
Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9543.
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based its decision on the single enterprise theory. The Commission relied upon the definition of controlled companies under
Italian company law and the fact that in its annual report the
Italian subsidiary was listed as belonging to CSC. The Commission apparently did not feel entirely comfortable with its
basis for linking CSC and its Italian subsidiary as one entity. 5
The twist in this case was that the Commission imputed the
liability of the parent to that of the subsidiary, which seems to
contradict the "nonautonomous behavior" test for the subsidiary.
On appeal to the Court of Justice, the Commission emphasized that CSC controlled its Italian subsidiary, "at least as
regards its relation with complainant."' 60 This emphasis appears to modify the single enterprise doctrine, requiring proof
relating to the single conduct in question, and not with respect
to the general activities of the parent and subsidiary. In
Commercial Solvents, the Advocate General attempted to
broaden even further the single enterprise theory by asserting
that:
there is a presumption that a subsidiary will act in accordance
with the wishes of its parent, because according to common experience subsidiaries generally do so act; . . . that unless that presumption is rebutted, it is proper for the parent and the subsidiary to be treated as a single undertaking for the purposes of
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty; and that the presumption
can be rebutted only if it is shown affirmatively, by those concerned to rebut it, that the subsidiary in fact conducted its business autonomously."

Such a presumption appears to place an insurmountable burden upon the defending parent and subsidiary corporations and
runs contrary to the traditional corporate law presumption that
related corporate entities are separate and distinct by virtue of
their respective corporate personalities.
59. Id. at 9215-5.
CSC holds the power of control over ICI [its Italian subsidiary] and
does, in fact, exercise that power, at least as far as relations with Zoja
[complainant corporation] are concerned in such a way that no distinction can be made between the will and the actions of CSC and those of
ICI. The CSC and ICI companies must, therefore, be treated as forming
a single undertaking or economic unit.
60. It should be noted that the Commission also, secondarily, relied on the
"effects" doctrine.
61. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Commission of the European Communities [19741 [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209, at 8827.
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As in ICI and Continental Can, the Court of Justice in
Commercial Solvents avoided any discussion of the "effects"
doctrine. The Court held that the conduct of CSC and its Italian subsidiary constituted a "united action" responsible for the
conduct complained of, and that the "entity" needed to be
proved only with regard to CSC and its subsidiary's relationship with the complainant. This assertion approximates the
Commission's position; however, the Court of Justice provided
no objective test for determining what constitutes a "united
action."62

The Commission has again recently applied the single enterprise doctrine in its decision against Hoffman-LaRoche
(LaRoche), the Swiss pharmaceutical company, for abuse of its
dominant position in the EEC as a supplier of vitamins.6 By
a fleeting reference, the Commission promptly based its jurisdiction on the fact that LaRoche had various subsidiaries
within the Community, through which LaRoche could be considered to have acted.
As indicated above, in its 1975 decision against UBC, the
Commission imposed a fine of one million units of account
against UBC for the abuse of dominant position that it holds
in the banana market within the EEC."4 Because UBC is a
highly integrated corporation whose operations are directed by
a central board of directors in New York, the Commission concluded that the EEC subsidiaries did not possess any real autonomy, but formed a single economic unit with UBC. The
facts in this case were perhaps the strongest of all preceding
cases in justifying the assertion of the single enterprise concept.
Moreover, unlike Commercial Solvents, the Commission decision held only the parent company liable. 5
I.

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

In its 1968 judgment in Parke Davis, the Court of Justice
62. For further discussion of the case, see Korah, Istituto ChemioterapicoItaliano
S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission of the European
Communities, 11 COMM. MKT. L. Rzv. 248 (1974).
63. Vitamin Maker Fined for Distortions of Competition, [19761 [1976-1978
Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 9853.
64. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800, at 9793.
65. For a discussion of the Commission decision, see Swan, The EEC United
Brands Decision: Can Chiquita Banana Find Happiness in Europe? 7 CAL. W. INT'L
L. J. 385 (1977).
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first delineated the essential elements for proving a violation
of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome: "The prohibited situation
therefore requires a combination of three elements: the existence of a dominant position; an improper exploitation of that
position; and the possibility that trade between Member States
may be affected thereby." 6 However, it has not been until
recent years that the Court has begun to develop a body of
jurisprudence respecting article 86.
A. Presence of a Dominant Position

Article 86 and related regulations of the Council of Ministers are silent as to what constitutes the presence of a dominant
position. Clearly, a dominant position may be something less
than outright monopoly; yet, it also appears that it must be
more than mere dominance in terms of market share."
From the Continental Can decision to the United Brands
decision, the Commission has remained persistent in its characterization of a dominant position." The Commission's primary emphasis is on "overall independence of behavior,"
which is based on a broad economic analysis of the given fact
situation.
The Court of Justice, in its various judgments centering
around article 86, has considered a number of criteria to be
significant in determining the existence of a dominant position.
Perhaps the most enduring theme of the Court was first articulated in the 1971 Deutsche-Grammophon case, wherein the
Court held that an enterprise is in a dominant position when
it is able "to prevent effective competition on an important
66. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, [1968] [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8054, at 7825.
67. See generally R. JOLET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

241 (1970); and D. McLACmHAN & D. SwANN, supra note 20, at 218-27.
68. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7736.
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power
to behave independently without taking into account, to any substantial
extent, their competitors, purchasers and suppliers. Such is the case
where an undertaking's market share, either in itself or when combined
with its know-how, access to raw materials, or capital enables it to determine the prices or to control the production or distribution of a significant
part of the relevant goods. It is not necessary for the undertaking to have
total dominance such as would deprive all other market participants of
their commercial freedom, so long as it is strong enough in general terms
to devise its own strategy as it wishes, even if there are differences in the
extent to which it dominates individual submarkets. (Emphasis added.)
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part of the relevant market."" In Continental Can, the Court
of Justice found dominance in a "relevant product market" to
be critical, which was the first instance in which the Court had
examined this criterion in any depth." In other cases (e.g.,
Suiker Unie) the Court placed primary focus upon the market
share of an enterprise within a relevant product market.
The most helpful and comprehensive enunciation by the
Court of Justice with respect to its concept of a dominant position is contained in the United Brands judgment:
The dominant position referred to in this article [86] relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave
to appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers. In general, a dominant position derives from a combination of several factors which, taken
separately, are not necessarily determinative. (Emphasis
added. )12

On the basis of the above synthesis made by the Court of Justice, in assessing whether an enterprise is in a dominant position within the Common Market, it is necessary to determine:
(1) the relevant product market, (2) the relevant geographic
market,13 and (3) the position of economic power such enterprise enjoys within the market. This latter requirement combines the Commission's notion of "independent behavior" with
the Court's early theme of "power to prevent effective competition." As evidenced by United Brands, the Court is establishing a sophisticated economic analysis on a case-by-case basis
in order to determine the existence of a dominant position.
1. Relevant Product Market
In the Continental Can judgment, the Court of Justice
decided against the Commission primarily for failure to clearly
define the "relevant product market." In this case the Commis69. Deutsche-Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmdrkte GmbH
& Co. K.G., [1971] [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8106, at
7193.
70. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8171, at 8301-2.
71. "Suiker Unie" (Cooperative Verenigning) UA v. Commission of the European
Communities [1975] [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

8334.

72. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7708.
73. Art. 86, note 12 supra. The criterion for establishing the relevant geographic
market is that the dominant position must be in the Common Market or "in a substantial part of it."
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sion declared a merger between a newly-formed, wholly-owned
Delaware subsidiary of Continental Can (Europemballage) and
a Dutch corporation (Thomassen) which produced metal and
other containers, to be an abuse of a dominant position. Europemballage was specifically created for the purpose of effecting
the merger. Continental Can also transferred its interest in an
85%-controlled German subsidiary (Schmalbach) to Europemballage. Schmalbach held between 80-90% of the German supply market for tins used for fish and shellfish, 70-80% in the
German market for meat cans, and between 50-55% in the
market for metal lids. The Commission determined that there
were three relevant product markets: (1) a "market for light
metal containers for canned meat products;" (2) a "market for
light metal containers for canned sea food;" and (3) a "market
for metal enclosures for the food packing industry, other than
crown corks." The Commission concluded that Continental
Can, through its subsidiaries, dominated each of these markets."
The Court of Justice stressed that:
the limits of the relevant market are of major importance, since
the possibilities for competition can only be judged on the basis
of the properties of the products in question, which are especially
suited for satisfying a continuing demand and appear to be
changeable with other products only to a small degree."

In this respect, the Court gave deference to the question of
"demand substitution," that is, the extent to which demand
may be satisfied by interchangeable products, such as glass
and plastic containers. However, in criticizing the Commission
for failing to "state in detail the peculiarities which distinguish
these three markets from one another and, therefore, necessitate their separate treatment, ' 76 the Court seemed more concerned with the possibility of "production substitution" than
"demand substitution." Production substitution essentially
arises when, with simple adjustments in the manner of production and/or supply, a producer of one product can produce and
supply products of the type in question or suitable substitutes
therefor.7 The Court held against the Commission primarily
74. [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9481, at 9032.
75. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171, at 8301.
76. Id.
77. For a general discussion of the economic implications of "production" and
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because the Commission had failed to prove that competitors
in other fields in the market for light metal containers could
not "by mere adaptation" enter into this market with sufficient
strength to form a serious counterweight. In effect, the Commission had not stated sufficiently why the alleged relevant
markets were separate and distinct from each other. 8 A better
factual showing by the Commission may well have changed the
day.
In the 1972 decision in Commercial Solvents,79 the Commission found that a group of companies controlled by Commercial Solvents enjoyed a worldwide monopoly in the production of a raw chemical used to produce an end drug product,
and that its denial of the raw chemical through its Italian
subsidiary to an Italian enterprise constituted an abuse of its
dominant position within the EEC. The Commission held that
both the raw chemical and the end drug product constituted
separate markets, and that Commercial Solvents held a dominant position in each of such markets. Commercial Solvents
contested this finding on appeal and asserted that no separate
markets existed, particularly as other raw chemicals could be
used, and were in fact being used, to produce the end product.
The Court of Justice was unimpressed with the arguments for
product substitution, as such adaptations had not been demonstrated on an industrial scale and would result in uneconomic
prices. With respect to the question of whether there were two
distinct markets, the Court decided that a dominant position
could exist in the market for the raw chemical without having
to take into consideration the market for the end product.N The
Advocate General had argued to no avail that the question of
the two markets could not logically be treated independently. 8
"demand" substitution, see P. SAMumsON, ECONOMICS, chs. 20, 22 (10th ed. 1976).
78. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171, at 8301-2.
79. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

9543.
80. [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209, at 8819.
[Ilt is in fact possible to distinguish the market in raw material necessary for the manufacture of a product in the market in which the product
is sold. An abuse of the dominant position on the market of raw materials
may thus have effects restricting competition in the market on which the
derivatives of the raw materials are sold, and the effects must be taken
into account in considering the effects of an infringement, even if the
market for the derivative does not constitute a self-contained market.
81. Id. at 8829.
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In its 1975 decision in General Motors,8" the Commission
evolved a strained definition of the relevant market. The Commission had alleged that General Motors of Belgium had violaed article 86 by charging excessive prices in a substantial part
of the Common Market for the issue of certificates and shields.
After inspecting Opel vehicles to check their conformity with
the generally approved type, and after determining identification of the vehicles and those registered abroad for no more
than six months, General Motors was required to issue the
certificates and shields under Belgian law. General Motors was
the sole authorized agent for Opel in Belgium. General Motors
countered that this inspecting function was ancillary to the
automobile market, that such activity did not constitute a separate market, and that by virtue of Belgian law, General Motors' ability to fix prices was sanctioned by the Belgian government. The Court held, however, that this legal monopoly, when
combined with the freedom to fix prices, led to a dominant
position, the function of inspecting the particular car brand
itself being the relevant market for purposes of article 86.13
In its 1976 decision in'Hoffman-LaRoche,"4 the Commission determined that the Swiss pharmaceutical company had

abused its dominant position with respect to each group of
thirteen vitamins available for sale within the Common Market. It considered each individual group of vitamins to constitute a distinct product market inasmuch as each group was
"particularly suited to satisfy stable requirements and [was]
not, or at least not to any significant extent, interchangeable
with any other group or with any other products.""5 Here the
[I] do not think that the question whether the market for the raw materials for the production of a particular compound is a relevant market can,
logically, be divorced from the question of whether the market for that
compound is a relevant one. The consumer, after all, is interested only
in the end product, and it is detriment to the consumer, whether direct
or indirect, with which Article 86 is concerned.. . . So it was legitimate,
in my opinion, for CSC to seek . . .to establish that the market for
ethambutol was but one of a number of interchangeable antipulmancry
tuberculosis drugs.
82. General Motors Fined for Monopoly Practices, [1974] [1973-1975 Transfer
Binder, New Developments] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9705.
83. General Motors Continental N.V. v. Commission of the European Communities [1975] [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320.
84. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9853.
85. Id. at 9875-11.
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Commission focused on the possibility of demand substitution.
In United Brands, the Commission asserted that the relevant market was bananas. UBC countered that the relevant
market was the fruit market in general. The Commission based
its arguments on the relevant market primarily upon research
conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization in parts
of France, Germany, and England. 86 This study demonstrated
that the prices and availabilities of other fruits had little impact on the prices and availabilities of bananas and that this
finding was applicable not only to year-round fruits (e.g., oranges and apples), but also to many seasonal fruits. The Commission concluded that "the effects of the prices and availabilities of other types of fruits [were] too brief, too ineffective and
too sporadic, applying to different fruit in different places, for
such other fruit to be regarded as forming part of the same
market as bananas or as a substitute therefor. ' '87 The Commission also emphasized that bananas form a significant part of
the diets of certain consumer sectors, such as the very young,
the sick, and the elderly. In effect, the Commission concluded
that the choice of bananas is "a matter of customer preference,
and customers do not readily accept other fruits as a substitute."8 The Court of Justice supported the Commission's position.
In considering whether the banana was in fact interchangeable with other fruit products, the Court of Justice considered such factors as the production of bananas over the
course of the year, possible cross-elasticity of demand (i.e., the
degree to which the relevant demand for the product responds
to changes in the price of each relative to the price of the other),
the physical characteristics of the banana distinguishing it
from other fruits, and the composition of consumer sectors.
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that there was a
small degree of "substitutionability," that there was a relatively consistent consumer demand for bananas, which could
be satisfied by UBC throughout the course of the year, and that
86. FAO Commodity Policy Studies, Demand Interrelationships between Major
Fruits, No. 19, Rome 1969; Competition between Bananas and Summer Fruits: Preliminary Case Studies, CCP BA 73/8, July 1973.
87. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800, at 9785.

88. Id.
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a large number of consumers could not be "enticed away from
the consumption of this product by the arrival of fresh fruit on
the market, even when the seasonal peak periods affected it for
a limited period of time." Accordingly, the Court held that the
banana market was in fact the relevant market, inasmuch as
it was "sufficiently homogeneous and distinct from the market
'
for other fresh fruits. 89

2. Relevant GeographicMarket
In determining the relevant geographic market, the Court
of Justice stated in Suiker Unie:
For the purpose of determining whether a specific territory is
large enough to amount to 'a substantial part of the common
market' within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty the pattern and volume of the production and consumption of the said
product as well as the habits and economic opportunities of vendors and purchasers must be considered."

In this case, the Court held that the Belgo-Luxembourg sugar
market constituted a "substantial part" of the Community. In
so concluding, the Court analyzed the increased production in
this market between 1969 and 1972 and its increased percentage share in comparision with the overall Community market.
By use of these same criteria, the Court also held Holland and
the southern part of Germany each to constitute a "substantial
part" of the Community. Thus, the determination rests not
only upon the extent of the geographical area, but also upon
the product market in that area and the relationship of that
product market to that of the entire Community market."
In United Brands, the Commission found that Germany,
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium-Luxembourg
comprised the relevant geographic market within which it was
necessary to consider whether UBC had the power to hinder
effective competition. The Commission was of the view that
the "[elconomic conditions in this part of the Community
allow importer/distributors to carry on their trade in bananas
normally and there are no noticeable economic obstacles in the
way of UBC as compared with other importer/distributors."2
89. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

8429, at 7705.

90. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8214.
91. For a discussion of the case, see Gijlstra and Murphy, Some Observations on
the Sugar Cases, 14 COMM. MKT. L. Ray. 45 (1977).
92. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800, at 9785.

1979

UNITED BRANDS

The Commission asserted that the whole structure of UBC's
European operations, with concentration on its Dutch subsidiary, was geared to the marketing of its bananas in a single
center for the whole of that part of the Community. The other
Member States of the Community (i.e., France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom) were excluded from this geographic market,
notwithstanding the significant economic presence of UBC (or
its affiliate) in these countries, because of the special circumstances pertaining to import arrangements and trading conditions and the fact that bananas of various types and origins
3
were sold in those countries.
UBC countered that the Commission should have more
clearly determined the geographic market because of the differences in conditions of competition in the Member countries
within the alleged geographic market (e.g., differences in systems of customs duties and consumer habits). The Court, conceding that such differences existed with respect to applicable
tariffs and transportation costs, concluded that the conditions
of competition within the countries comprising this relevant
market were "sufficiently harmonious" to be considered in
their entirety, and therefore, a relevant geographic market for
purposes of article 86.11
3. Economic Power
An analysis of the economic position enjoyed by an enterprise within a relevant market usually commences with a quantitative analysis, particularly with respect to the market share.
For example, in Suiker Unie, the Court focused on the fact that
the leading Belgian producer of sugar accounted in prices for
85% of Belgian production. However, the Court noted that
while this figure is "highly significant," it must still be
"evaluated in light of the negligible volume of sugar imports in
Belgium." As a result of all the circumstances, the producer
enjoyed sufficient economic power "to impede effective competition" on the market in question, and consequently, during the
relevant period, occupied a dominant position on this market. 9
In United Brands, the Commission concluded that there
was sufficient economic power enjoyed by UBC to constitute
93. Id. at 9785-86.
94. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7706-7.
95. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8215.
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a dominant position. This determination was based on a series
of factors which, when taken together, produced "a degree of
overall independence in its behavior on the market in question
which enable[d] it to hinder effective competition within this
part of the Community."' 6 These factors included the market
share compared with that of its competitors, the diversity of its
sources of suppliers, the harmonious nature of its products, the
organization of UBC's production and transportation systems,
UBC's marketing system and publicity campaigns, the diversified nature of UBC operations, and most significantly, UBC's
overall vertical integration. UBC denied this conclusion as unsupported by any evidence. UBC asserted that an objective
evaluation of its structure and the relevant market conditions
would indicate that
it was not in a dominant position in a
7
relevant market.9

The Court of Justice analyzed UBC's market position from
two perspectives: first, UBC's internal operating structure, and
second, the competitive situation within the market. In considering the high degree of vertical integration of UBC at all stages
(i.e., producing, packaging, transporting, selling, and displaying), the Court concluded that UBC had firm control over the
economic destiny of the product. The Court of Justice next
considered the impact on competition within the relevant market. The fact that UBC's share of the relevant market was
always more than 40% and nearer 45% was significant, but did
not automatically infer that UBC dominated this market. In
addition to market share, the Court felt it necessary to consider
the strength and number of competitors. UBC's share of the
market was seven times greater than its closest competitors,
with all other competitors falling far behind. The Court interjected temporal considerations (which may in future cases
evolve as a separate criterion), by observing that, while there
were certain periods when competition was enhanced, these
periods were limited both in time and space. Moreover, the
Court stressed that UBC's overall economic strength permitted
it the flexibility to direct strategy against new competitors
within the market, which provided additional obstacles to the
existing practical barriers for the entry of new competition
96. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM.
9800, at 9787.
97. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7708.
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(e.g., large capital expenditures). 8
UBC raised two objections concerning this issue, namely
that its other competitors were able to use the same methods
of production and distribution if they so chose, and that UBC
had suffered financial losses in its banana division for a fiveyear period from 1971 to 1976. To the first objection, the Court
responded that none of UBC's competitors were able to use the
same methods as they "came up against almost insuperable
practical and financial obstacles." With respect to the latter
objection, the Court noted that an undertaking's economic
strength "is not measured by its profitability." On the basis of
this total economic analysis of UBC's structure and its situation with respect to the relevant market, the Court held that
the "cumulative effect of all the advantages enjoyed by UBC
thus ensures that it has a dominant position on the relevant
market."'
B.

Abusive Practices
In the United Brands judgment, the Court of Justice was
concerned primarily with four alleged abuses of article 86:
(i) restrictions on the resale of green bananas;
(ii) refusal to continue to supply a longstanding customer;
(iii) discriminatory pricing; and
(iv) unfair pricing. m
Under the terms of article 86, the mere presence and enjoyment of a dominant position is not in and of itself prohibited.
What is prohibited is the abuse or the improper exploitation of
the position. 0' In this sense, article 86 is neutral with respect
to the matter of size. 02 However, article 86(2) does set forth
certain broad, illustrative types of activities which would constitute an abuse. Such abusive activities include: imposing
unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; limiting production, markets, or technical development;
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions; and
98. Id. at 7708-11.
99. Id. at 7711.
100. Note 34 supra.
101. Treaty of Rome, Art. 86, note 12 supra.
102. See generally European Commission, Annual Report on Competition Policy,
issued annually since 1971.
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making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance of
supplementary obligations which have no connection with the
subject of the contracts. 03 These criteria indicate that they
apply "not only to practices that are likely to cause an immediate detriment for consumers, but also to practices which, because of their effect on the structure of actual competition...
are harmful to them [consumers]."'0 " Moreover, while these
categories of activities do not purport to be exhaustive, they are
sufficiently broad that most activities (including the alleged
abuses in United Brands) which could be determined to be
abusive would fall within one of these four categories. 05
"[Tihe restrictions of competition, which the Treaty permits
under certain circumstances because the various Treaty objectives must be reconciled, find a limit in the requirements of
Articles 2 and 3, beyond which there is a danger that a weakening of competition would be contrary to the goals of the Common Market."''0 Therefore, irrespective of any specific classification of an activity, every alleged "abusive exploitation"
under article 86 must be tested objectively, regardless of any
consideration of fault.
1. Prohibitionson Resale
In United Brands the Commission specifically objected to
UBC's above-mentioned conditions of sale to its distributor/
ripeners.10 7 These general conditions had been in effect
since 1967, although not always in writing. In January 1976,
UBC circulated a letter to all its established customers to the
effect that these general conditions were not intended to forbid
the sale by a duly appointed ripener to another Chiquita ripener of green Chiquita bananas or the resale of unbranded green
bananas. 0 1 The Court of Justice, however, rejected UBC's position and upheld the Commission's order to cease the prohibition on resale.'0 The Court viewed this general condition of sale
103. The text of article 86(2) is quoted at note 12 supra.
104. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rzp. (CCH) 8171, at 8300.
105. See Samkalden and Druker, Legal Problems Relating to Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome, 3 COMM. MKT. L. Rav. 158, at 176 (1965).
106. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rap. (CCH) 8171, at 8299.
107. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7668.
108. Id. at 7769.
109. Id. at 7713.
Although it is commendable and lawful to pursue a policy of quality...
such a practice can be justified only if it does not raise obstacles whose
effect goes beyond the objective to be obtained. In this case, . . . the
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in a similar manner as it would a prohibition of exports."'0
2. Refusal to Continue Supplies
The Commission also concluded that UBC's refusal to continue supplies to Olesen could not be justified objectively and
was an arbitrary interference in the management of Olesen's
business, which had caused it to suffer damage and which was
designed to dissuade UBC's ripeners from selling bananas
bearing competing brand names or at least from advertising
them. The Commission viewed these facts as tantamount to a
violation of article 86.' UBC endeavored to justify their refusal
to sell because of Olesen's dealings with UBC's primary competitor. Moreover, UBC contended that the refusal did not
constitute an abuse inasmuch as it did not affect the actual
competition on the Danish market and did not affect trade
between Member States."' 2 The Court of Justice was not impressed with UBC's argument:
[An undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of
marketing a product-which cashes in on the reputation of a
brand name known and valued by the consumers-cannot stop
supplying a long-standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice, if the orders placed by the customer are in no
way out of the ordinary. Such conduct is inconsistent with the
objectives laid down in

. .

.the Treaty [of Rome] . . .since the

refusal to sell would limit markets to the prejudice of consumers
and would amount to discrimination which might in the end
eliminate a trading party from the relevant market. .

.

.Such a

course of conduct amounts therefore to a serious interference with
the independence of small or medium sized firms in their commercial relations with the undertaking in a dominant position
prohibition on resale imposed upon duly appointed 'Chiquita' ripeners
and the prohibition on the resale of unbranded bananas ... are without
any doubt an abuse of the dominant position since they limit markets to
the prejudice of consumers and affect trade between Member States, in
particular by partitioning national makets. Thus, UBC's organization of
the market confined the ripeners to the role of suppliers of the local
market and prevented them from developing their capacity to trade visA-vis UBC.
110. Id. at 7711. "Apart from the fact that this obligation indirectly helps to
strengthen and consolidate UBC's dominant position, it makes any trade in UBC's
green bananas, whether branded or not, either within a single State or between Member States, almost impossible."
111. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800, at 9790.
112. [19781 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) .8429, at 7714.
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and this independence implies the right to give preference to
competitor's goods.'"

The applicant also argued that in view of a 40% fall in the price
of bananas on the Dutch market in the latter two weeks of 1974
that competition had not been affected by the refusal to supply
Olesen. The Court of Justice dismissed this contention, finding
that this fall in prices was attributable to the lively competition in which UBC and Castle & Cook were engaged. The Court
also found that it was immaterial whether this behavior on the
part of UBC related to trade between Member States "once it
[had] been shown that such elimination [would] have repercussions on the terms of competition in the Common Mar4
ket."1
The Court of Justice in Commercial Solvents had previously made clear that if an enterprise in a dominant position
with respect to the supply of goods to its customers in fact
competes with its customers, it cannot act in such a manner
as to eliminate or impair competition, whether by a refusal to
supply or by other discriminatory means."' If there is a refusal
to supply regular customers, the dominant enterprise must justify objectively such refusal. In all events, the refusal to supply
a longstanding customer who purchases with a view to reselling
to another Member State is deemed by the Court of Justice to
have "an appreciable effect" on trade between Member States,
and therefore, the refusal is violative of article 86.
3. Discriminatoryand Unfair Pricing
The most significant aspect of United Brands with respect
to the determination of abuse of a dominant position centers
around UBC's pricing practices, particularly whether these
practices were discriminatory and/or unfair.
In determining whether UBC's pricing practices were discriminatory, the Commission concluded: "For an undertaking
in a dominant position, a policy of systematically setting prices
at the highest possible level, resulting in wide price differences,
cannot be objectively justified, particularly where that undertaking maintains market segregation.""' In reaching this con113. Id.
114. Id. at 7715.
115. [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209, at 8819.
116. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800, at 9788.
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clusion, the Commission utilized the same test previously suggested by the Court of Justice in Deutsche-Grammophon,
which was an analysis of price differences for the same products
in different Member States." 7
UBC countered that its prices were determined by market
forces and therefore were not discriminatory. Moreover, UBC
asserted that the average difference in the price of Chiquita
bananas between the various markets in question was only 5%
in 1975. Prices were calculated in any given week in order to
reflect as much as possible the anticipated yellow market price
of the following week for each national market. UBC insisted
that so long as the Community had not set up institutions and
machinery for a single banana market, the various markets
would remain national and would respond to a variety of distinctive factors." 8
The Court of Justice agreed with the Commission that the
policy of differing prices enabled UBC to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage. The Court
recognized that because of the lack of a Community market,
price differentials may legitimately arise; however, the Court
appears to suggest that the dominant firm must be able to
justify price differentials between national markets. Accordingly, while conceding that the responsibility for establishing
a single banana market did not rest with UBC, the Court
stressed that UBC's pricing practices must comply with the
rules and regulations and coordination of the market laid down
by the Treaty of Rome. Therefore, once the differences in such
matters as transportation costs, taxation, customs duties,
wages, differences in parity of currency, and the density of
competition have been assessed and taken into account, the
Treaty of Rome would require UBC to exercise responsibility
toward consumers with respect to the final pricing."'
The Court of Justice derived from the facts that UBC did
impose its selling price on the intermediate purchaser and that
these discriminatory prices, which varied according to the circumstances of the Member States, constituted "many obsta117. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8106, at 7193.
118. [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7716-17.
119. Id. at 7717.
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cles to the free movement of goods and were intensified by the
clause forbidding the resale of bananas while still green and
reducing the deliveries of the quantities ordered." 120 The Court
concluded that UBC's pricing policy amounted to a "rigid partitioning of national markets . . .at price levels which were

artifically different, placing certain distributor/ripeners at a
competitive disadvantage." Such practice was an abuse of a
dominant position for purposes of article 86.121
The point on which the Commission and Court differed
concerned whether the prices charged by UBC to its customers
in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the BelgoLuxembourg area were unfair. In General Motors, the Court
had proposed a test of price unfairness based on the relationship of the price to the economic values of the services provided, particularly when the effect was to curb parallel imports
by neutralizing the possibility of more favorable price levels as
applied in other sales areas of the Community. 2 The Commission felt that UBC's pricing practices met this test; however,
the Court of Justice, in applying the General Motors test, rejected the Commission's view, and annulled that part of the
Commission's decision which found that UBC had imposed
unfair prices for the sale of its bananas.
The Court of Justice did not disagree with the legal arguments of the Commission. However, the Court found that the
Commission had failed to produce "adequate legal proof of the
facts and evaluation which form the foundation of its findings
that UBC had infringed Article 86 of the Treaty by directly and
indirectly imposing unfair selling prices for bananas."'" The
Court specifically criticized the Commission for its failure to
analyze UBC's cost structure, which made it impossible for a
proper analysis of differentials in profit margins. The Court felt
that the Commission was at least under a duty to require UBC
to produce particulars of all the constituent elements of its
production cost and not simply to base its view of excessive
prices on an analysis of the differences between prices charged
in the different Member States. The Court was particularly
unimpressed by the comparisons between prices charged in the
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.

[1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
[19781 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7719.

8320, at 7735.
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Irish market (which were the lowest) and those charged in other
parts of the Community. Consequently, the Court held that the
burden of proof of showing unfair prices rested with the Commission and that the Commission had failed to meet this burden.'

24

C. Effect on Trade Between Member States
The requirement of article 86 that the abuse of the dominant position be apt to "affect trade between Member States"
is analogous to that requirement contained in article 85(1).
Under article 85(1) the Court of Justice has deemed trade between Member States to be affected whenever the restrictive
practice may impair, directly or indirectly, potentially or actually, the realization of the unified Common Market.' Paradoxically, a practice may in fact increase trade between Member States, yet also be deemed a restrictive agreement for purposes of article 85(1) because the actual or potential effect upon
trade between the Member States does not necessarily have to
be prima facie adverse.'25 These applications of principles
under article 85(1) would appear to be equally apropos for purposes of article 86.1'2

Both the Commission and the Court of Justice have generally had little difficulty in interpreting the facts of a given
case as meeting this requirement of article 86. The only major
qualification had been the application of a de minimis rule
which requires that trade between Member States be "appreciably" affected by the agreement or act in question.' '5 In
United Brands, the Commission determined that UBC's
124. Id,
125. See, e.g., S. A. Cadillon v. Firma H6ss Maschinenbau K.G., [19711 [19711973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135, at 7542.
126. See, e.g., Consten and Grundig v. Commission of the European Communities, [1966] [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM MKT. RFP. (CCH) 8046.
127. Cf. [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.REP. (CCH) 8209, at 8821.
When an undertaking in a dominant position within the Common Market
abusively exploits its position in such a way that a competitor in the
Common Market is likely to be eliminated, it does not matter whether
the conduct relates to the latter's exports or its trade within the Common

Market, once it has been established that this elimination will have repercussions on the competitive structure within the Common Market.
Here, the Court of Justice appears to be equating possible repercussions with the
possibility of effect on trade between Member States.
128. See, e.g., European Commission, Guidelines to Promote Cooperation between Firms, [1970] [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9367.
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dominant position was capable of affecting trade between
Member States to an appreciable extent as follows:
(i) the prohibition on the resale of green bananas impeded
trade between distributor/ripeners in different Member States
and deflected the flow of trade from its normal course;
(ii) the refusal to supply a longstanding customer who purchased with a view toward reselling in another Community
state limited markets and could have eliminated a trading
party from the relevant market;
(iii) the application of dissimilar prices for equivalent
transactions was liable to encourage or discourage the export
of those bananas from one Member State to another according
to the different price levels in the various Member States; and
(iv) the imposition of unfair prices on customers in certain
Member States was liable to affect the quantities of Chiquita
bananas traded between Member States, in that it encouraged
export from Member States where such unfair prices were not
opposed and vice versa.'2 9
The rationale used by the Commission with respect to
points three and four above is difficult to accept, because such
conduct would in fact produce a beneficial effect on trade between the Member States. Such considerations, however, do
not appear to be relevant, as the Court of Justice sustained the
Commission's findings on point three above and would most
likely have sustained the finding with respect to the effect on
trade between Member States as to number four if the Commission had met its burden of proof in showing unfair prices.' 3
The Court of Justice also concurred with the Commission on
point one above because this prohibition was capable of affecting trade between Member States and dividing up national
markets'"' and on point two because this had an influence on
the normal movement of trade and an appreciable effect on
trade between Member States. 32 When there is evidence of
actual harmful effect on the market, as was the case in United
Brands, any consideration of possible beneficial effect is appar129. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800, at 9790.
130. [19781 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7717.
131. Id. at 7713.
132. Id. at 7715.
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ently precluded. The emphasis of both the Commission and the
Court of Justice is, therefore, directed toward the potentiality
of a harmful effect brought about by abusive exploitation of a
dominant position on the market. The factual situation of
United Brands provided the Commission and Court with an
opportunity to find both a dominant position and an abuse of
that position.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Article 86 will undoubtedly continue to be a fertile device
for the European Commission in attacking the activities of
dominant corportions doing business within the Community,
whether such corporations are based within the EEC or outside. The European Court of Justice appears to appreciate the
legal and economic potential of article 86 and has shown itself
substantially in agreement with the Commission with respect
to the legal analysis of this article. However, the Court of Justice appears to be signalling the Commission to take a more
careful and detailed approach in developing and proving its
allegations.
This writer does not view the differences between the
Court of Justice and the Commission as a significant clash in
basic legal or economic antitrust philosophies, nor does he believe that such differences will have a long term effect upon the
energetic institution of cases under article 86 by the Commission. The agressiveness of the Commission will, however, most
likely be tempered by the requirement of the strict, analytical
proof of facts required by the Court of Justice.
With respect to the question of the extraterritorial application of the EEC antitrust laws, it appears that for the moment
both the Commission and the Court of Justice will continue to
favor the "single enterprise" theory over any embrace of the
"effects" doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although one
can argue the legal consistency of the "single enterprise" doctrine, and particularly its refinement into the "unity of action"
doctrine, there is little doubt that the Commission will continue to act with confidence against foreign multinationals acting through EEC subsidiaries in situations in which the Commission feels there is a violation of either Articles 85 or 86 of
the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, it appears clear that the Court
of Justice will uphold such an extension of jurisdiction both on
the basis of its interpretation of articles 85 and 86 and of its
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overall view of the legal personality of the Community. Given
a fact situation that does not accommodate the "single enterprise" theory, it is most likely that the Commission will once
again resurrect its "effects" doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and if necessary, press for a clear resolution of the matter
before the Court of Justice.

Management Services Agreements with a
Foreign Parent Corporation and the Income
Source Determination Rules
JOHN

L.

RUPPERT*

INTRODUCTION

With the proliferation of multinational brother-sister,'
parent-subsidiary, 2 and other "related groups" 3 of corporations, numerous provisions of the Internal Revenue Code have
increasingly become traps for the unwary corporate taxpayer.,
One area in particular that may be the subject of future scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service is the interrelationship
between the income source determination rules of sections 861
through 8641 and the withholding at the source requirements of
* Member Colorado Bar. B.A., Northwestern University (1975); J.D., University
of Denver (1978). Editor-in-Chief, DENVER LAW JOURNAL (1977-1978).
1. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(A), (B). Brother-sister corporations are two or more corporations in which five or fewer persons own stock possessing (a) 80 percent of the voting
power or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of a corporation,
and (b) more than 50 percent of the combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote, or more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of
stock, taking ownership into account only to the extent it is identical with respect to
each corporation. For specific examples of the brother-sister relationship see Treas.
Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3)(ii), examples (1)-(2) (1976).
2. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1)(A), (B). A parent-subsidiary relationship is one or more
chains of corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent if (a)
the 80 percent ownership of voting stock or 80 percent total value requirements are
met, and (b) the common parent meets the same two tests for at least one of the other
corporations. For specific examples of the parent-subsidiary relationship see Treas.
Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(2)(ii), examples (1)-(4) (1976).
3. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(3). A combined group of corporations is three or more corporations each of which is a member of a group of corporations described supra notes 1-2
and one of which is a common parent corporation in a group of corporations described
supra note 2 and also is included in a group of corporations described supra note 1.
For examples of such a relationship see Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(4)(ii), examples (1)(2) (1976).
4. In the last 20 years, the area of foreign tax has mushroomed. For a discussion
of recent trends in this field see generally Brantner, Taxation and the Multinational
Firm, 65 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNrTINo 11 (1973); Hammer, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Corporationsand Nonresident Aliens, 29 So. CAL. TAx INST. 89 (1975); Kragen, Avoidance
of InternationalDouble Taxation Arising From Section 482 Reallocations, 60 CAL. L.
REv. 1493 (1972); Lundy, A Review of US. System of Taxation on Foreign Income of
Corporationsand Subsidiaries, 160 N.Y.L.J. 34 (1973); Sherfy, Recent Changes and
New Considerationsin the International Tax Area, 53 TAxms 857 (1975); Tillinghast,
United States Income Taxation of Foreign Source Income: A Survey of the Provisions
and Problems, 29 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAx. 1 (1971).
5. I.R.C. §§ 861-864. These income source determination provisions of the Code
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sections 1441 and 1442.1 "Management fees" agreements present, perhaps, the best example of the potentially difficult problems that these provisions may create for related business entities.
As a starting point, the basic premise of the Code is that
a foreign parent corporation, not engaged in a United States
trade or business, is nonetheless subject to a flat thirty percent
tax on only its United States source fixed or determinable income.7 Consequently, such factors as the source of an item of
income, the nature of the income item, and the very structure
of the "management services" agreement that gave rise to the
income item are of concern to both the parent corporation and
its subsidiary for purposes of avoiding or mitigating unanticipated and often disastrous double taxation.
The potential for such double taxation is simply demonstrated by the following example. The receipt of management
services fees by the foreign parent will constitute gross income
to the parent and as such will be subject to income tax liability
in the foreign state.' Simultaneously, the domestic subsidiary
constitute an exclusive three-tier classification system for allocating items of income
to particular sources. These provisions play the primary role in determining what
income of a foreign corporation will be subject to United States income tax liability.
For a general discussion of the impact of these provisions in the foreign tax area see
generally Hammer, supra note 4; Lundy, supra note 4; White, InternationalTax Planning with U.S. Source Rules, 51 TAxEs 211 (1973).
6. I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442. These withholding at the source provisions are the principal method of enforcing the United States tax liability of foreign taxpayers not engaged
in a trade or business within the United States. For further discussion of these
provisions see Sitrick, New Rules on Withholding Payment of Tax on U.S. Income of
Foreign Taxpayers, 28 J. TAX. 110 (1968).
7. I.R.C. § 881 imposes a tax on income of foreign corporations not connected with
a United States business at a flat rate of 30 percent. Tress. Reg. § 1.881-2(a)(3) (1976)
expressly states that deductions shall not be allowed in determining the amount subject to tax under section 881. In contrast, a foreign corporation engaged in a United
States trade or business, but not having a United States office, is taxed only on its
United States source income but at two different rates: 30 percent on its gross income
from sources not effectively connected with its United States trade or business (I.R.C.
§ 881(a)), and at the regular corporate rates on that income effectively connected to
its United States trade or business (I.R.C. §§ 882, 864(c)(3)). Finally, foreign corporations engaged in a United States trade or business having a United States office are
taxed the same as foreign corporations engaged in a United States trade or business
without a United States office except that certain foreign source effectively connected
income, as defined in I.R.C. §§ 864(c) and 882, is taxed at domestic corporate rates
(I.R.C. § 882).
8. Were the foreign parent corporation a domestic corporation, it is unquestioned
that management fee income would constitute gross income to the entity. I.R.C. § 61
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(payer) corporation would be entitled to an "ordinary and necessary" business deduction for such management fees on its
United States income tax return.' If management fees constitute the foreign parent's only income from sources outside its
state of incorporation, a successful allocation of such services
to sources wholly outside the United States will preclude the
parent from incurring any United States tax liability. Assuming that no other income from United States operations was
earned by the foreign parent during the taxable year, 0 the
foreign parent may decide that no United States tax return
need be filed." As a result of the foreign parent's decision not
to file a return, the three-year statute of limitations of section
6501(a)' 2 would be inapplicable, and pursuant to section
provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all
income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following
items: (1) compensation for services, including fees." (Emphasis added.) For further
discussion see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a) (1976). As an example of how a foreign state
would treat income from sources outside its boundaries earned by a resident corporation see Canadian Income Tax Act, Can. Stat., An Act to Amend the Income Tax
Act, c. 63, § 126(2), 126(6), 126(7) (1971).
9. Management fee expenses have been held to be deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under I.R.C. § 162. See American Sa,!ings Bank, 56 T.C.
828, 842-43 (1971); United States Freight Co. & Subsid. v. United States, 70-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9244 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Preston Wilson, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 676 (1961).
10. Unless the corporation falls into the class of foreign businesses not engaged in
a United States trade or business, the foreign entity will be subject to the same tax
rates as would a domestic corporation on its effectively connected income. See I.R.C.
99 864(c), 882. See also note 7 supra. For a more detailed discussion of this concept
see R. RHOADES, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS §§ 2.21-.40 (rev.
ed. 1977).
11. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) requires that "every corporation subject to taxation under
subtitle A" must file an income tax return for the taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.60122(g) (1976) elaborates on this mandate by stating that every foreign corporation which
is engaged in a trade or business in the United States or which has become subject to
taxation under subtitle A must file a return. Subsection (2) of the regulation creates
an exception to the obligation to file a return when the foreign corporation, not engaged
in a United States trade or business, has its tax liability satisfied by withholding of
tax at the source by one so obligated under I.R.C. §§ 1441 and 1442. Even nonresident
foreign corporations are required to file returns for all of their I.R.C. § 881(a) income.
If the foreign taxpayer should determine that because it received no I.R.C. § 881(a)
income for the taxable year, it need not file a return, the entity may have a return
calculated and filed for it by the Revenue Service. See I.R.C. § 6020. As an example
of the Service's power to file a return for a foreign corporation that failed to file a return
see Cantrell & Cochrane, Ltd. v. Shea, 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
12. I.R.C. § 6501(a) prescribes a general three-year statute of limitations starting
on the date the return was filed, or actually due, whichever is later, in the absence of
fraud or failure to file a return. See generally 10 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 57.01 et seq. (rev. ed. 1971).
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6501(c)(3) tax may be assessed or a proceeding in court for the
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment at any
time. 3 Should the Service subsequently be successful in classifying the management fees as United States source income,
pursuant to sections 1461 and 7501, the payer-subsidiary would
be personally liable for a tax deficiency in the amount of thirty
percent of the total management fees paid." In effect, the related corporations will be taxed twice on the same management
fees income, i.e., once in the parent's home and once in the
subsidiary's. Other potential concerns such as section 482 reallocations,"6 denials of excessive deductions,"6 or constructive
13. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3). Two interesting questions arise at this point: (1) Where
does the burden of proof lie, and (2) how does the Service compel production of
documents? If the corporate taxpayer fails to file a return, must the Service shoulder
the burden of proving that a return should have been filed, or must the taxpayer refute
the correctness of the Service's assessment? For a general discussion see United States
v. Lease, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9478, at 96,127 (2d Cir. 1965), where the Second Circuit
held that the Service had the burden of coming forward and persuading the trier of
fact that the taxpayer had a tax liability. As for the production of documents question
see I.R.C. § 7602. See also Matter of Daniels, 56.1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9451 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). See Bartlett, Authority of the United States Internal Revenue Service to Obtain
InformationSolely to Aid Foreign Tax Authorities: United States-CanadaTax Treaty,
28 BULL. INT'L FiscAL DOCUMENTATION 497 (1974).
14. I.R.C. § 1442 imposes a withholding at the source tax of 30 percent on United
States source income earned by a foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 7501 provides that any
person required to withhold internal revenue tax from any person shall hold such
monies in a special trust fund. The amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected,
and paid in the same manner, and subject to the same requirements, as are applicable
with respect to the taxes from which such fund arises. Id. I.R.C. § 1461 states that
every person required to withhold taxes is liable for such tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.1461-3(b)
(1976) states that for failure to pay the withheld tax to the Service, the withholding
agent may be subject to penalties under I.R.C. §§ 6653, 7502. In addition, the withholding agent may be subject to penalties under I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6656, and 7203 for
failure to file a return, for willful failure to file a return, and for failing to make a timely
deposit of taxes withheld, respectively.
15. I.R.C. § 482. For a good discussion of the impact of section 482 in the multinational corporate context see Barnett, Recent Developments in Allocation of Income,
46 FLA. B.J. 607 (1972); Brown, Canada-United States Tax Relations Problems, 28
TAX. EXEC. 1 (1975); Delise, Section 482 Allocations of Income to Stockholders for
Services Rendered to Closely Held Corporations, 1972 UTAH L. Rxv. 491; Kauder,
InternationalAllocations of Income: Problems of Administration and Compliance, 9
J. INT'L LAw & ECON. 1 (1974); Kragen, supra note 4; McGowan, Taxation of the
Multinational, 22 R.I.B.J. 4 (1973); Wolpe, When and How Section 482 Is Applied, 6
PRAc. AccT. 37 (1973); Note, Section 482-Internal Revenue Code-Burden of Proof:
Arm's Length Dealing, 25 BAYLOR L. Rev. 392 (1973); Note, New Developments In
Allocation of Income Among Commonly Controlled Entities Under Section 482, 57
MINN. L. REv. 559 (1973); Note, Allocation-Section 482, 4 RUTr.-CsAM. L.J. 445 (1973).
16. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business, including
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dividend treatment,' 7 which may present additional and related taxation difficulties, are beyond the scope of this paper.
This article will attempt to examine the interaction of the
source determination rules of sections 861 through 863 and the
withholding at the source requirements of sections 1441 and
1442 in the specific setting of a management services agreement between a foreign parent corporation' s and its domestic, 9
American subsidiary. Because the United States-Canadian
Income Tax Treaty 0 is generally representative of United
States income tax treaties as a class, its analogous income
source determination provisions will be examined also in some
detail. The primary purpose of this article will be to analyze
the aforementioned statutory provisions in light of the relevant
case law, revenue rulings, and treaty provisions. In addition,
those procedures which may assist the taxpayer in supporting
a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (1976). For an in-depth analysis of the reasonable compensation issue see [1977] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1370-1370.06. Cf.
Fogg, How to Apply the Current Rules to Increase Deductions for ProfessionalFees,
18 TAX Acer. 352 (1977) (discussion of analagous payments: startup expenses, computer software expenses, and appraisal fees).
17. Especially in the area of related or controlled corporations' dividend payments in the guise of compensation for services rendered may be recast by the Service
as constructive dividends pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 301, 316. See generally J. Lupowitz
Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974) (bona fide advances between corporations were not constructive dividends); Sammons v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.
1972) (the test for determining whether intercorporate transfers constitute constructive dividends is whether the majority stockholder primarily benefited); Rushing v.
Comm'r., 52 T.C. 888, aff'd on other grounds, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971) (adoption
of the primary benefit test); but see McLemore v. Comm'r, 494 F.2d 1350 (6th Cir.
1974) (two intercorporate transfers were constructive dividends to the sole shareholder, for one allowed him to pay off a personal obligation and the second was not a
binding obligation). See also Frank, Brother-Sister Transfer of Funds, 53 TAxEs 693
(1975); Young, Provoking, Invoking, and Revoking 'Phantom'Dividends, 21 TuL. TAX
INsT. 68 (1972).
18. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(5). Foreign, when applied to a corporation, means an entity
which is not domestic.
19. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) defines "domestic," when applied to a corporation, as
referring to an entity created or organized in the United States or under the laws of
the United States or of any State.
20. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion in the Case of Income Taxes Between the United States and Canada, March
4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399, 6 Bevans 244, T.S. No. 983, as amended by Supplementary
Convention, June 12, 1950, 2 U.S.T. 2235, T.I.A.S. No. 2347, as amended by Supplementary Convention, Aug. 8, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916, as amended by
Additional Supplementary Convention, Oct. 25, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No.
6415 [hereinafter cited as Convention Between the United States and Canada Respecting Double Taxation].
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its allocation of management services to sources wholly or predominantly outside of the United States will be identified and
discussed.
I.

STATUTORY LAW

Withholding at the Source
Section 1442 requires that in the case of foreign corporations subject to tax under subtitle A, a tax of thirty percent
shall be withheld at the source on those items of income enumerated in section 1441(b). 21 Section 1441(a) and (b) require
that all persons having control over, or payment of salaries,
wages, premiums, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical
gains, profits, and income, to the extent such items constitute
gross income from sources within the United States, shall deduct and withhold at the source a tax equal to thirty percent
22
thereof.
A.

Nowhere in the statute or regulations does the phrase
"management fees" appear. Possibly anticipating an argument
to the contrary, the Service promulgated regulation 1.1441-2(a)
which specifically states that forms of income other than those
enumerated were meant to be included within section
1441(a).21 Additionally, the regulation indicates that "fixed or
determinable annual or periodical gain" was meant merely to
be descriptive of the "character of a class of income. 24 In conjunction with the Service's extremely broad interpretation of
the statute, the courts have also given a broad sweep to the
language of section 1441. Alimony payments,2 proceeds from
21. I.R.C. § 1442, entitled Withholding of Tax on Foreign Corporations.
22. I.R.C. § 1441(a), (b).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(a)(1) (1976) specifically provides: "Section 1441(b)
specifically includes in such income [see the list in the text accompanying note 22
supral . . . but other kinds of income are included, as, for instance, royalties."
24. Id. The regulation also provides that the term fixed or determinable annual
or periodical income is merely descriptive of the character of a class of income. If an
item of income falls within the class it is immaterial whether payment of that item is
made in a series of repeated payments or in a single lump sum.
"Fixed" is defined as payable in amounts definitely predetermined. Id.; Treas.
Reg. § 1.1441-2(a)(2) (1976). "Determinable" is defined as subject to a basis of calcula.
tion by which the amount to be paid may be ascertained. Id. Finally, income need not
be paid annually if it is paid periodically, that is to say, from time to time, whether or
not at regular intervals. Id.
25. See A. Lamm, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 473 (1975); W.A. Howkins, 49 T.C. 689
(1968); Gerard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Comm'r, 194 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 821 (1952); Rev. Rul. 283, 1965-2 C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 53, 1954-1 C.B. 156. But
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the maturity or surrender of a life insurance policy,2" royalties,2
and the earnings of professional athletes 28 have all been found
to fall within the general language of section 1441(b). 21 Though
prior case law has treated "management fees" as a form of
income or gain within the statutory language, no opinion has
identified the specific form of income it constitutes. 0 For withholding at the source purposes, the issue may be totally irrelevant, however, for sections 1441 and 1442 draw no distinction
(for tax purposes) among such broad classes of income as
''compensation," "remuneration," and "fixed or determinable
annual or periodic gain, profits and income."'"
B. Source DeterminationRules
A second element must also be present for the withholding
at the source obligation to arise. In addition to the income or
gain being within the general class described in section 1441(b),
cf. Rev. Rul. 108, 1969-1 C.B. 192 (alimony payments to a nonresident alien by a
United States ancillary administrator of a nonresident alien estate were not United
States source income and were not subject to withholding tax at the source).
26. See Rev. Rul. 51, 1964-1 C.B. (Part I) 322 (amounts received by a nonresident
alien, from sources within the United States, upon surrender or maturity of a life
insurance policy were United States source income).
27. See Treas. Reg. § .1.1441-2(a)(1) (1976). See also Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183
(1947); Comm'r v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
28. See Rev. Rul. 503, 1975-2 C.B. 352 (the Service illustrated the tax treatment
for amounts earned in the United States by French or British boxers and trainers);
Rev. Rul. 107, 1973-1 C.B. 376, amplifying Rev. Rul. 543, 1970-2 C.B. 172 (nonresident
alien journalist who wrote articles in the United States while under contract to a
domestic news service had United States source income); Rev. Rul. 543, 1970-2 C.B.
172 (prize money earned by a nonresident boxer and nonresident professional golfer
was United States source income subject to withholding); Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B.
388 (that portion of payments for manufacturing "know-how" and' personal services
performed outside the United States in connection with instruction of employees with
respect to such "know-how" is in the nature of royalty income and, therefore, subject
to withholding of tax at the source).
29. Other forms of income, not mentioned in I.R.C. § 1441(b), but still subject
thereto, are: Rev. Rul. 108, 1974-1 C.B. 248 (sign-on fees with a sports team); Rev. Rul.
479, 1958-2 C.B. 60 (prizes, commissions, and winnings at the racetrack).
30. Yardley and Co., Ltd., 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 42,482 (1942) is the only case to
date that has discussed the treatment for source-determination purposes of management fees. The opinion, however, never clearly determined what class of income such
fees specifically come within (for purposes of I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442). Such phrases as
"remuneration," "compensation," or "gain" clearly seem broad enough, both in the
letter and spirit of § 1441 to encompass the concept of management fees.
31. I.R.C. § 1441(b). Section 1441(b) prescribes a general rule for all the forms of
income it encompasses. For that reason, it is of little concern which specific form of
income management fees constitute. The rule is the same regardless of the classification.
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it must also constitute "income from sources within the United
States. ' 32 Should the income constitute income from sources
without the United States, the withholding at the source requirement of section 1442 is inapplicable."
Generally, the Service's complement of weapons consists
of three interrelated provisions. Section 861 defines the concept
of United States source income, 34 section 862 defines the concept of foreign source income, 35 and section 863 includes any
items not specifically found in the preceding two sections. 3 As
with sections 1441 and 1442, none of these sections mentions
"management fees."
In contrast to the breadth and sweep of sections 1441 and
1442, however, the very structure of the income source determination provisions negates any argument that "management
32. I.R.C. § 1441(a). The language of the statute is: "[Hlaving the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of any of the items of income specified in subsection (b) (to the extent that any of such items constitutes gross income from sources
within the United States) ....
" See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1 (1976).
33. See Tress. Reg. § 1.1441-3(a) (1976). The regulation states: "To the extent
that items of income constitute gross income from sources without the United States,
they are not subject to withholding under § 1.1441-1." The regulation then cross
references one to the income source determination rules of I.R.C. § 861 et seq. See
generally Burge, Current Trends in the Taxation of Multinational Enterprises, 52
TAXES 746 (1974).
34. I.R.C. § 861. The statute allocates the following items of income to sources
within the United States: interest, dividends, personal services compensation, rentals
and royalties from property located in the United States, gains from the sale or exchange of realty in the United States, gains from the sale or exchange of personalty
purchased without but sold within the United States and certain underwriting income.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-1(a) (1976) notes that the statute specifically allocates these items
of income to sources within the United States. In effect, the statute irrebutably presumes that the items of income enumerated are from sources within the United States.
35. I.R.C. § 862. Section 862 briefly states that for each of the items of income
enumerated in I.R.C. § 861, if generated without the United States, an irrebutable
presumption arises that the income is from sources without the United States. Tress.
Reg. § 1.862-1(a) (1976) states: "The following items of gross income shall be treated
as income from sources without the United States." (Emphasis added.)
36. I.R.C. § 863(a) provides that: "Items of gross income . . . other than those
specified in sections 861(a) and 862(a), shall be allocated or apportioned to sources
within or without the United States." The final sentence of § 863(a) states that
the remainder if any shall be included in full as taxable income from sources within
the United States. Id. It would appear that this provision may be read as a catch-all.
See Op. A.G. 5,1-2 C.B. 192 (1922) (the Attorney General opined that damages paid
by a domestic corporation to a foreign corporation for breach of a contract were income
from sources within the United States because any income from the completed contract would have been income from sources within the United States). Arguably, the
last sentence of § 863(a) would have encompassed these facts. See notes 70-71 infra
for the discussion of an analogous question: allocation burden.
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fees" may be included within those specific items of income
conclusively allocated entirely to either United States or foreign sources by sections 861 and 862.17 Section 863 specifically
states that items of gross income other than those specified in
sections 861(a) and 862(a) shall be allocated or apportioned to
sources within or without the United States under regulations
38
prescribed by the Secretary.
Though the Commissioner has been empowered to promulgate allocation rules under section 863, he has ony done so
with respect to certain businesses such as transportation services and telegraph and cable services. 3 Regulation 1.861-4(b),
however, may offer some guidance to the taxpayer attempting
to allocate or apportion management services. The regulation
states that gross income from sources within the United States
includes compensationfor labor or personal servicesperformed
in the United States irrespective of the residence of the payer,
the place in which the contract for service was made, or the
place or time for payment." The logical questions therefore
37. See note 36 supra. I.R.C. § 863 expressly requires that income be allocated to
its proper source. The statute precludes one from designating an item of income as
"substantially" or "predominately" from one source, thereby imposing a duty on the
taxpayer to specifically support his alleged allocation of such an item. See Le Beau
Tours Inter-America, Inc. v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9302 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
whereby the court questioned the continued validity of Comm'r v. Piedras Negras
Broadcasting Co., 42-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9384 (5th Cir. 1942). The Southern District
Court of New York questioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' allocation of "certain
insignificant activities." 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9302, at 83,693 n.2.
38. I.R.C. § 863(a).
39. The only regulations promulgated to date by the Service under I.R.C. § 863
are primarily concerned with transportation services (Treas. Reg. § 1.863-4 (1976)), the
sale of personal property (Tress. Reg. § 1.863-3 (1976)), and communication services
(Trees. Reg. § 1.863-5 (1976)). In addition, recent regulations have been proposed
under I.R.C. § 861 allowing a taxpayer to treat income from certain aircraft and vessels
as income from sources within the United States. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9
(1976), 40 Fed. Reg. 30971 (1975).
40. Tress. Reg. § 1.861-4 (1976). The language of the regulation appears to be
aimed at the performance of services by a nonresident alien individual. That is exclusive focus of subsection (1) of the regulation. Id. § 1.861-4(a)(1). Nowhere in the statute
or regulation are foreign corporations specifically mentioned, either as included or
excluded from the statute's scope. As will be discussed in the text and accompanying
notes 45-73 infra, courts have simply assumed that foreign corporations are within the
spirit and letter of the statute. The Ninth Circuit expressly addressed this issue,
however, in Comm'r v. Hawaiian-Phillipine Co., 100 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 635 (1939), when it held that the statute did apply to corporations.
See note 69 infra, for further discussion of the Hawaiian-PhillipineCo. decision.
Nonetheless, § 863 has been extensively applied to foreign corporations. The major
difficulty that has arisen centers around the issues of by whom, how, and where does
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become (1) can a corporation perform personal services, and (2)
how and where does a corporation perform such services."
For years beginning after December 31, 1975, when services are performed partly within and without the United
States, the amount to be included in gross income from sources
within the United States shall be determined on the basis that
most correctly reflects the proper source of income under the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. In many cases,
the proper method of allocation will be on a time basis but in
other cases another method will be acceptable." In contrast, for
taxable years beginning before January 1, 1976, regulation
1.861-4(b)(2) mandates the use of a time basis allocation for
services performed partially within and partially without the
United States:
If no accurate allocation or segregation of compensation for labor
or personal services performed in the United States can be made,
or when such labor or service is performed partly within and
partly without the United States, the amount to be included in
the gross income shall be determined by an apportionment on the
time basis; that is, there shall be included in the gross income
an amount which bears the same relation to the total compensation as the number of days of performance of the labor or services
within the United States bears to the total number of days of3
performance of labor or services for which the payment is made.

Regulation 1.863-4(c) also suggests a similar time based
method of allocation for the performance of certain transportation services."
a corporation act? See Rev. Rul. 55, 1960-1 C.B. 270, at text and accompanying notes
50-51 infra; Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388 (payments by a domestic corporation to a

foreign corporation for instructing its personnel were not United States source income).
See note 69 infra.

41. That a time basis allocation of personal services by foreign corporations seems
logical is a different issue from whether the statute mandates such a method of allocation. Hawaiian-PhillipineCo., 100 F.2d at 991, best summarized the issue by noting
that (1) the Commissioner failed to cite any authority for the proposition that corporations could not perform personal services, (2) no reason was advanced for excluding
corporations from the reach of the statute, and (3) I.R.C. § 7701 expressly includes a
corporation within the definition of person. In any event, a time based allocation of
services performed by a corporation, whether they may be classed as personal services
or not, appears most logical.
42. Tress. Reg. § 1.861-4(b)(1) (1976).
43. Id. § 1.861-4(b)(2). Unfortunately, the regulation gives no indication of what
other method of allocation might be permissable for the Service to use.
44. See Tress. Reg. § 1.863-4(c) (1976). The regulation allows for the use of a
"reasonable method" of apportionment, but suggests a proration based on the propor-
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I. CASE LAW
In the management services area, the case law clearly supports the "place of performance" allocation test adopted under
regulation 1.861-4(b) for labor and personal services for individuals as well as corporate taxpayers.
In Appeal of G. H. Salmon45 the Board of Tax Appeals
expressly sanctioned the "place of performance" test for allocating services within and without the United States. In
Salmon the taxpayer spent two years in India renovating an
Indian factory recently purchased by his New York based employer and claimed that his wages were foreign source income.
The Service argued to the contrary and alleged a deficiency
only slightly in excess of the $84.00 tax liability calculated by
the taxpayer. On review the Board of Tax Appeals concluded
that the taxpayer was taxable only upon the portion of the
compensation paid him for services rendered within the United
States."
In British Timkin, Ltd. v. Commissioner,7 a 1949 Tax
Court case, the court again faced the issue of whether fees paid
to a foreign corporation constituted United States or foreign
source income. In this instance a United States firm sold parts
to foreign purchasers who had previously dealt exclusively with
a foreign supplier. The domestic corporation received the foreign supplier's permission to sell to the foreign buyers and, in
exchange, agreed to pay the foreign supplier a twenty percent
tion which the number of days the ship was within the territorial waters of the United
States bears to the total number of days on the voyage. This method of allocation was
explained in Rev. Rul. 495, 1972-2 C.B. 414, superseding I.T. 2098, M-2 C.B. 167
(1924). Compare Treas. Reg. 1.863-4(c) (1976) with Treas. Reg. § 1.863-5(b) (1976)
(concerning telegraph and cable services) and Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(c) (allocation of
personal property sales income).
45. 3 B.T.A. 838 (1926), acq. V-1 C.B. 5 (1926).
46. The Board of Tax Appeals stated: "As a nonresident alien the taxpayer would
be taxable only upon such portion . . . as was paid him for services rendered within
the United States." Id. at 839 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases have sanctioned
this "place of performance test" for the source allocation of personal services income.
See, e.g., William N. Dillin, 56 T.C. 228 (1971), acq. 1975-1 C.B. 1 (citing Karrer v.
United States, 152 F. Supp. 66, 71 (Ct. Cl. 1957)) (source is determined by the situs
of the services rendered, not the location of the payer, residence of the taxpayer,
place of contract, or place of payment).
47. 12 T.C. 880 (1949), acq. 1949-2 C.B. 1. The petitioner was a British corporation. All of the capital stock of petitioner was purchased by American Timken in 1928.
Subsequently, the two corporations executed licensing and trademark agreements. Id.
at 881.
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commission on all such sales."8 At the time the parties executed

their agreement, the domestic firm owned slightly more than
fifty percent of the foreign supplier's stock. The court looked
closely at the situs of the foreign corporation's services. The
factors the court found to be determinative were (1) the foreign
corporation maintained no office or place of business in the
United States, (2) no officer of such corporation visited the
United States, and (3) the foreign corporation was not engaged
in a trade or business within the United States. 9 As a result
the court concluded that all of the services rendered by the
foreign subsidiary had been performed without the United
States.
Both the Salmon and British Timken, Ltd. cases were subsequently cited in Revenue Ruling 60-55.10 In that instance, a
48. Id. at 881-85. The court expressly noted that American Timken could not have
sold its bearings to petitioner's distributors and customers without petitioner's consent, unless it chose to violate the territorial sales agreement between the companies.
Id. at 887.
49. Id. at 888. The court held that the source of the petitioner's income was
exclusively in the British Empire, which was the situs of the sales activities of the
petitioner's agents. In this instance, therefore, the court believed that the corporation
acted where its agents conducted business. In support of this allocation, the court cited
three earlier decisions. The earliest of the three was Sabatini v. Comm'r, 98 F.2d 753
(2d Cir. 1938), modifying 32 B.T.A. 705 (1935). In Sabatini, the court held that a
nonresident author's income from certain copyrights constituted income from sources
within the United States. It is interesting to note that Sabatinidid not involve personal
services but instead focused on the issue of royalty income. Id. at 755.
The second decision cited by the Timken court was Comm'r v. Piedras Niegras
Broadcasting Co., 43 B.T.A. 297 (1941), aff'd, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942). In Piedras,
95% of a Mexican radio station's income came from United States advertising pursuant
to contracts executed at its Mexican office. Id. at 301. The court held, however, that
because the services were rendered at the point of transmission, all of the services were
performed outside of the United States. 127 F.2d at 261. In the opinion of the Board
of Tax Appeals, it was expressly noted that there had been no contention that radio
broadcasting constituted services rendered partly within and without the United
States. 43 B.T.A. at 314. The Fifth Circuit ignored this fact in their majority opinion.
Because of this, Piedrasis of questionable value in regard to the Timhen Case.
Finally, the Timken court cited Korfund Co., 1 T.C. 1180 (1943). The Tinmken
court's reliance on Korfund is also highly suspect in light of the fact that Korfund
expressly followed Sabatini and distinguished Piedrason the ground that Piedrasdid
not involve personal services. Id. at 1187.
For discussion of the "place of performance" test in a sale of goods setting, see
Phillip Bros. Inter-Continent Corp. v. United States, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9421,
85,993-86,005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
50. Rev. Rul. 55, 1960-1 C.B. 270. Of primary concern to the Service in this
instance, was the fact that the foreign taxpayer corporation maintained its sales and
service personnel permanently outside of the United States. The Service cited, with
approval, the following passage from British Timhen Ltd., 12 T.C. 880, 887:
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foreign corporation agreed to solicit purchase orders from foreign buyers for a domestic American corporation. In the event
that buyers circumvented the agent or purchased directly from
the American corporation, the seller was nonetheless obligated
to pay a commission for the foreign corporation's "promotional
services." Without extensive analysis the Service concluded
that all of the promotional work by the foreign corporation was
performed exclusively in foreign countries." Consequently, the
fees paid were held to be entirely foreign source income.
Only one case has directly reviewed the issue of "management fees." In Yardley & Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner,52 a
British corporation supplied "managerial services" to its
United States subsidiary in return for fifteen percent of the
subsidiary's profits. The specific services performed by the
parent corporation were (1) arranging for shipment to the
subsidiary of foreign source materials, (2) maintenance of a
research laboratory, (3) exclusive laboratory testing and
experimentation, (4) all advertising and art work, and (5)
general consultation on policy matters.13 The domestic subsidiary, two years after the "management fees" arrangement had
been executed, formally identified irthe minutes of a board of
directors meeting the above-mentioned services as the basis for
the "management fees."'"
[W]e do not regard the fact that the situs of the sales was within the
United States as determinative of the source of petitioner's income ....
It is the situs of the activity or property which constitutes the source of
the compensation paid and not the situs of the sales by which it is measured that is of critical importance.
Id. at 271.
51. The Service noted that the commissions paid in recognition of the fact that
the sales would not have been made except through the services of the taxpayer and
that any promotion so performed was done exclusively in foreign countries. Id. at 27172. Though unclear, there appeared to be some ownership relationship between the
foreign and domestic entities. The ruling was vague on this point.
52. 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1219 (1942).
53. Id. at 1222, 1225. The shipment arrangements concerned shipments from British and various other foreign ports. Id. The testing laboratory was located in Britain.
Id.
54. Id. at 1224. The only documentation of the nature of the services rendered by
the foreign corporation to the domestic subsidiary rested in some hastily drawn meeting minutes. The specific resolution adopted by the board of directors stated that the
payments were made "in consideration of the use of the name 'Yardley,' and of other
good and valuable considerations." Id. At trial, the Secretary of the domestic subsidiary testified that it was really the intention of the directors to focus on the other
good and valuable considerations and that use of Yardley's name was an erroneous
expression. Id. The president of the American corporation testified that he understood
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The Board of Tax Appeals concluded that ninety percent
of the British corporation's services were performed without
the United States. 5 Without explaining the basis for this
precise allocation, the Board appears to have adopted the
exact percentage allocation suggested by the chairman of the
board of Yardley and Co., Ltd., 5 the taxpayer.
Subsequent cases have elaborated only slightly on the
method for allocating services to within and without the United
States. In 1973, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded
Tipton & Kalmbach, Inc. v. United States. 7 In Tipton &
Kalmbach, a Colorado corporation contracted to perform engineering services incident to the design and construction of certain canals in West Pakistan. Two of the taxpayer's principal
officers spent sixty to eighty percent of their time working in
the taxpayer's Denver office. 58 In attempting to support its contention that fees generated were foreign source income, the
taxpayer relied heavily on Commissioner v. Piedras Negras
BroadcastingCo., 59 where the Fifth Circuit held that advertisthe payment to have simply arisen as an ordinary charge by the foreign parent corporation. Id. For further elaboration of the testing services performed see 11 B.T.A.M. (PH) at 1226. Mr. Pitt, one of the directors of the British corporation, testified that the
fees merely covered "services rendered and travelling expenses." Id. at 1225.
55. Id. at 1227.
56. Id. at 1226-27. It is difficult, looking at the opinion alone to determine exactly
how the Board came to so precise an allocation of services to within and without the
United States. The Board stated: "We are convinced that a maximum of 10 percent
of the services for which the payments in question were made were rendered in the
United States and that the remaining 90 percent were rendered by the British Corporation in England." Id. at 1226. The Board never specifically identified those services
that were rendered within the United States, nor the method of allocation that resulted
in such services accounting for ten percent of the total. The Board never discussed a
time basis allocation method, or any other method, for that matter. Consequently, the
opinion is of some guidance in identifying those elements of managerial services that
lend themselves to source allocation under I.R.C. §§ 861-863, but the opinion offers
little assistance in identifying the actual allocation method.
57. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9541 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. The taxpayer's services were performed by expatriate personnel in Pakistan,
Pakistan nationals, and employees in the taxpayer's Denver office. Messrs. Tipton and
Kalmbach spent approximately 20 to 40 percent of their time in Pakistan. The remainder of their time was spent in the Denver office. Id. at 81,727. The court did not
indicate the nature of the work performed by these men while in the Denver office.
Compare Tipton & Kalmbach, Inc., 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9541, with Yardley, 11
B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1219 (in Tipton as opposed to Yardley, the court was less concerned
with the nature of the services rendered and more concerned with the manner of
allocation. Id. at 81,728).
59. 43 B.T.A. 297, aff'd, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942). See the discussion of the
Piedrasmajority opinion in note 49 supra. The Tipton court attempted to distinguish
the Piedrasdecision on the ground that in Piedrasall of the services were held to have
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ing fees paid by Americans to a Mexican based radio station
represented income generated wholly from services performed
outside the United States. Though a minor amount of activities
were rendered within the United States, the Fifth Circuit attributed all of the income to that country where the predominant service, broadcasting, was performed.10
In Tipton & Kalmbach, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
the decision in Piedras Negras on the basis that no United
States source services were performed in that case."' The Service advocated a payroll basis method of allocation of the taxpayer's services. 2 The district court indirectly supported the
Service's position by finding that the taxpayer had failed to
establish its right to a method of allocation other than the
payroll cost basis. 3 Citing regulation 1.861-4(b) concerning
labor and personal services and noting that the taxpayer's exbeen rendered outside of the United States, while in Tipton, some services were concededly performed within the United States. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,728. The Tipton
court, in an indirect reference to Piedras, stated: "Furthermore, Code sections
861(a)(3) and 862(a)(3) do not attribute all of a taxpayer's income to the country where
most of its services are performed." Id.
60. See note 49 supra. In this early allocation case, the dissent clearly appeared
to be approaching an interpretation of I.R.C. §§ 861-863 more consistent with the
present interpretation of those provisions. The dissenting opinion of Judge McCord
noted that (1) many of Piedras' programs originated from a Texas based studio, (2)
programs were aimed at American listeners, (3) 95 percent of the advertising income
came from United States citizens, (4) Piedras' agents solicited funds in the United
States, (5) contracts were entered into within the United States, (6) Piedras availed
itself of American banks, and (7) a United States mail address was maintained. 127
F.2d 261-62. In spite of the numerousness of these "contacts" within the United States,
the majority opinion elected to ignore these factors and focus exclusively on the issue
of where the actual transmissions originated. Id. at 261.
61. See notes 59 and 60 supra. The Piedrasdecision stands as questionable support in all allocation cases because the Board of Tax Appeals noted that the decision
was argued on an "all-or-nothing" basis, without any discussion of the possibility of
allocation. 43 B.T.A. at 314. See note 49 supra.
62. The Service took the position that the income generated by the services performed should have been apportioned between United States and Pakistani sources in
the same proportions as were the taxpayers' payroll costs. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,729.
The basis for such an allocation method, in the Service's opinion, was that source
allocation would be more accurate. Id.
63. 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 9563 (D.Colo. 1972). The court noted: "Section 1.8614(b) of the Treasury Regulations on Income Tax [concerning personal services source
allocation] was not intended to apply to service-performing corporations." Id. at
85,304. The court then shifted the burden to the plaintiff-taxpayer to show that it was
entitled to a different method of allocation than the payroll cost method supported by
the Service. Id. at 85,306. In effect, the district court gave the Service carte blanche
authority to use whatever method of source allocation maximized tax liability.
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hibits contained sufficient uncontroverted figures to utilize the
time basis allocation, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, stating that
[n]either system of allocation [time or payroll] can reflect with
complete exactness the amount of taxable income and consequently we hold that the Internal Revenue Service should abide
by its own regulations [time basis allocation] when they are not
in conflict with an express statutory provision.6 '

In March 1976 in Le Beau Tours Inter-America, Inc. v.
United States,6 5 the Southern District Court of New York found
the continued validity of Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co.
questionable in light of the Tipton & Kalmbach decision."6 In
Le Beau Tours the taxpayer alleged that the arrangement and
packaging of foreign tours took place in Latin America by
means of direct and personal contact with the foreign hotels.
In examining the facts the court found that the taxpayer's
selecting, administering, and supervising of tours in Latin
America were services performed outside of the United States.
To the degree, however, that the plaintiff carried on these
activities within the United States, United States source
income was being generated. 7 In a footnote the court noted
that a substantial portion of the taxpayer's income-generating
activities, such as developing packaged tours and providing
assistance to American tourists, was performed within the
United States."
64. Id. at 81,728. More specifically, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that: "The Internal Revenue Service is thus not free to apply an ad hoc method of
allocation when Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b) does not abuse the allocation issue in this
case." 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,729. A long line of precedent supports the proposition
that if the taxpayer is bound by a regulation, the Service is equally bound. See Brofman v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12 494, at 85,644 (5th Cir. 1967); Miller v.
Comm'r, 333 F.2d 400, 403 (8th Cir. 1964); McCord v. Granger, 201 F.2d 103, 107 (3d
Cir. 1952); Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r., 91 F.2d 103, 105 (9th Cir. 1937); Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Westover, 70 F.Supp. 111, 115 (S.D. Cal. 1947). See generally
MERraNs, THE LAW OF FEDzRAL INcoME TAXATION § 3.20 (1942).
65. 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9302 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
66. The Court stated "Commissioner v. PiedrasNegras Broadcasting Co., supra,
whatever its validity after Tipton and Kalmbach is in conflict with the decision here."
Id. at 83,693 n.2.
67. The court noted: "While this court does not believe that the plaintiff can
properly be considered a wholesale seller of hotel space and tours, . . . the plaintiff is
engaged in a service business in which services are performed both in the United States
and abroad." Id. at 83,692. The specific services performed by the taxpayer were: (1)
personal inspections of hotels, (2) developing total tour packages, (3) maintaining
representatives in foreign countries to assist tourists, and (4) selecting, administering,
and supervising tours. Id. at 83,692-93.
68. The court said: "Here it appears that a fairly substantial portion of the activi-
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In retrospect the only clear pattern discernible from these
allocation cases is that the taxpayer bears a heavy burden of
proof.6 ' Should the taxpayer fail to substantiate his alleged
allocation of services to a specific source, he faces the possibility that such services will be classified as performed wholly or
predominantly within the United States.70 In Sax Rohmer just
ties which generated Le Beau Inter-America's income-as distinguished from that of
its local hotel and tour operators-took place in the United States." Id. at 83,693 n.2.
69. The source allocation of income from services performed by a corporation has
arisen in various other decisions, also. See Comm'r v. Hawaiian Phillipine Co., 100
F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 635 (1939) where the court noted that
the time basis allocation of services performed by a corporation was within both the
letter and spirit of the personal services income allocation guides of I.R.C. § 861-863
(at that time I.R.C. § 119(c)). It is interesting to note that Hawaiian Phillipines
received only passing mention in an obscure footnote in the Piedras Negras decision,
127 F.2d at 261 n.2. For further elaboration on the HawaiianPhillipinesdecision see
generally Annot. 160 A.L.R. 559, 589 n.5 (1946).
For other instances of corporate performed services falling under the concept of
source allocation see, e.g., Yokohama Ki-Ito Kwaisha, Ltd., 5 B.T.A. 1248, 1256-57
(1927) (a foreign corporation which took orders for, or entered into contracts for the
sale of, silk in the United States, through an agent in the United States, received
income from within the United States to the extent of the difference between the selling price and its cost); Comm'r v. East Coast Oil Co., 85 F.2d 322, 323 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936) (where a Mexican corporation negotiated for the sale of
Mexican oil to United States businesses, but the title to the property passed at the
place of shipment and delivery occurred in Mexico, the fact that the payments were
made in the United States did not change the status of this income as generated by
services performed outside of the United States).
See also Rev. Rul. 154, 1976-1 C.B. 191 (compensation paid a domestic corporation
by a foreign country for property of the domestic corporation previously expropriated
was held to be income from sources without the United States); Rev. Rul. 198, 1971-1
C.B. 210 (income of a foreign corporation from the sale of tuna caught in international
waters to United States canners was income from sources without the United States);
Rev. Rul. 194, 1967-1 C.B. 183 (income of a foreign corporation from the sale of mineral
ore extracted in the foreign corporation's homeland to United States buyers, through
an independent agent located in the United States is income from sources without the
United States).
For a generalized discussion of the above issues see generally Brigg & Hufbauer,
ExpropriationLosses and Tax Policy, 16 HAuv. Irr'LL.J. 533 (1975); Caplin, Trading
With Related Foreign Entities: Current American Tax Perspective, 9 AKRON L. REv.
223 (1975).
70. Where there is no basis upon which an allocation or apportionment of income
to sources within and without the United States can be made, the full amount must
be deemed to be from sources within the United States. In short, the taxpayer carries
the burden of proof concerning allocation. See, e.g., Wodehouse v. Comm'r., 177 F.2d
881, 883 (2d Cir. 1949); Molnar v. Comm'r, 156 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1946); Rohmer v.
Comm'r, 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946); Estate of Alexander
Marton, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942). Particular attention should be paid to Misbaurne Pictures, Ltd. v. Johnson, 189 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1951) (the appellants presented no basis
upon which to allocate income, so the entire amount was allocated to United States
sources).
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such an all-or-nothing allocation was imposed upon a taxpayer
who failed to substantiate his claimed allocation of lump sum
payments between United States source and Canadian source
serial rights to stories published by the taxpayer in both countries.7'
The case law and revenue rulings concerning the proper
source allocation of foreign corporation-performed management services is meager. Because such a determination is primarily a factual issue, one may anticipate a willingness on the
Service's part to contest such allocations between related corporate entities. A foreign corporation not engaged in a trade or
business within the United States is taxed at a rate of thirty
percent only on its United States source income.72 Again, if
management fees constitute the foreign parent's only income
from the United States, a successful allocation of such services
to sources wholly outside the United States will preclude the
parent from incurring any United States income tax liability.73
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Service may refuse to let
the related corporations' source allocation go unchallenged.
III.

UNITED STATES-CANADIAN INcoME

TAX

TREATY

Section 894 of the Code provides that income of any kind,
to the extent required by any treaty obligation of the United
States, shall be exempt from taxation.7 ' In addition, section
7852(d) states that no provision of the tax code shall apply
where its effect would be contrary to any treaty of the United
States.75
The United States-Canadian Income Tax Treaty has been
subject to numerous modifications and supplements since its
signing in 1942.76 Numerous provisions of the treaty exempt
71. Rohmer v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 183 (1945), aff'd., 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946). It is interesting to note that all of the cases in note 70
supra were concerned with the taxpayers' allocations of serial rights to publications or
movies. See also Note, Taxation of Income from Literary Property Owned by Nonresident Aliens, 54 YALz L.J. 879 (1945).
72. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
73. Id.
74. I.R.C. § 894. The United States has signed tax treaties with over 40 different
countries. For a brief synopsis of each treaty see [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
4200 et seq.
75. I.R.C. § 7852(d).
76. Convention Between the United States and Canada Respecting Double Taxation, supra note 20. For an additional source where the entire United States-Canadian
Income Tax Treaty may be found, see [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX RzP. (CCH) 422224.
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certain income earned by Canadian taxpayers in the United
States from United States taxation in an attempt to minimize
the possibility of double taxation of the taxpayer." Summarizing various provisions of the treaty, regulation 519.102 exempts "industrial and commercial profits of a Canadian enterprise having no permanent establishment in the United
States" from United States taxation."8 Additionally, regulation
519.103(a) provides that the mere fact that a Canadian parent
corporation has a domestic subsidiary in the United States
shall not constitute the maintenance of a "permanent establishment" in the United States by that Canadian parent." Any
For a discussion of the treaty and its impact, see generally Brown, Canada-United
States Tax Relations, 28 TAX. Exac. 1 (1975); McKie, US.-CanadianTax Treaty, 66
PRoc. NAT'L TAX A.-TAx INST. AMmuCA 67 (1973); Mullens, The Tax Treaty Between
Canada and the USA: A U.S. Viewpoint, 27 TAx Exc. 53 (1974); Patrick, US.CanadianTax Treaty, 66 PRoc. NAT'L TAX A.-TAx INST. AMERICA 67 (1973); Stileman,
The Tax Treaty Between Canada and the US.A.: A Canadian Viewpoint, 27 TAX
ExEc. 52 (1974).
77. The following classes of income have been exempted from taxation by other
than its state of incorporation: (1) industrial and commercial profits (article I), 56 Stat.
at 1399, T.S. No. 983, [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REm'. (CCH) at 48,023; (2) certain
income from the operation of ships or aircraft (article V), 56 Stat. at 1401, T.S. No.
983, [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,024; (3) wages or salaries paid by
governmental entities (article VI), 56 Stat. at 1401, T.S. No. 983, [1977] 5 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,024-25; (4) annuities (article VIA), 2 U.S.T. at 2237, T.I.A.S.
No. 2347, [19771 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,025; (5) certain forms of
personal services compensation (amended article VII), 8 U.S.T. at 1621-22, T.I.A.S.
No. 3916, [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,025-26; (6) sales or exchanges
of capital assets (article VIII), 56 Stat. at 1402, T.S. No. 983, (1977] 5 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,026; (7) visiting professors' income (article VIIA), 2 U.S.T. at
2238 T.I.A.S. No. 2347, [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX IRz. (CCH) at 48,026; (8) funds to
maintain students (article IX), 56 Stat. at 1402, T.S. No. 983, [1977] 5 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,026; (9) income derived by charitable organizations (article
X), id. Various other forms of income are also exempt, e.g., directors' fees (article
XIIHB), royalties (article XIIIC), 2 U.S.T. at 2239-40, T.I.A.S. No. 2347, [19771 5
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,028-29. For a brief discussion of the interrelationship of management fees and the United States-Canadian Tax Treaty from a Canadian
tax perspective see generally O'Keefe, Management Fees and Withholding Tax, 23
CAN. TAX. J. 130 (1975).
78. 56 Stat. at 1399, T.S. No. 983, [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at
48,023. See specifically 26 C.F.R. § 519.102 (1976) reproducedin [1977] 5 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,035. The specific language of the regulation is: "Industrial and
commercial profits of a Canadian enterprise having no permanent establishment in the
United States." Id.
79. 26 C.F.R. § 519.103(a) (1976), [1977] 5 STAND. FRD. TAX REP. (CCH) at
48,037. For a discussion of the "commercial and industrial profits" concept and the
"permanent establishment" concept see Donray, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200,
208 (9th Cir. 1962) (Canadian corporations which are limited partners in a United
States partnership maintain a permanent establishment within the United States);
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hope, however, that management fees earned by a Canadian
corporation might fall within this exemption is clearly negated
by regulation 519.103(d), which provides that "industrial and
commercial profits" are those profits arising from "industrial,
mercantile, manufacturing, or like activities of a Canadian enterprise"; fees or charges for managerial activities are expressly
excluded from the definition of "industrial and commercial
profits. " 8
Regulation 519.1058' provides for a "time basis" allocation
Comm'r v. Consolidated Premium Iron Ores, Ltd., 265 F.2d 320, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1959)
(a foreign corporation did not have a United States permanent establishment when it
had no assets in the United States, maintained no United States bank accounts, had
no real United States office and had not delegated to anyone in the United States
power to execute contracts); F. Handfield, 23 T.C. 633, 638 (1955) (an individual
residing in Canada who effected the sale of Canadian-made post cards through an
American distributor had a permanent establishment in the United States); Rev. Rul.
562, 1973-2 C.B. 434, 435 (interest received from borrowers in the United States by a
Canadian bank did not qualify as industrial or commercial profits); Rev. Rul. 263,
1965-2 C.B. 561, 561-62 (maintenance of United States offices to solicit business for a
Canadian corporation to be performed in Canada constituted a permanent establishment in the United States); Rev. Rul. 113, 1963-1 C.B. 410, 411 (a United States
corporation which purchased goods on consignment from a Canadian corporation did
not constitute a permanent establishment in the United States); Rev. Rul. 282, 19551 C.B. 634, 635 (a Canadian corporation having an agent in the United States with
discretionary authority to buy or sell has a United States permanent establishment).
80. 26 C.F.R. § 519.103(d) (1976), [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at
48,037.
81. 26 C.F.R. § 519.105 (1976), [1977] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) at 48,039.
The regulation provides that:
Except as provided in section 119(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, gross income from sources within the United States includes compensation for labor or personal services performed within the United
States regardless of the residence of the payor, of the place in which the
contract for service was made, or of the place of payment. If a specific
amount is paid for labor or personal services performed in the United
States, such amount (if income from sources within the United States)
shall be included in the gross income. If no accurate allocation or segregation of compensation for labor or personal services performed in the
United States can be made, or when such labor or service is performed
partly within and partly without the United States, the amount to be
included in the gross income shall be determined by an apportionment
on the time basis, i.e., there shall be included in the gross income an
amount which bears the same relation to the total compensation as the
number of days of performance of the labor or services within the United
States bears to the total number of days of performance of labor or services for which the payment is made.
For further discussion of the allocation of personal services income under the
Treaty, see Rev. Rul. 66, 1976-1 C.B. 189, 190 (salary paid a Canadian hockey player

1979

MANAGEMENT SERVICES AGREEMENTS

of compensation for labor or personal services performed partly
within and partly without the United States by a Canadian
individual that is almost identical to that found in regulation
1.861-4(b)(2) 2 The treaty provisions do not appear to apply to
corporate-performed services, and it is difficult to determine if
this provision was so drafted purposely or inadvertently.
An alternative argument for excluding management services from United States taxation may exist under article
XII(B) of the treaty. The provision states that "director's
fees" paid by a corporation to a director residing in one of the
contracting states for services at directors' meetings held in the
"other" controlling state shall be exempt from tax by the
"other" state." Though superficially appealing, the taxpayer
subsidiary must overcome the following weaknesses inherent in
such an argument: (1) directors' fees are not defined by the
statute; (2) directors' fees are paid directly to directors, while
management fees are usually paid to the parent corporation;
and (3) often management services are performed primarily by
nondirector experts and technicians. Thus, it appears that
none of the exemptions created by the United States-Canadian
Income Tax Treaty were meant to encompass "management
fees."
IV.

SUGGESTED TAX PLANNING TECHNIQUES

In light of the inability to bring United States source
"management services" fees within any of the United Statesby a United States team which plays some games in Canada is income partly from
within and partly from without the United States); Rev. Rul. 330, 1957-2 C.B. 1013,
modifying Rev. Rul. 24, 1956-1 C.B. 851 (allocation of employees' income for transportation services rendered partly within and partly without the United States); Rev.
Rul. 119, 1954-1 C.B. 156, 157 (income of a Canadian corporation from personal appearances of an entertainer in the United States is not personal services income, but
rather exempt commercial or industrial profits).
82. See text and accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
83. See 2 U.S.T. at 2239-40, T.I.A.S. No. 2347, [1977] 5 STAND FED. TAX Rzl.
(CCH) at 48,028-29.
84. Merely finding that none of the exemptions in the United States-Canadian
Income Tax Treaty apply to management fees does not automatically subject the
Canadian parent and domestic subsidiary to the withholding at the source requirements of I.R.C. § 1442. If so alleged, the Service must carry the burden of proof that
the foreign corporation fraudulently failed to file a return. See note 11 supra. See also
I.R.C. § 7454(a). In those cases, however, where the Service has only alleged failure to
file a return, the taxpayer must carry the burden of proving that the Service's deficiency calculation is incorrect. See, e.g., King Tsak Kwong, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1136,
1140 (1953); Broadcast Measurement Bureau, Inc., 16 T.C. 988 (1951).
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Canadian Income Tax Treaty exemption provisions, foresighted tax planning in such transactions is an absolute necessity. Of greatest value to the taxpayer is preventative tax planning aimed at avoiding any question as to where management
services were performed. Reactive, post-transaction tax advice
often can do little to mitigate or lessen the tax impact of an
already-completed transaction. Unfortunately, all too often tax
questions are not recognized until after they become tax problems.
A. Management Fee Payment Planning
Although not precluding a contest by the Service, pretransaction preventative tax planning coupled with extensive
documentation will certainly place the management fee-paying
domestic subsidiary in a more defensible position. If any lesson
may be learned from the Yardley case, 85 it is that the taxpayer
must carry his burden of proof as to the allocation of services
within and without the United States.
Consequently, prior to the adoption of a management services arrangement, the following items should be extensively
documented in the minutes of the board of directors meetings
of both the subsidiary and the parent corporations:
1. The management services agreement should be
embodied in a formal written contract."
85. See 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1222-27. The taxpayer had numerous witnesses
testify on its behalf. The witnesses were the domestic subsidiary's accountant, president, and other officers. Such testimony was supplemented by numerous pieces of
correspondence. See also notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
86. The purpose served by a written management services agreement is primarily
an evidentiary one. Not that only in British Timken Ltd., 12 T.C. at 880, 881-83, and
Rev. Rul. 55, 1960-61 C.B. at 271, were the taxpayers foresighted enough to reduce their
agreements to written contracts. In both those instances, the court and the Service
found, in accordance with those agreements, that none of the foreign corporation's
services were performed in the United States. Compare Le Beau Tours, 76-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. at 9302, with Tipton & Kalmbach, Inc., 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,304-05, where
the court noted that written agreements executed by the parties were highly explicit
concerning the allocation of services to particular sources. See also Yardley and Co.,
Ltd. 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1223, where the Board noted that it was unclear whether
the management services agreement was written or oral. In those cases where the
petitioner is successful in his claimed services allocation, the courts have focused on
the existence and terms of the written agreements. See British Timken, Ltd., 12 T.C.
at 887; Rev. Rul. 55, 1960-1 C.B. at 271. In Yardley and Co., Ltd., 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H)
at 1225-26, the Board found a plethora of other documentation to support its findings.
In those cases where the plaintiff is unsuccessful in its proposed allocation, the courts
make no mention of the terms of the contracts. See Le Beau Tours, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
at 83,692-93; Tipton & Kalmbach, Inc. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,727-28. Without
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2. The formula used in calculating the management
fee should be clearly identified."
3. If possible, the corporation should avoid tying
management fees to gross or net profits. Preferably,
fees should be tied to a time basis allocation
method8s
4. Fees should be determined in advance of the beginning of the corporation's fiscal year."'
5. If possible, there should be documentation of
comparable fees paid by comparable companies for
comparable services."
6. The management services agreement should
clearly identify the nature of the services to be performed and the specific location where such services
are to be performed."
attributing more to these distinctions than they merit, at the very least, it may noted
that written contracts executed by a foreign parent and its domestic subsidiary would
be of some evidentiary value.
87. Not only should the formula be identified, it should also adhere closely to the
time basis allocation method outlined in Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b)(2) (1976). By anticipating problem areas under such an allocation method, careful drafting may serve to
reduce potential attacks by the Service. In Yardley and Co., Ltd., the Board accepted
and adopted the taxpayer's own method of allocation. 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1226-27.
Compare Wodehouse v. Comm'r, 117 F.2d at 883, where the court cited the following
language of the Tax Court: "The parties to the contract were best able to make a
proper allocation and segregation of the respective values. They neglected or chose not
to do so," but held instead that the taxpayer's agent's testimony was sufficient, with
Rohmer v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d at 65, where the court simply noted that the taxpayers,
who had the burden, offered no direct proof on the allocation issue. The obvious benefit
of a reasonable method of allocation, adopted by the parties in a written agreement,
is its effect on the Service's burden of going forward.
88. One of the primary dangers in tying "management services fees" determinations to a percentage of some form of profits, is that the fees begin to resemble actual
or constructive dividends. See I.R.C. H 301, 316. Under I.R.C. § 861(a)(2), dividends
received from a domestic corporation are presumptively allocated to sources within the
United States, in their entirety. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.861-3(b) (1976). Though there
are exceptions and mitigations of this "all-or-nothing" rule, it is much safer to simply
avoid any question that management fees might constitute dividends.
89. This strategy should be implemented to avoid any of the problems attendant
upon a reclassification of management services fees as dividends. See note 88 supra.
90. In Yardley and Co., Ltd., the domestic subsidiary's president testified that:
"even if they [the management services] could have been obtained in the United
States . . . [it] 'would have undoubtedly cost us more than the 15 percent we pay
London."' 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1228. In short, such a search for comparable domestic
services and the negative results therefrom may be some evidence that only foreign
sources remained as available suppliers. In light of the location test adopted for personal services under I.R.C. § 861 and its regulations, indirect support in this manner
may be of some assistance. See Rohmer v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d at 883,
91. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. In Yardley and Co., Ltd., the
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7. Arm's length attempts at employing an independent party to perform similar services should be doc92
umented, if made.
8. Finally, the agreement should contain a provision whereby interest is charged on the "management
3
fee" account's outstanding balance.
B.

OperationalStage Planning
In addition to preventative tax planning prior to entering
into a management services agreement, certain steps or policies
may be implemented during the life of the contractual relationship between the related business entities that will bolster the
assertion that management services were performed wholly or
predominantly outside of the United States. At this stage, the
maintenance of accurate and complete records is an absolute
necessity. The following procedures will constitute persuasive
evidence in support of the taxpayer's allocation:
1. Steps 1 through 8 of the previous section should
be performed, if not already done."
2. Any amendments to the agreement must be formally adopted, and the reason for the amendment
should be clearly documented. 5
3. Fees incurred must be actually paid or accrued
with interest."
taxpayer eventually identified the services, with great specificity, that the foreign
parent corporation performed. 11 B.T.A.M. (CCH) at 1225-26. See also British
Timken, Ltd., 12 T.C. at 887, 888, where the court identified and examined the specific
services rendered by the foreign corporation to the domestic entity.
92. See notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text supra.
93. Id.
94. In Yardley and Co., Ltd., a formal resolution identifying the specific services
that were being compensated for was not adopted until June 5, 1930, but the actual
payments began sometime in 1928. 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1223-25. Consequently, even
"midstream" documentation, when supported by other evidence may be sufficient
grounds upon which the taxpayer may substantiate his alleged allocation.
95. See text and accompanying notes 86-93 supra. Again the formal resolution
adopted in Yardley and Co., Ltd., on June 5, 1930, had as its primary purpose the
correction of the earlier 1928 minutes where the domestic corporation designated use
of the name Yardley as the quid pro quo for the 15 percent of profits payment to the
foreign corporation. 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1224-25. See note 54 supra.
96. This function is more a requirement of the nature of deductible payments than
it is a question of an income source allocation. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-7 (1976). See First Nat'l Benefit Society v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 841, 847,
aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1950) (cash basis taxpayer must deduct compensation payments when actually paid); Vander Poel, Francis & Co., 8 T.C. 407, 41012 (1947) (only salary actually paid is deductible). But cf. Globe-Gazette Printing Co.,
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4. The following records accurately reflecting time
spent on subsidiary, as opposed to parent, related
business must be maintained:
(a) employee time cards,97
(b) trips by parent officers to the subsidiary's offices," 8 and
(c) phone bills and research time spent resolving issues raised during these calls."
5. Inventory and supply records must accurately
reflect the above-outlined components.w
6. Preferably, meetings and visits should be held at
the parent's offices and not at the subsidiary's.1°1
C. Post-Deficiency Notice Planning
The "post-deficiency notice" period may be the most difficult time frame within which to build support for one's contention that a Canadian parent's managerial services were performed wholly or predominantly without the United States. It
16 B.T.A. 161, 165-66 (1929) (If taxpayer is on the accrual method, actual payment is
not a prerequisite. The salary is only deductible during the year in which it accrued.)
97. The use of employee time cards is one method of documentation readily available to the corporate taxpayer and also perfectly consistent with the time based allocation method of I.R.C. § 861 and Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b)(2) (1976). See notes 42 and
43 and accompanying text supra.
98. The travel by executive officers to the domestic corporation's plant in the
United States, twice a year, in Yardley and Co., Ltd., appeared to be the major service
rendered by the British parent within the United States. 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1226.
See also Comm'r v. Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co., 42-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 356, 357 (5th
Cir. 1942) (McCord, J., dissenting) (the dissent stressed the numerous activities actually performed by the taxpayer or its agents in the United States). But cf. Tipton &
Kalmbach, Inc., where the Tenth Circuit rejected a payroll cost method of allocation
urged by the Service. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,728. Instead the court required the
Service to apply the time method of allocation outlined in the regulations. Id.
It is important to note here that often the actual physical time spent within the
United States will be minimized when compared to the time allocated to services
rendered outside of the United States.
99. Phone bills are another method of allocation based on "time." It must not be
forgotten, however, also to include all the hours spent by foreign personnel at the
foreign corporation's office resolving any problems raised during these phone calls.
100. See, e.g., Yardley and Co., Ltd., 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1222, 1225. See also
Comm'r v. East Coast Oil Co., 85 F.2d 322, 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608
(1936).
101. See note 98 supra. This appears to be one way to eliminate the major element
of United States source services: advice rendered during trips to the domestic subsidiary's plant or offices. When "location" is as crucial to a transaction's source determination as it is under I.R.C. §§ 861-863, the loss of a travel expenses deduction under
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) is a small price to pay for the foreign parent.

440

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 8:415

must be remembered, however, that even partial documentation of the source of the services will be helpful. Section 863
clearly indicates that the taxpayer may prove partial allocation
10 2
of management services under the income source provisions.
Assuming the entities had not anticipated income source
allocation problems, the worst possible situation occurs when
the statute of limitations on the Canadian tax liability has run,
but the statute has not run on the American subsidiary's return.103 In such a situation, the Service may allege that the
management services were performed wholly within the United
States, and therefore the American subsidiary should have
withheld at the source on such fees." If the Service is successful, the related group will be faced with double taxation: a
thirty percent withholding at the source tax on the subsidiary
as well as Canadian corporate income tax liability on the parent. Other less onerous but nonetheless serious double taxation
possibilities may arise, depending on when the taxpayers become aware of their position. 05
Fortunately, various administrative procedures have been
developed to minimize the possibility of international double
taxation. The United States-Canadian Income Tax Treaty specifically provides in Articles IV""1 and XVI 107 for an administrative mechanism known as the "competent authority."" In the
102. See notes 39-69 and 85-101 and accompanying text supra.
103. The potential for such a situation is not unlikely. Except in cases of fraud or
misrepresentation, the Canadian Minister must notify any taxpayer in writing of a
deficiency within four years from the day the tax was due. Can. Stat., Act to Amend
the Income Tax Act, c. 63, § 152(4) (1971). In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service
may assess the tax at any time if the taxpayer has filed a false or fraudulent return or
failed to file a return at all. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1)-(3). See note 12 supra.
104. See notes 21-33 and accompanying text supra. In this instance, if the statute
of limitations had run on the Canadian tax return, but no American return was filed,
the Service could assess a withholding at the source tax against the domestic subsidiary.
105. If the assessment by the Service occurs within four years of the date that the
Canadian return was filed, a refund could be requested by the foreign parent from its
taxing authority. Can. Stat., Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, c. 63, § 164(1)-(3)
(1971).
106. Convention Between the United States and Canada Respecting Double Taxation, supra note 20.
107. Id., 56 Stat. at 1404.
108. The competent authorities were designated in the Protocal to the Tax Treaty
as the Commissioner and the Minister and their duly appointed representatives. (Protocal § 4). Id., 56 Stat. at 1408. The "competent authority" procedures have recently
been the subject of much literature, see Cole, Competent Authority Procedure:Inter-
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United States the competent authority function is bifurcated
into the Assistant Commissioner Compliance and the Assistant
Commissioner Technical.'19 By treaty the United States competent authority and his foreign counterpart are empowered to
negotiate arrangements minimizing or eliminating double taxation." 0
Revenue procedures 70-18'" and 77-16111 outline the steps
to be followed by a taxpayer in requesting competent authority
assistance. Revenue procedure 70-18 is exclusively concerned
with the possibility of double taxation arising from section 482
reallocations, "' 3 while revenue procedure 77-16 is concerned
with double taxation arising from the availability to a United
States taxpayer of credits, exemptions, reduced tax rates, or
other benefits provided under an income tax treaty." 4 Though
the question of the determination of the source of a particular
item of income does not fall squarely within the categories
addressed by either of these rulings, the procedures outlined
should offer the taxpayer some guidance.
The competent authority alternative is not free from drawnational Tax Counsel Gives His Views, 35 J. TAX. 8 (1971); Hanlon, The Competent
Authority: Settlement of InternationalTax Disputes, 1975 TAX ADvISER 4; O'Donnell,
A Provision-By-ProvisionAnalysis of Rev. Proc. 70-18: Many Questions Remain, 35 J.
TAX. 12 (1971); Pergament and Auderieth, The "Competent Authority" Rules for
Section 482 Relief: An Analysis of Rev. Proc. 70-18, 35 J. TAX. 2 (1971); Comment, The
Competent Authority Concept in United States Tax Treaties, 2 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus.
232 (1970).
109. See Hanlon, supra note 108, at 4.
110. See Convention Between the United States and Canada Respecting Double
Taxation, supranote 20. By January of 1975, 68 cases had been referred to the United
States competent authority and 60 had resulted in full relief from double taxation.
Hanlon, supra note 108 at 7-8.
111. Rev. Proc. 18, 1970-2 C.B. 493.
112. Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-19 I.R.B. 35.
113. Section 1. The Purpose and Scope of Rev. Proc. 70-18 states that it is concerned exclusively with allocation of income questions. 1970-2 C.B. at 493. The Revenue Procedure then outlines the procedures to be followed where the treaty country
proposes the allocations, Id. at 494-96, and the procedures to be followed where the
Internal Revenue Service proposes the allocations. Id. at 496-97. The Procedure also
outlines the general responsibilities of the competent authority. Id. at 498.
114. Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-19 I.R.B. 35 outlines the procedures whereby a taxpayer may present his request for relief from double taxation, id. at 35-37, and the
procedures to be followed by the competent authority, id. at 37-38. Section 7 recognizes that taxpayers of the United States may request advance rulings as an alternative
to the competent authority procedures. Id. at 38. Section 1, Purpose and Scope of the
Procedure, makes it clear that Rev. Proc. 77-16 was not meant to encroach in any wry
on the problems addressed by Rev. Proc. 70-18. Id. at 35.
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backs. Many questions have been left unanswered even by the
revenue procedures. First, the criteria for acceptance of a case
by the competent authority have not been published."' Second, all the taxpayer may request is "consideration"; the
granting of consideration by the competent authority does not
guarantee relief from double taxation."' Finally, the question
remains as to what relief, if any, the taxpayer will be afforded
if the competent authorities fail to agree."7 Though the Service
(through the competent authority) has demonstrated a willingness to help taxpayers facing potential double taxation, preventative tax planning may eliminate the need to rely on the
ambiguous and uncertain competent authority procedures developed in recent years.
CONCLUSION

The relative paucity of case law and revenue rulings in the
area of income source determination of foreign parentperformed management services is no indication of the importance of the issue. Management services agreements are a valuable tax planning tool for both the subsidiary and the parent
corporation. However, the ramifications of poorly planned or
115. Prior to the release of Rev. Proc. 70-18 Commissioner Thrower had identified
three criteria for acceptance by the competent authority: (1) the economic double
taxation issue had to have been established and fully explored at the administrative
level; (2) an informal agreement had to exist between the Service and the United
States taxpayer as to how much of a settlement would be acceptable; and (3) the
request had to merit consideration. O'Donnell, supra note 108, at 14. One finds no
mention of the criteria for acceptance in either Rev. Proc. 70-18 or Rev. Proc. 77-16.
See notes 111-112 supra.
116. Pergament and Auderieth, supra note 108, at 4. See Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2
C.B. at §§ 5.01, 5.02 and 9.01. See also Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-19 I.R.B. at §§ 2.02,
4.03 and 6; Cole, supra note 108, at 9-10.
117. It would appear that the taxpayer is left with his other alternative adminis.
trative and judicial remedies. See 1970-2 C.B. at 498 (sec. 9.04); 1977-19 I.R.B. at 38
(sec. 6.04). O'Donnell has noted that: "Unless the taxpayer's foreign affiliate is successful in any legal action, if any it is able to bring in the foreign country, the taxpayer
appears to be eternally burdened with a double taxation situation." O'Donnell, supra
Note 108, at 13-14. See also Pergament and Auderieth, supra note 108, at 4 (taxpayer
is limited to his administrative and judicial remedies if he refuses to accept the competent authorities' compromise or if the competent authority refuses to consider the
case). Hanlon has noted however that as of January 1975, 68 cases had been closed by
the competent authority, in which 60 resulted in full relief from double taxation, four
in partial relief, and four without relief due to procedural barriers. Hanlon, supra note
108, at 7-8. Hanlon concludes: "In short, the record demonstrates our overall success
in resolving these issues. Only a small number of cases were closed without relief to
the taxpayers, and this was caused by a procedural barrier, not a breakdown in negotiations." Id. at 8.
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unplanned management services agreements may have a twofold effect: unanticipated recognition of United States source
income and, even more deleterious, subjection to potential
double taxation.
This article has attempted to identify those procedures
that may be implemented by related corporations to minimize
the possibility of United States source income recognition or
double taxation. Because the structure of the income source
provisions permits partial income source allocation, every attempt to document the source of every possible management
service performed should be made at the earliest possible date.
In conclusion, the relationship of parent corporation and subsidiary is such that because of the ever-present concern for
avoiding even the appearance of a section 482 non-arm's-length
transaction, many of the procedures and forms of documentation advocated by this article will entail little additional preparation, if any. Consequently, the implementation of these procedures will prepare the taxpayers for, if not protect them from,
Service scrutiny of parent-subsidiary management services
agreements under sections 861 through 864 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Foreign-Trade Zones: Sub-Zones, State
Taxation, and State Legislation
JESSE J. ATKINS Ill*
STEPHEN J. DOYLE**
WALTER D. SCHWIDETZKY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article proposes to address the topics of sub-zones,
state taxation, and state legislation as they relate to foreigntrade zones. Before embarking upon a detailed treatment of

these topics, however, it may be appropriate to discuss briefly
certain general characteristics of foreign-trade zones.
Foreign-trade zones are facilities created under the
Foreign-Trade Zones Act' (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
for the purpose of expediting and encouraging foreign commerce. The Act provides for the creation of a Foreign-Trade

Zones Board' consisting of the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of War.3 The
Board is authorized, inter alia, to grant to qualified applicants'
"the privilege of establishing, operating, and maintaining
foreign-trade zones in or adjacent to ports of entry under the
jurisdiction of the United States."5
Perhaps the most frequently cited definition of a foreigntrade zone is that contained in the regulations' promulgated by
the Foreign-Trade Zones Board:
It [a foreign-trade zone] is an isolated, enclosed, and policed
area, operated as a public utility, in or adjacent to a port of entry,
* B.A., 1971, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1978, University of Denver;
M.B.A. Candidate, 1979, University of Denver.
** A.B., 1975, Georgetown University; M.B.A., J.D., 1978 University of Denver;
Member of Colorado Bar.
*** B.A., 1974, University of Denver; M.B.A., J.D., 1978, University of Denver.
1. Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 1934, ch. 590, 48 Stat. 998-1003 (1934), as amended,
19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-u (1976).
2. Id. § 81a(b).
3. Id. The Secretary of the Army is now the third member of the Foreign-Trade
Zones Board replacing the now defunct office of the Secretary of War. 15 C.F.R. §
400.103 (1977).
4. Id. § 81a(g).
5. Id. § Sb(a).
6. 15 C.F.R. §§ 400.100-1406 (1977).
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furnished with facilities for lading, unlading, handling, storing,
mainipulating [sic], manufacturing, and exhibiting goods, and
for reshipping them by land, water, or air. Any foreign and domestic merchandise, except such as is prohibited by law or such
as the Board may order to be excluded as detrimental to the
public interest, health, or safety may be brought into a zone
without being subject to the customs laws of the United States
governing the entry of goods or the payment of duty thereon; and
such merchandise permitted in a zone may be stored, exhibited,
manufactured, mixed or manipulated in any manner, except as
provided in the act and other applicable laws or regulations. The
merchandise may be exported, destroyed, or sent into customs
territory from the zone, in the original package or otherwise. It is
subject to customs duties if sent
into customs territory, but not
7
if reshipped to foreign points.

As this definition suggests, "The ability to defer or eliminate
payment of customs duties is the traditional incentive for sending goods to a foreign trade zone for storage or manufacture." 8
The foreign-trade zone is one component of the temporary
entry system established under Title 19 of the United States
Code.' The drawback, the bonded warehouse, and the temporary importation bond, constitute the other three components
of the system. 0 Like the foreign-trade zone, each of the three
offers some relief from payment of customs duties.
The drawback permits a merchant to "drawback," (that
is, to reacquire) up to ninety-nine percent of the duties paid
on imported goods, if the goods imported are later exported."
The drawback procedure is helpful principally in those cases
in which a merchant imports goods for use in the manufacture
of a product for export. The chief disadvantages of the drawback are the initial capital outlay for payment of duties on the
items imported, the quite burdensome paperwork necessary
to implement the drawback procedure, and the delay in collection of the drawback payments.
Bonded warehouses for storage and for manufacture are
also available to importers." Duties are not assessed on goods
7. Id. § 400.101 (1977).

8. Landy & McGinnis, Foreign Trade Zones in Florida:Legal Considerationsfor
Foreign Business Interests, 10 LAW. AM. 141, 142 (1978).
9. See note, Foreign Trade Zones: Hole in the Tariff Wall or Incentives for
Development?, 2 LAW & POL'v INT'L Bus. 190, 191 (1970).
10. Id.
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
12. Id.§ 1311.
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in a bonded warehouse until they leave the bonded warehouse
and enter United States Customs Territory. 13 However, a bond
must be paid both for the warehouse facility, and for the individual goods imported. 4 A bonded warehouse has an advantage
over the drawback system in that the duty on an imported
product is never levied if the product is reexported. However,
the problem of the initial capital outlay is not solved in its
entirety, since payment of bond is required. Additionally, the
bonded warehouse procedure, like the drawback procedure,
involves burdensome paperwork and, moreover, constant Customs supervision is required. 15 A final disadvantage is the
three-year time limit after which goods may no longer remain
in the bonded warehouse. 6
Temporary importation bonds permit a manufacturer to
import goods without paying customs duties, provided that the
goods are repaired, altered, or processed and then exported."
The advantage of this procedure is that manufacturing can
take place outside a bonded warehouse without payment of full
customs duties as required by the drawback procedure. The
disadvantages of the temporary importation bond are strict
Customs supervision, the time limit in which the final product
must be exported," and the required bond. 9
In an attempt to alleviate some of the administrative and
financial burdens of the drawback, the bonded warehouse, and
the temporary importation bond, Congress created the foreigntrade zone. The zone, although operated under constant U. S.
Customs Service supervision, does not require immediate payment of customs duties or initial expenditures for bonds. In
addition, the administrative procedures associated with zone
use are far simpler than those required for the utilization of the
other components of the temporary entry system.
II. SUB-ZONES
In 1952 the Foreign-Trade Zones Board amended its regulations to authorize "special-purpose sub-zones" in addition to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

19 U.S.C. § 1555 (1976).
Id.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1555, 1562 (1976).
19 U.S.C. § 1557(a).(1976).
19 U.S.C. § 1202, subch. 8, pt. 5, subpt. C, item 864.05 (1976).
Id. at item 862.20.
Id.
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the "general-purpose zones" already authorized by the Act.2
Businesses which qualify under this provision avoid relocating
their export operations to an existing zone. Instead, they simply secure the area of their plant or warehouse which will comprise the sub-zone, and follow the same procedural regulations
enacted for the general-purpose zones. The only distinction
between the two types of zones is that sub-zones, unlike
general-purpose zones, are used by only one firm. They are not
accessible to other companies wishing to operate under foreigntrade zone status. In fact, they were specifically designed for
companies unable to relocate to, or take advantage of, an existing general-purpose zone.'
The importance of the sub-zone provisions has grown as
more companies which cannot use existing zones seek the benefits of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act. This section will discuss
the problems which may be encountered by companies planning to apply for a grant of sub-zone status.
The application procedure for sub-zones is similar to that
for general-purpose zones. A public or private corporation =
must submit an application detailing the "location and qualifications of the area in which it is proposed to establish a zone."
However, in the case of sub-zones, an application cannot be
submitted unless either a general-purpose zone application has
also been submitted or a general-purpose zone has already been
authorized. 2 ' In addition, the applicant for the sub-zone must
20. 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1977).
21. Da Ponte, Foreign-Trade Zones: An Update, AM. IMPoRT & EXPORT BuLL.,
April, 1977.
22. The applicant is usually a public corporation as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 81a(e)
(1976):
JAI State, political subdivision thereof, a municipality, a public agency
of a State, political subdivision thereof, or municipality, or a corporate
municipal instrumentality of one or more States.
A private corporation is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 81a(f):
[Alny corporation (other than a public corporation) which is organized
for the purpose of establishing, operating, and maintaining a foreigntrade zone and which is chartered under special Act enacted after June
18, 1934, of the State or States within which it is to operate such
zone.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 81f(a)(1) (1976).
24. The regulation states that sub-zones may be established in "an area separate
from an existing zone," 15 C.F.R. § 400.304, thereby necessitating the existence of a
general-purpose zone. However, the Board has accepted simultaneous generalpurpose zone and sub-zone applications. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,391 (1977).
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be the same corporation which applied for, or is the grantee of,
the general-purpose zone.25 A company cannot be the applicant
for its own sub-zone but must request the general-purpose zone
26
applicant or grantee to apply for a sub-zone in its behalf.
Once the application is submitted, the Board analyzes the
information and holds hearings on the proposal." The Board is
authorized to "make the grant"2 8 if it "finds that the proposed
plans and location are suitable," the "facilities and appurtenances . . . are sufficient,"0 and that "existing or authorized
zones will not serve adequately the convenience of commerce
with respect to the proposed purposes."'" An additional standard, not appearing in the statute or the regulations, but used
by the Board, is whether the applicant can show a "specific
public benefit" brought about by establishment of the subzone. 32 Companies which are planning to develop a sub-zone
should be especially concerned with meeting both the location
requirement (as used to insure that the sub-zone lies "in or
adjacent to" a customs port of entry) 33 and the public benefit
test. Neither criterion is clear in practice, but both must be
understood prior to the application process.
The location requirement is implied from the relationship
of the sub-zone regulation to the Act. The Foreign-Trade Zones
Act authorizes the Foreign-Trade Zones Board "to grant to
corporations the privilege of establishing . . . foreign-trade
zones in or adjacent to ports of entry . . . . ",3, (Emphasis
added.) The regulation states that sub-zones may be established "in an area separate from an existing zone." The language in the regulation can be interpreted to extend the bound25. Da Ponte, supra note 21.
26. Id. The restriction is implied since section 400.304, which authorizes subzones, does not indicate who may apply, thereby leaving this area to the section of
the Act and regulations which specify who may apply for a grant. In addition, subzones are considered to be extensions of the general-purpose zone, not independent
zones.
27. 15 C.F.R. § 400.605 (1977).
28. 19 U.S.C. § 81g (1976).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1977).
32. Da Ponte, supra note 21.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 81b(a) (1976).
34. Id.
35. 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1977).
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aries of the area in which sub-zones can be located. However,
by permitting sub-zones "in an area separate from" the
general-purpose zone, the Board was referring to its conception
of sub-zones as nonadjacent additions to general-purpose
zones. Sub-zones were authorized not to extend the area for site
location, but rather to meet the needs of individual companies
which were "in or adjacent to" customs ports of entry but were
unable to use the general-purpose zone.
Colorado offers an example of the problems encountered in
interpreting the definition of "in or adjacent to" the port of
entry. The only port of entry in Colorado is Denver." The Denver port of entry is established by statute and roughly corresponds with the city limits of Denver.
The definition of "adjacent to" the customs port of entry
is, as yet, unclear. Some commentators have suggested that
"adjacent to" allows a general-purpose zone or a sub-zone to
be located in any county adjacent to the county within which
the port of entry lies. This would supposedly help insure that
the U.S. Customs Service would not be prevented from supervising any zone operations because of distance problems. However, in Colorado this interpretation would allow zones to be
constructed sixty miles from Denver in Arapahoe County, yet
not be constructed in Boulder, only thirty miles away.
The regulations offer support for a different interpretation
of "adjacent to," based upon the ability of surrounding areas
to sustain a foreign-trade zone. An important consideration of
the Board when evaluating applications is whether the proposed zone will "adequately serve the convenience of commerce." 37 In order to serve the "convenience of commerce" a
foreign-trade zone must be located in an area with, inter alia,
an adequate transportation network 3 and a regional economy
which can support a foreign-trade zone. 9 The logical sites for
establishment of foreign-trade zones, including sub-zones, are
large urban areas. "Adjacent to" could be defined to be the
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2, Annex A, Sch. D (1976).
37. 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1977).
38. 15 C.F.R. § 400.402(b) (1977) requires proof of adequate warehouse space,
transportation connections, and power facilities.
39. The application entails an economic survey of the area in order to:
"demonstrate ... that the anticipated commerce, benefits, and returns, both direct
and indirect, will justify its construction to expedite and encourage foreign commerce."
15 C.F.R. § 400.400 (1977).
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next adjacent urban area, subject to reasonable distance constraints. 0 The closest urban areas to Denver with over 50,000
in population are Colorado Springs and Boulder. If "adjacent
to" were interpreted to mean the "next adjacent urban area"
then both cities would qualify as potential sites for additional
general-purpose zones or sub-zones.
The Boonville, Missouri application for a general-purpose
zone, filed in September of 1978, offers precedent for the "next
adjacent urban area" interpretation of "adjacent to" a customs
port of entry." Boonville is not in a county adjacent to the
Kansas City port of entry. However, as of November 1, 1978,
the Boonville zone had not been authorized. Yet, an internal
opinion written by counsel in the office of the Foreign-Trade
Zones Board supports the Boonville application by arguing for
the "next adjacent urban area" interpretation of "adjacent to"
the port of entry.4" If the application is approved, it will do
much to liberalize the current standard.
If a firm is reasonably certain that it lies "in or adjacent
to" a customs port of entry, it must then determine whether it
can show a "public benefit" resulting from sub-zone operations. Sub-zones cannot be authorized solely on the basis of
profit to the sub-zone user. Rather the sub-zone must benefit
the economy in general, such as through "retention of jobs that
would otherwise be overseas."'

3

Actually the public benefit test is no more than proof of a
condition presumed to be present in general-purpose zones.
The Foreign-Trade Zones Act was enacted to help alleviate
problems with bonded warehouses and drawbacks in order "to
expedite and encourage foreign commerce."" In order to determine whether the Act's purpose would be met, the application
requires preparation of an economic survey.15 This survey must
not only determine whether foreign commerce will be encouraged but also take into consideration the effect upon "the U.S.
balance of payments." Congress was attempting to prevent the
40. An internal opinion in the office of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board supports
this interpretation. Telephone conversation with John J. Da Ponte, Jr., Executive
Secretary, Foreign-Trade Zones Board (September 11, 1978).
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 44,876.(1978).
42. Telephone conversation, supra note 40.
43. Da Ponte, supra note 21.
44. 48 Stat. 998 (1934).
45. 15 C.F.R. § 400.400 (1977).
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Foreign-Trade Zones Act from becoming a tool for foreign companies to the detriment of domestic business.
The public benefit test for sub-zones fulfills the same function as the economic survey in the application. The test requires the applicant to prove that the sub-zone will encourage
foreign commerce and favorably affect the balance of payments. In addition, the test is useful to both applicants and the
Board in that it underscores the importance of showing benefits
to the public where special arrangements are being made for a
particular company.
The most significant challenge to date against the establishment of sub-zones and the Foreign-Trade Zones Act arose
in Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans.11 This action was commenced
in federal district court by Armco Steel Corporation (Armco)
which sought a declaratory judgment to set aside an order by
the Foreign-Trade Zones Board authorizing the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans (New Orleans Board) to
operate a sub-zone. The sub-zone was to be located at a shipyard owned by Equitable-Higgins Shipyard, Inc. (Equitable).
Equitable intervened in the action, joined by Central Gulf
Steamship Corporation (Central Gulf). The district court
granted Equitable's and Central Gulf's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal the district court's judgment was affirmed.
The events which led to the lawsuit originated with a contract between Equitable and Central Gulf. Under the contract
Equitable was to supply Central Gulf with 233 barges.47 These
barges were to be manufactured out of steel plates imported
from Japan. Equitable would normally pay duty on the imported steel upon entry of the steel into U.S. customs territory.
Since barges entered U.S. customs territory duty-free, Equitable could avoid payment of any duty on the steel by manufacturing under foreign-trade zone status. However, the shipyard
was not next to the operating general-purpose zone and could
46. 303 F.Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970).
47. The barges were to be used aboard LASH vessels which were high-speed cargo
ships equipped with cranes to pick up and carry light barges. The barges could travel
inland waterways, pick up cargo, return to the port of entry, and then be transferred
onto the LASH ship. These barges would then be transported aboard the LASH vessel
to foreign ports of entry, and then unloaded to travel along inland waterways to discharge their goods and pick up new goods.
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not be economically moved. The sub-zone provision offered
Equitable its only access to the benefits of the Foreign-Trade
Zones Act.
Armco's motion for summary judgment rested heavily on
three of its five arguments in which it claimed that:
1) . ...
2) The Order nullifie[d] the tariff laws and enable[d] Equitable to evade customs duties;
3) the sub-zone [could not] be operated as a "public utility,"
as required by the Act, since it [would] be used solely by a
private corporation; [and that]
4) the Zones Board's findings of fact [were] insufficient and
[were] not based on substantial evidence;"
5) .. ..

The first of these contentions referred to the concern that
the Act would become a "hole in the tariff wall" in that Equitable could avoid duty payment on importation of foreign goods
used in the manufacture of the barges. The court deferred to
Congressional determination that this was a "consideration of
national policy.' 4 In this decision, Judge Bonsal, District
Judge in the original action, recognized that the Act was designed to alleviate custom obligations in order to promote foreign trade, and that this was typically an executive decision.
Armco's argument was premised on the necessity for absolute
protection of domestic manufacturers through tariff laws. It
failed to acknowledge the contribution the Act provides by
permitting domestic companies to lower costs by avoiding certain duties and encouraging foreign companies to utilize American labor and warehousing facilities.
During lengthy debates on the bill which subsequently
became the Foreign-Trade Zones Act,50 the House discussed
the possible effects on domestic commerce which later concerned the court in Armco. Those opposing the bill feared that
foreign-trade zones would permit the lower priced foreign products to be dumped into the United States in competition with
domestic commerce. Congressman Cullen, a proponent of the
bill, disagreed. Foreign-trade zones would benefit domestic
commerce, he stated, not hinder it. In support of his argument,
48. 303 F.Supp. at 268.

49. Id.
50. 78 CONG. REc. 9778 (1934).
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he quoted from a letter written by the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States who wrote:
[The Chamber of Commerce believes] that . . .American merchants and manufacturers will benefit in a variety of ways from
the advantages of a wide American consignment market for foreign products; that the free zones will bring needed improvements in American port and terminal facilities; that the free
zones will bring added business to American banks, insurance
companies, freight forwarders, and warehousemen; that free
zones will bring about a vast improvement of the type of facilities
provided at present only by bonded warehouses and drawbacks
together with a simplification and saving in the work of customs
administration."'

The public benefit test responds to the concern in Armco
and in the House debates that the Act may damage domestic
commerce in its attempt to "expedite and encourage foreign
trade.""2 The test requires the Board to assess the overall impact on the economy which would result from the operation of
a proposed sub-zone. It prohibits the Board from granting a
sub-zone if, for example, jobs would be lost to foreign countries
with no offsetting benefit to the domestic economy.
Armco's second argument questioned the ability of the
sub-zone operator to manage the sub-zone as a public utility,
as required by the Act. 53 A profit-seeking company could not
fall within the definition of a public utility under Armco's interpretation of the statute. The court dispensed with this contention by addressing the issue of whether other firms were
denied the same ability to operate as a sub-zone. The court
assumed that the public utility requirement was satisfied
through compliance with customs regulations. Quoting the
Foreign-Trade Zones Board regulations, the court held that the
New Orleans Board was obligated to provide sub-zone status
under like conditions. 4 The important factor was whether the
Board or the grantee could discriminate between companies
asking for sub-zone status. Ifso, the Act could be used against
portions of domestic industry instead of as a tool to encourage
foreign trade. Since the court read in a requirement of impar51. 78 CONG. REc. 9768 (1934).
52. See 303 F.Supp. at 268.
53. 19 U.S.C. § 81n requires: "[Ejach zone [to be] operated as a public utility,
and all rates and charges for all services or privileges within the zone [to] be fair and
reasonable."
54. 303 F.Supp. at 270.
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tiality in permitting sub-zone grants, access to the Act's benefits was open to all qualifed companies.
The third challenge to the Equitable sub-zone claimed
that the Board's findings were insufficient. In order to grant a
sub-zone the Board must find that "existing or authorized
zones will not serve adequately the convenience of commerce
with respect to the proposed purposes."" However, the Board
found enough evidence to satisfy this criterion since employment would increase, more goods would be shipped through the
Port of New Orleans, and the sub-zone would help reduce the
balance of payments deficit."
On appeal the Second Circuit upheld the lower court, discussing the impact of the sub-zone on domestic industry and
on the balance of payments. 7 The court recognized that United
States steel producers would lose the competitive protection
afforded by tariffs if the sub-zone were established. However,
the overall effect on American steel producers would be negligible since the shipbuilding industry consumed only one percent
of domestic steel. As for the balance of payments, there would
be a flow of cash out of the country if Central Gulf decided to
contract with foreign shipbuilders. 51 The sub-zone benefits
would encourage construction within the United States, and
only the steel would be purchased on a foreign market.
The public benefit test addresses the same issues which
concerned the courts in Armco. Both Armco and the test focus
on the economic effect of a sub-zone. The Act was designed to
bolster trade. If the sub-zone's benefits are limited to the operators of the sub-zone, it contradicts the Act's intent. However,
if the applicant shows that domestic employment will increase
or that the balance of trade will improve, then the Board might
be more disposed to order the grant.
Sub-zone 33A offers an example of the procedure a company must undertake in order to obtain a grant from the
Board. 9 In April of 1977 the Regional Industrial Development
Corporation of Southwestern Pennsylvania (RIDC) submitted
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1977).
303 F.Supp. at 270.
431 F.2d 779 (1970).
Id. at 785.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,391 (1977).
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an application requesting a grant authorizing it to establish a
general-purpose zone in Allegheny County and a specialpurpose sub-zone in Westmoreland County. The Pittsburgh
customs port of entry was located primarily in Allegheny
County, but extended into Westmoreland County, thereby allowing both zones to meet the requirement that they be "in or
adjacent to" a customs port of entry.
The sub-zone was to encompass a portion of an automobile
assembly and manufacturing plant owned by Volkswagen
Manufacturing Corporation of America (Volkswagen). Since
RIDC was the applicant for the general-purpose zone, it was
necessary for it to apply for the sub-zone on behalf of Volkswagen.
Volkswagen had negotiated for sub-zone status for its
plant because it had determined that it would be paying duties
at a rate of 3% within the sub-zone, as opposed to 4.2% without the sub-zone. However, the benefits of the sub-zone were
not limited to Volkswagen. Once operations started, Volkswagen planned to employ up to 5,000 people, and it estimated
a secondary impact of 20,000 additional jobs in the region.
Volkswagen also indicated that it might not operate a United
States plant without foreign-trade zone status. The public
benefit test was satisfied since the sub-zone would significantly increase employment.
III.

STATE AND LocAL TAXATION OF FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES

While the Foreign-Trade Zones Act exempts goods in
foreign-trade zones from customs duties, it does not specifically
exempt such goods from state and local taxation. Whether
state and local taxes" apply is of obvious importance to businesses in determining whether they should move the goods they
import and export through foreign-trade zones.
Export/Import Clause
Under the Export/Import Clause of the United States Constitution, a state may not impose "imposts" or "duties" on

60. Henceforth referred to simply as "state taxation." For example, it is at present
unclear whether such state taxes as sales taxes (CoLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-101 to 126),
and use taxes (Cow. Ryv. STAT. § 39-26-201 to 211), or such local taxes as sales taxes
(DENVER, CoO., Rzv. MusednAL. CODE § 166), and use taxes (DENVER, COLO., REV.
MuNro]PAL CODE 166A), would apply to goods within a zone located in Colorado.
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exports or imports.' However, as a result of Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages 2 the clause almost certainly does not prohibit
a state from taxing goods held in a foreign-trade zone. In
Michelin the Supreme Court held that a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax "is not the type of state exaction which
the Framers of the Constitution . . .had in mind as being an
'impost' or 'duty' under the Export/Import Clause.63 Therefore,
as long as the state tax on items in a foreign-trade zone is nondiscriminatory, meaning goods outside the zone are taxed on
the same basis as goods in the zone, the Export/Import Clause
does not present an impediment to the state taxation of products stored or processed in a foreign-trade zone.
However, it might be argued that if the goods in the
foreign-trade zone are intended for export, then a nondiscriminatory state tax is in the nature of an impost or duty.
The tires in the Michelin case (upon which the state tax levies
were permitted) were no longer in transit, a fact specifically
acknowledged by the Supreme Court. 4 As discussed below,
courts will frequently make reference to whether goods are or
are not intended to come to rest in the United States, without
stating precisely how that affects the decision.
Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary authority
over both interstate and foreign commerce. 5 States may not
discriminate against foreign commerce, 6 or infringe upon the
federal regulation of foreign commerce. 7 Therefore, if the state
taxation of goods in a foreign-trade zone is held to be discriminatory with respect to foreign commerce, or is held to be an
intrusion upon the federal government's regulation of that
commerce, it will be disallowed.
Foreign Commerce/Relevant Cases
Neither the Foreign-Trade Zones Act, nor the regulations
thereunder, states that goods in foreign-trade zones are in for61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
Shultz,
66.
67.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl.2.
423 U.S. 276 (1976).
Id. at 283.
Id. at 302.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.3, as interpreted in California Bankers Ass'n v.
416 U.S. 21 (1974).
See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
See McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil, 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
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eign commerce. However, since goods in a zone are exempt
from United States customs duties, 8 and since goods in a
foreign-trade zone are intimately connected with foreign commerce, and further since Congress desired to encourage foreign
commerce by the passage of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act,"
there would seem to be no fundamental difference between
goods in a zone and goods in foreign commerce. In McGoldrick
v. Gulf Oil7 the Supreme Court indicated it might support
such a view. This case involved an attempt by the state of New
York to tax oil located in a bonded warehouse. The oil in the
bonded warehouse had been imported and was intended, after
processing, for export. The court pointed out that the Congressional exemption of the oil from United States taxation was a
valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce
and that the state tax on the oil would be an "infringement of
the Congressional regulation of the commerce."' Since, as
previously pointed out, a foreign-trade zone is in part intended to have a similar function to that of a bonded warehouse, it could be argued that goods in a foreign-trade zone, but
which are intended for export, should be exempt from state
taxation under McGoldrick.
During v. Valente," while not a tax case, contains reasoning similar to that of McGoldrick. In During the defendant
hired the plaintiff to obtain purchasers for foreign liquor stored
in the New York foreign-trade zone. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant breached his contract, and it was maintained in
defense that the plaintiff had no cause of action because he had
not received a permit to sell liquor as required by New York
law. The New York court held that "[the] zone was created
under the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations" which "power is exclusive and plenary. 7 3 (Emphasis
added.) The court went on to state that the mere "geographical
location of the goods within the state of New York did not
constitute an import into the state," citing McGoldrick.7" The
court added that the imposition of the licensing requirement
68. 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1976).
69. Purpose Clause to the Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 48 Stat. 998 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Purpose Clause].
70. 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
71. Id. at 429.
72. 267 App. Div. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1944).
73. Id. at 387.
74. Id.
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would be a burden on foreign commerce and interfere with
Congress' exclusive control over such commerce. However, the
court also pointed out that the complaint contained no allegation that the sale involved the importation of liquor into the
state of New York, thereby maintaining the distinction between goods in a zone intended for export and goods in a zone
intended for entry into United States customs territory.
In American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Contra
Costa,75 a California appellate court permitted the state to
impose a nondiscriminatory tax on metal inventories in a
bonded warehouse. The case is, however, of dubious explanatory value with respect to the state taxation of goods in a
foreign-trade zone. The California court emphasized the special nature and background of smelting and refining warehouses," and specifically held that the law covering foreigntrade zones was not controlling," and suggested that the
Foreign-Trade Zones Act may be a "broader statute" than the
statute authorizing bonded warehouses.7 8 The court, however,
also stated that the inventories in the bonded warehouse in
question were not irrevocably destined for foreign commerce. 9
Thus, here too the destination of the good is emphasized.
The Final Destination
Whether goods in a foreign-trade zone should be treated
differently for state taxation purposes may depend upon
whether the goods will be exported or enter United States customs territory. An argument may be made for the proposition
that the goods should not receive different treatment, and thus
state taxes should not apply in either case. It should be recalled
that "persuasive reasons" are required before federal regulation of a field of commerce will be deemed preemptive of state
regulatory power 0
As stated earlier, Congress felt foreign commerce would be
encouraged by exempting goods stored in a zone from custom
75. 271 Cal.2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 273 (1970).
76. 77 Cal. Rptr. at 592-97.
77. Id. at 599.
78. Id. Bonded warehouses are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1555 (1976).
79. 77 Cal. Rep. at 596. This issue of state taxation of goods in a foreign-trade zone
is now being litigated in California. See Lilli-Ann Corp. v. City & County of San
Francisco, No. 726-271 (Super. Ct. of San Francisco County filed July 29, 1977).
80. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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duties.8 1 Congress, in passing the Foreign-Trade Zones Act,
made no distinction between goods destined for the United
States and those destined for other countries. Congress could
have done so. The fact that Congress did not could arguably
mean that it felt foreign commerce would be fostered by the use
of a foreign-trade zone regardless of the destination of the goods
in the zone. If states are permitted to levy taxes on items in a
zone, many of the cost benefits foreign-trade zones offer to
exporters and importers will be decreased.
In addition, foreign commerce will be encouraged if state
taxes are not permitted to be levied on goods in a foreign-trade
zone, even if those goods are destined for United States customs territory. Potential importers and exporters of goods will
have a further inducement to engage in foreign commerce if
they know a place exists where goods can be stored or processed
without the imposition of duties or taxes. Since state taxes
would increase a zone user's costs, even where the goods never
enter U.S. customs territory, they too discourage foreign commerce, thus conflicting with the congressional mandate demonstrated by the Foreign-Trade Zones Act."2 Such taxes thwart
the primary purpose of a foreign-trade zone.
Also, state taxation of the zones interferes with the desire
Congress had to simplify matters when it passed the ForeignTrade Zones Act, bonded warehouses and drawbacks frequently being more complex solutions.8 State taxation introduces a complicating element, particularly since some states
will have the tax and others will not, presenting the anomaly
that foreign-trade zones will be more beneficial to exporters
and importers in some areas than others. "Persuasive reasons"
thus exist for exempting foreign-trade zones from state taxation.
Federal Taxation
Apart from customs duties, foreign-trade zones are not
exempt from federal taxation. The Foreign-Trade Zones Act
makes no mention of exempting goods in a zone from anything
other than customs duties. The sponsor of the Act, Congressman Emmanuel Celler stated: "[Foreign-trade zones are] . . .
81. See Purpose Clause, note 69 supra.
82. Id. See also related discussion.
83. See introductory discussion supra.
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subject to all the laws relating to . . . everything except the
customs."8" Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service is of the
opinion that federal income taxes do apply to income derived
from foreign-trade zones, although goals are exempt from the
manufacturer's excise tax.u
Some would argue s" that since nonexempted federal revenue laws apply to zones, state laws should similarly apply. A
possible fallacy in this line of reasoning is that the federal
authority over foreign commerce is plenary. The federal government can reshape its policies as expressed by the ForeignTrade Zones Act.8 7 The Federal Constitution does not give the
states such powers.
IV.

STATE LEGISLATION

One facet of the study of foreign-trade zones which has
received scant attention from commentators is that of state
legislation engendered by the Foreign-Trade Zones Act.m This
section proposes, first,, to ascertain the necessity (if any) for
such legislation under the Act and, second, to discuss ways in
which such state enactments, whether required or not by the
Act, can contribute to the efficient establishment, operation,
and maintenance of foreign-trade zones.
Statements may be found in the literature of foreign-trade
zones suggesting that enabling or authorizing legislation
enacted by the state in which the zone is to be located is a
prerequisite to any application for or grant of the privilege to
establish, operate, and maintain such a zone. 8 If such statements are construed to mean that the Act requires state enabling legislation prior to any application or grant, they may not
be wholly accurate. Close scrutiny of the provisions of the Act
indicates that, under certain circumstances, application for a
84. 78 CONG. REc. 9853 (1934).
85. Rev. Rul. 76-161, 1976-1 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 59-318, 1959-2 C.B. 310.
86. See Letter from Legislative Council of California to Senator Alquist (February
4, 1976).
87. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
88. 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-u (1976).
89. "Before either a public or private corporation may apply to the ForeigrxTrade Zones Board for operating authority, however, the state in which the zone is to
be established must pass authorizing legislation." Davison, Foreign-Trade ZonesAn Aid to Those Doing Business'Abroad, 17 Bus. LAw. 960, 965 (1962). "An application for a zone may be made by either a public or private corporation, but only after
an enabling statute has been enacted by the state where the zone is to be located."
Note, Foreign-Trade Zone Manufacturing: The Emergence of a Free Trade Instrument, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 444, 450 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
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grant by a "public corporation," as therein defined,'" need not
be preceded by an authorizing enactment of the state in which
the zone is to be established.
Applicants
A brief discussion of the nature of eligible applicants may
be useful in determining when state enabling legislation is or
is not a prerequisite to application. According to the terms of
the Act, an "applicant"'" for (and "grantee"" of) the privilege
of establishing, operating, and maintaining a zone must be a
"corporation," 3 as therein defined. A "corporation," in turn,
may be either a "public corporation"" or a "private corporation."' 5 The definition of a "public corporation" encompasses
a rather extensive hierarchy of governmental entities: "The
term 'public corporation' means a State, political subdivision
thereof, a municipality, a public agency of a State, political
subdivision thereof, or municipality, or a corporate municipal
instrumentality of one or more States."" A "private corporation," on the other hand, is defined as: "[Any corporation
(other than a public corporation) which is organized for the
purpose of establishing, operating, and maintaining a foreigntrade zone and which is chartered under special Act enacted
after June 18, 1934, of the State or States within which it is to
operate such zone."' 7
Private Corporationsand the Special Act
Limitation of the definition of a "private corporation" to
one which "is chartered under special Act . . .of the State or
States within which it is to operate such zone" quite obviously
envisions the existence of such "special Act" and has the effect
of making such "special Act" a prerequisite under the ForeignTrade Zones Act to application by (and grant to) a "private
corporation." Regulations promulgated by the Foreign-Trade
Zones Board are not entirely unambiguous on this point, but
do appear to confirm the interpretation that an authorizing
enactment of the State is necessary prior to a grant of the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 81a(e) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.105(a) (1977).
§ 81a(g) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.106 (1977).
§ 81a(h) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.107 (1977).
§ 81a(d) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.105 (1977).
§ 81a(e) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.105(a) (1977).
§ 81a(f) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.105(b) (1977).
§ Ra(e) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.1 0 5(a) (1977).
§ 81a(f) (1976); see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.105(b) (1977).
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privilege to a "private corporation": "Grants to private corporations will not be approved by the Board unless such corporations have been authorized by an act of the State legislature
(enacted after June 18, 1934)."11
Additional support, if any were needed, for the proposition
that state enabling legislation constitutes a precondition to
application for (and grant of) the privilege to a "private corporation" may be garnered from the legislative history of House
Bill H.R. 9322, which (with certain amendments not here pertinent) subsequently became the Foreign-Trade Zones Act."
The term "special Act" is not further defined in either the
Act or the regulations'" of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board promulgated thereunder. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
individual states, left to their own devices, have formulated a
variety of legislative responses to the "special Act" requirement. These range from blanket authorization' by the state
of any "private corporation" wishing to apply for the privilege,
to the pointed omission'0 2 of any reference to "private corporations" from state legislation pertaining to foreign-trade zones.
Less extreme positions are represented by state statutes such
as those which authorize applications by any "private corporation" organized under the laws of the enacting state for the
purposes of establishing, operating, and maintaining a foreigntrade zone in accordance with the Act,'"1 or by any non-public
"not-for-profit corporation authorized to do business" in the
98. 15 C.F.R. § 400.502 (1977).
99. "It is to be noted that the only private corporations which are eligible for the
operation of foreign-trade zones are ones specially chartered by the State or States in
which the zone is to be established." H.R. REP. No. 1521, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934).
"The House bill limited the organizations (other than public corporations) which
might operate zones to corporations chartered under special act enacted after the date
of this act of the State or States within which the zone was to be operated. The Senate
amendment broadens the class of operators to include partnerships and associations
and removes the requirement with respect to special charter in the case of corporations.
The Senate amendment also includes organizations existing under or authorized by the
laws of the United States. The conference agreement adopts the House provision."
H.R. REP.No. 1884, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). "Private corporations are authorized
to establish such zones only in the case such zones are not established by the States
or other public agencies, with a further limitation that they must be chartered by the
State legislature." 78 CONG. REC. 9768 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Cullen).
100. 15 C.F.R. §§ 400.100-.1406 (1977).
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 33-1-30 (Supp. 1977).

102. See, e.g.,

§§ 212-1 to -10.
§ 6306 (West).

HAwAn REV. STAT.

103. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T

CODE
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state, 10 or by a "private corporation" identified by name. 05
It is important to note, before turning to a consideration
of public corporations, that the Act mandates that preference
be given to the application of a "public corporation" over that
of a "private corporation": "In granting applications preference shall be given to public corporations.""w The strength of
this preference may be gauged by the historical fact that, as of
the time of this writing, few private corporations have received
a grant of the privilege of foreign-trade zone establishment,
operation, and maintenance. 107 Thus, even assuming the prior
enactment of appropriate legislation by the state in which the
zone would be located, application by a "private corporation"
could prove unsuccessful.
Public Corporations
Although mention of any "special Act"'' 8 is conspicuously
absent from the definition of the term "public corporation,''0
it is not to be presumed that state legislation is not a prerequisite to application by or grant to a public corporation in every
case. As to those states in which the circumstances described
in section 81b(d) of the Act exist, "an Act of the legislature of
such State" is required prior to grant of the privilege:
In case of any State in which harbor facilities of any port of entry
are owned and controlled by the State and in which State harbor
facilities of any other port of entry are owned and controlled by
a municipality, the Board shall not grant an application by any
public corporation for the establishment of any zone in such
State, unless such application has been authorized by an Act of
the legislature of such State (enacted after June 18, 1934.)"'

This provision was evidently intended to deny to states
wishing to apply for a grant an advantage not possessed by
municipalities which were similarly inclined. While a state
could make application for a zone in its port of entry at once,
a municipality might be obliged to make a time-consuming
approach to the state legislature for authority to issue bonds to
104. KAN. STAT. § 12-825h.
105. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446.7 (Vernon).
106. 19 U.S.C. § 81b(c) (1976); 15 C.F.R. § 400.503 (1977).
107. Telephone conversation with John J. Da Ponte, Jr., Executive Secretary,
Foreign-Trade Zones Board (November 16, 1978).
108. 19 U.S.C. § 81a(f) (1976); 15 C.F.R. § 400.105(b) (1977).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 81b(e) (1976); 15 C.F.R. § 400.105(a) (1977).
110. 19 U.S.C. § 81b(d) (1976); 19 C.F.R. 400.501 (1977).
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raise funds needed for establishing a zone in its port of entry."'
Except as provided in section 81b(d), the Act does not
require that the application of a "public corporation" have
been previously authorized by an act of the legislative body of
the state in which the zone is to be located. It may be concluded, therefore, that, for the purposes of the Foreign-Trade
Zones Act, the necessity of prior state legislative authorization
of an application by a "public corporation" is determined by
the applicability of the provisions of section 81b(d) to the state
in question. In other words, a state to which section 81b(d)
applies, by virtue of the existence within such state of the
circumstances set out in that section, must give prior legislative authorization to an application by any of its "public corporations." Conversely, a state to which section 81b(d) is inapplicable, for whatever reason, is not obliged by the Act to
give prior legislative authorization to any application by any of
its "public corporations."
That section 81b(d) does not apply to all states seems
plain. By its terms, its applicability to a given state is dependent upon the existence of at least two United States Customs
ports of entry within the state. Hence, it cannot apply to a state
in which there is only one such port of entry." 2 The state of
111. The committee had in mind that in some States there are ports in
which the State owns the water front or where the city owns it; and the
committee was confronted with the situation where the State could immediately establish a foreign trade zone in its State-owned port, whereas
the city-owned port would have to go to the legislature for authority to
issue bonds to raise the necessary money to establish the foreign-trade
zone. The committee felt that it was not fair to give this advantage to
the State; that both should start on a par; that both should have the same
opportunity.
78 CONG. REc. 9976 (1934) (remarks of Mr. McCormack).
112. Mr. McDUFFIE. I think the committee has been eminently fair in
meeting the situation; but I refer to the case of a port in which not only
does the State own facilities but the municipality also owns facilities.
I think New Orleans, La., occupies this position and I know the port
of Mobile, in my district, in Alabama, is in a similar position. I was
fearful there might be some delay in those cities taking advantage of this
legislation which I heartily approved.
Mr. VINSON of Kentucky. If I understand the gentlemen from Alabama, the case which he presents is where both State and cities own
harbor facilities, of course, at the same place.
Mr. McDUFFIE. At the same place.
Mr. VINSON of Kentucky. It is my understanding that in that character of case subsection (d) would not apply.
Mr. McCORMACK. That is my opinion.
Mr. McDUFFIE. Subsection (d) is made to apply to 2 ports and 2
cities in the same State.
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Colorado, for example, within its single United States Customs
port of entry at Denver,"3 would seem not to come within the
scope of section 81b(d). Consequently, the Foreign-Trade
Zones Act does not appear to require that the application of a
Colorado "public corporation" have been previously authorized by an Act of the State's legislature.
Although worded somewhat differently"' than section
81b(d) of the Act, section 400.501 of the regulations of the
Foreign-Trade Zones Board seems to be identical in effect and
is thus susceptible to the same analysis as is section 81b(d).
However, section 400.603(k)" 5 of the regulations, which deals
with an exhibit that must accompany an application for grant,
may create some confusion in determining whether the application of a public corporation must have been authorized by
the state legislature. This section, in pertinent part, states:
(1) If the applicant is a State, the application for a grant shall
be accompanied, as evidence of the applicant's qualifications to
make application, by a copy of the law or laws under authority
of which the application is made, duly certified by the Governor
or secretary of state of the State under seal, and three uncertified
copies of such law or laws (enacted after June 18, 1934).
(2) If the applicant is a public corporation, other than a State,
as defined in section 1(e) of the Act, the application for a grant
shall be accompanied by evidence of the applicant's qualifications to make the application as follows:
(i) A copy of its charter or other organization papers duly
certified by the secretary of state of the State in which it is
located, or by the officer having legal custody of the record of
municipal and other public corporations (one copy only);
(ii) A statement under seal of the secretary of state of the
State or other officer charged by State laws with supervision of
harbor facilities, setting forth whether the State owns and controls harbor facilities of any port of entry and whether harbor
facilities of any other port of entry in the State are owned and
Mr. VINSON of Kentucky. Yes."
78 CONG. Rc. 9776 (1934) (remarks of Messrs. McDuffie, Vinson and McCormack)
(emphasis added).
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see also 19 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1977).
114. Where harbor facilities of any port of entry in the State are owned
and controlled by the State, and where habor facilities of any other port
of entry in the State are owned and controlled by a municipality, grants

to public corporations will not be approved by the Board unless such
applications have been authorized by an act of the State legislature enacted after June 18, 1934.
15 C.F.R. § 400.501 (1977).
115. 15 C.F.R. § 400.603(k) (1977).
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controlled by a municipality with three uncertified copies of such
statement."'

The language in subsection (1) of section 400.603(k) referring to "the law or laws under authority of which the application is made. . . (enacted after June 18, 1934)" could conceivably be interpreted to impliedly require in every case authorizing state legislation prior to application by a state itself-an
interpretation which appears at odds with the Act in general
and section 81b(d) in particular. Moreover, subsection (2) of
section 400.603(k), which applies to "a public corporation other
than a state" (a distinction not made in the Act) does not refer
to State legislation authorizing application for grant, despite
the fact that such legislation would presumably have been a
prerequisite to such application if the circumstances within the
state rendered section 81b(d) applicable. In short, section
400.603(k)(1) can be read as requiring as an exhibit to any
application by a state a copy of a law whose existence is not
mandated by the Act, while section 400.603(k)(2) can be read
as not requiring as an exhibit to any application by a "public
corporation other than a state" a copy of a law or laws whose
existence is, under certain conditions, expressly mandated by
section 81b(d) of the Act.
The present Executive Secretary of the Foreign-Trade
Zones Board has informally indicated that, while as a general
matter applications are most often authorized by a state enactment, section 400.603(k)(1) is not to be regarded as an indirect
requirement of state authorizing legislation in cases where such
legislation is not otherwise mandatory under the Act. With
respect to a state which believes itself to be outside the applicability of section 81b(d), an option may exist in the case of an
application by a "public corporation." The state may enact
authorizing legislation which, though not technically required
under the Act, could prove useful in other ways. Alternatively,
a "public corporation" could meet the requirements of section
400.603(k) by including as Exhibit 11 to its application (a) an
opinion of the state's attorney general (or other official performing the function of legal counsel and advisor to the state)
setting out the grounds upon which the provisions of section
81b(d) of the Act are deemed to be inapplicable to the state
and (b) documentation such as state constitutional or statutory
provisions or organizational charters which set out the legal
116. 15 C.F.R. § 400.603(k)(1)-(2) (1977).
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basis for the establishment and existence of the particular
"public corporation" applicant." 7
Contributions of State Legislation
As indicated in the preceding discussion, one function of
state legislation is compliance with the Foreign-Trade Zones
Act in those cases in which an application for grant must have
received prior authorization of the state legislature. State legislation may, however, serve a somewhat broader, more positive
purpose in contributing to the efficient establishment, operation, and maintenance of foreign-trade zones. Even in those
states in which an application by a public corporation need not
be legislatively authorized, state legislation may be a means of
clarifying a state's position with respect to zones within its
borders, as well as a way of obviating difficulties which have
plagued zones in other jurisdictions.
The discussion which follows identifies a limited number
of the potentially great range of issues relating to foreign-trade
zones which may be susceptible to resolution through state
legislation; additionally, certain examples drawn from existing
state statutes serve to illustrate some of the ways in which
these "foreign-trade zone-related" issues have been addressed
legislatively by the individual states.
A threshold issue in the establishment of a zone in any
state relates to the designation of applicants for grant of the
privilege. Designation of appropriate applicants is, of course,
an integral part of legislation authorizing an application when
such is required under the Act." 8 However, where such prior
authorization is not mandatory under the Act, a state enactment setting out those organizations deemed to be appropriate
applicants may nevertheless clarify a potentially murky aspect
of foreign-trade zone establishment.
State statutory designations of appropriate "public corporation" applicants range from those which are nearly as broad
as the definition of a "public corporation""' under the Act to
those which are as narrow as the meaning of a single specific
governmental entity. A definitional provision of the California
statute exemplifies the former category: " '[P]ublic corporation' means the State, any political subdivision thereof, any
incorporated municipality therein, any public agency of the
State, or any political subdivision thereof, or of any municipal117. Telephone conversation with John J. Da Ponte, Jr., Executive Secretary,
Foreign-Trade Zones Board (September 22, 1978).
118. See notes 91-107 supra and accompanying text.
119. 19 U.S.C. § 81a(e) (1976).
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ity therein, or any corporate municipal instrumentality of this
State or of this State and one or more States."'2 Typical of the
latter category is the Illinois foreign-trade zone statute, which
states in part: "The Port Districthas power to apply to proper
authorities of the United States of America pursuant to appropriate law for the right to establish, operate, maintain, and
lease foreign-trade zones.''2 (Emphasis added.) In some instances, state statutes have combined relatively broad designations of applicants of the "public corporation" type with
somewhat more specific references or criteria intended, presumably, to facilitate a determination of which governmental
entities come within the sweep of the more general language.
The Florida statute concludes its definition of the term
"governmental agency"-the functional equivalent of "public
corporation" under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act-with the
statement that: "Specifically included [in the definition] are
airports, port authorities, and industrial authorities."' An alternative approach to specific reference appears in the Michigan statute which employs the presence or absence of public
funds in the financing of the organization in question as the
criterion for determining which governmental entities may
apply for a grant: "'Public corporation' means the state, or
any county, township, city or village within the state, or any
state or municipal authority or similar organization financed
in whole or in part by public funds."'' (Emphasis added.)
With respect to "private corporations," state statutes, as
mentioned previously,'2 ' have run a gamut from omitting reference to such corporations altogether to embracing any such
corporation as an applicant. In view of the preference for grants
to public corporations expressed by the Act 25 and substantiated by historical fact, the omission of the designation of private corporations as appropriate applicants-an approach
taken in Hawaii's statute' 2 -may be quite realistic.
However, if the state elects to designate what it considers
to be suitable applicants of the "private corporation" type,
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

CAL. GoV'T CODE § 6300 (West).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, § 159.1 (Smith-Hurd).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.35(2) (West).
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 447.1(b).
See notes 101-105 supra and accompanying text.
19 U.S.C. § 81b(c).
HAWAII Rxv. STAT. §§ 212-2 to -3.
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some legislative formulae seem more serviceable than others.
To illustrate, the Alabama statute authorizes "any. .. private
corporation . . . to establish at all ports of entry within this

state foreign trade zones."' (Emphasis added.) Conceivably,
this provision could be construed to authorize any private corporation, whether or not incorporated or otherwise qualified
to do business in Alabama, to apply for and receive a grant.
The possibility of an unqualified foreign corporation establishing, operating, and maintaining a foreign-trade zone within the
state may be an undesirable contingency from the state's
perspective. On the other hand, a provision such as that in the
Texas statutes designating, along with certain other "public
corporations," a single "private corporation incorporated under
the laws of the state"' 2 8 may be susceptible to challenge as
unfair to another private corporation which might be desirous
of establishing a foreign-trade zone. A legislative formula
which avoids the foregoing criticisms may be found in the Georgia statute:
Any private corporation hereafter organized under the laws of
this state for the purpose of establishing, operating and maintaining a foreign-trade zone in accordance with [the ForeignTrade Zones Act] is likewise hereby authorized to make application for the privilege of establishing, operating and maintaining
a foreign-trade zone in accordance with the said [Foreign-Trade
Zones Act]. '"

State legislation may also prove useful in propounding
state policy with respect to operation of an established foreigntrade zone by a "private corporation" which is not the grantee.
It is likely, for reasons discussed previously,' 30 that recipients
of future grants of the privilege will be "public corporations."
Such a grantee would be, by definition, a governmental entity
and, if it were to operate and maintain the zone itself, would
presumably expend public funds and employ public servants
for that purpose. Conceivably this arrangement could bring
about unsatisfactory consequences, as, for example, competition between a foreign-trade zone and a school system (or other
public institutions) for monies and personnel. To reduce the
possibility of such costly and inefficient rivalries, the state
127. See note 101 supra.

128. See note 105 supra.
129. GA. CODE ANN. § 98-303.
130. See notes 106-107 supra and accompanying text.
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could by statute expressly countenance contractual relations
between the "public corporation" grantee and a "private corporation" whereby the latter, at its own expense, would undertake to operate and maintain the zone as a public utility'3 ' on
behalf of the grantee. Neither the Act nor the regulations of the
Foreign-Trade Zones Board addresses the propriety of this arrangement directly. While a "grant shall not be sold, conveyed,
transferred, set over, or assigned,"' l2 there is an acknowledgment in the early case of American Dry Dock v. City of New
York to the effect that the Foreign-Trade Zones Board does
not consider a contract between a "public corporation"
grantee and a "private corporation" for operation of a zone
violative of this prohibition. 33 Moreover, a review of the most
recent annual report of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board reveals
several instances in which such contractual arrangements for
zone operation exist. '3
The statutes of the state of Washington contain an example of one technique which may be used to give express legislative approval to zone operation by nongrantee "private corporations":
A city or town, as zone sponsor, may apply to the United States
for permission to establish, operate, and maintain foreign trade
zones: Provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to prevent these zones from being operated and financed by a private
corporation(s) on behalf of a city or town acting as zone spon-

sor. 13

Questions regarding zone location may also be an appropriate object of state legislation. As discussed in a previous
section, the Foreign-Trade Zones Act requires in effect that
zones shall be "in or adjacent to ports of entry" but does not
define the term "adjacent."'' Not surprisingly, therefore, state
legislative responses to the "in or adjacent" language vary from
general references to ports of entry within the state to rather
precise descriptions of the area in which a zone may be established. More precision rather than less in setting forth appro131. 19 U.S.C. § 81(n) (1976).
132. 19 U.S.C. § 81(g) (1976).
133. American Dock Co. v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.S.2d 943, 949, 174 Misc. 813
(1940), aff'd 26 N.Y.S.2d 704, 261 App. Div. 1063, aff'd 36 N.E.2d 696, 286 N.Y. 658.
134. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BoAD, 38m ANNuAL R.poirr (1976).
135. REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 35.21.805 (1977 Supp.); See also §§ 24.46.020,
36.01.125.

136. See notes 34-42 supra and accompanying text.
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priate areas for zone establishment may be desirable, since a
very broad description (or no description at all) of such an area
may give rise to unrealistic expectations of zone establishment
nearby, based upon the mistaken notion that there are few or
no restrictions on zone location. By way of illustration, the
Illinois statute requires that any zone be "within the limits of
'
the Chicago Regional Port District.'

37

A related consideration which may be addressed by state
legislation is that of who may select specific zone sites within
the designated areas. One logical choice is, of course, the applicant for grant of the privilege, and certain states have, in fact,
enabled applicants to select and describe zone sites: "Any corporation or government agency may select and describe the
location of the foreign-trade zones or foreign-trade subzones for
which an application is made.""'
Perhaps the most substantial contribution state legislation
may make to efficient establishment and operation of foreigntrade zones is the clarification of state and local taxing policies
with respect to zones. The California statute, for example,
makes no reference to state and local taxes as they may apply
to foreign-trade zones within the state. 39 The fact that litiga-

tion of this issue is underway in California at the time of this
writing may serve to underscore the seriousness of the statutory
omission.1 10
In a few instances, states have dealt with the question of
state and local taxes in legislation pertaining to foreign-trade
zones. Hawaii provides an exemption from certain taxes for
sales of specified products in a zone to specified purchasers.'
Massachusetts spells out the incidence of real property taxes
upon land within a foreign-trade zone."' Oregon exempts personal property "in transit" through the state from certain state
taxes.13 These measures do not, however, seem to represent as
complete a treatment of the state and local taxation issues as
may be desirable in light of the possibility of litigation.
137. See note 121 supra.
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.37 (West).
139. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6300-6305 (West).
140. Lilli-Ann Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 726-271 (Super. Ct.
of San Francisco County, filed July 29, 1977).
141. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 212-8,
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91 App. § 1-3(g) (1978 Supp.)
143. OR. Rav. STAT. § 307.810.
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CONCLUSION

The principal purpose of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act is
to expedite and encourage foreign commerce. Whether this
purpose will be fulfilled in a particular case is in some measure
determined by the availability of sub-zones, by state and local
taxing policies with respect to zones, and by state legislation
relating to zones. As the foregoing discussion has sought to
demonstrate each of these matters has a potentially significant
impact upon the establishment and operation of any foreigntrade zone.

STUDENT COMMENT
I.R.S.

AND THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT: THE
RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF REVENUE RULING 78-61.

THE

JAMES
I.

J. DUFFICY*

INTRODUCTION

In 1978 the Internal Revenue Service issued two rulings'
that clarify its position with respect to the creditability of
foreign income, war profits, or excess profits taxes.' This comment will examine the position taken by the I.R.S. in one of
those rulings.'
In Rev. Rul. 78-61, the Ontario Mining tax was held to be
neither an income tax nor a tax in lieu of an income tax within
the meaning of sections 901 and 903 of the Internal Revenue
Code, and the credit for the tax was denied.'
* B.A., 1977, University of Denver; J.D. candidate, 1980 University of Denver.
1. Rev. Rul. 78-61, I.R. Bull. No. 1978-8 11; Rev. Rul. 78-62, I.R. Bull. No. 19788 16.
2. The foreign tax credit provision is contained in I.R.C. § 901. Pertinent provisions include:
(a) Allowance of Credit - If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefits of this subpart, the tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject to the
applicable limitation of section 904, be credited with the amounts provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b)...
(b) Amount Allowed - Subject to the limitation of section 904, the
following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under subsection (a):
(1) Citizens and domestic corporations - In the case of a citizen of
the United States and of a domestic corporation, the amount of any
income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the
taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of the United
States; ....
3. While dealing directly only with Rev. Rul. 78-61, this comment will, in effect,
deal also with Rev. Rul. 78-62, since the latter revolves around the same principles of
creditability as the former.
4. I.R.C. § 903 grants an alternative credit for any taxes paid to a foreign country
in lieu of an income tax. Under Tress. Reg. 1.903-1(a)(3), 1957-2 C.B. 419, the credit
can be claimed only: (a) if the country has in force a general income tax law; (b) if
the taxpayer would be subject to the tax in the absence of a specific exemption; and
(c) if the income tax is not imposed upon the taxpayer subject to the substitute tax.
In the instance case the I.R.S., after denying the § 901 credit, also properly denied
a credit under § 903 because the taxpayer in question was also subject to a general
income tax from which he had not been exempted by the operation of the mining tax.
This part of the decision will not be considered further, as it was amply justified in
light of relevant case authority. On the creditability of "in lieu of" taxes, see generally
Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1950); Abbot
Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1958), aff'd per
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The tax was levied on all profit of any mine in the Canadian province of Ontario if the profit from the mining function
exceeded $50,000 for the taxable year. "Profit" under the act
was defined as the sum of the gross receipts from the sale of
ore, plus the actual market value of unsold ore that had been
extracted during the year, less a narrow group of deductions.
The I.R.S. disallowed the credit under these circumstances. The mining tax was held to be levied not on income actually received from extracting and selling the ore, but on the
value of the extraction. The tax was due on the value of the
output whether or not it was sold (and in the case of output
that had been incorporated into the owner's manufacturing
process, in spite of the fact that it never would be sold). Furthermore, the Ontario tax did not allow the deduction of significant operating expenses that are deductible under the Internal
Revenue Code of the United States. Some of the more important nondeductible expenses were interest, initial exploration
and development expenses, taxes and royalties paid, depletion
allowances, salaries and other expenses not directly connected
to the mining function (in a typical mining enterprise, there are
also manufacturing and treatment functions). Since this tax
was levied on the market value of the extracted ore and not on
an actual income base, the I.R.S. classified it as "a production
or severance tax on the mining privilege," a noncreditable tax.5
II.

BACKGROUND

The United States Government taxes its nationals on
their worldwide income. This method of taxation could lead
to double taxation, i.e., paying income taxes on the same income to the United States and to the country where the income
curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959); Compania Embotelladora Coca-Cola v. United
States, 139 F. Supp. 953 (Ct. Cl. 1956); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1233 (1970), nonacq. on another issue, 1971-2 C.B. 4.
5. The I.R.S. also properly ruled that this tax should be considered in its entirety,
as it is an indivisible tax. As a general rule, when a tax is imposed upon more than
one base, one of which would qualify as a proper base for the credit and one or more
of which would not, that part of the tax levied upon a qualifying base will be creditable
provided it is computed separately from the tax that is imposed upon a nonqualifying
base. In the instant case, all of the various bases (output sold, output incorporated in
a manufacturing process, and output sold after treatment) were combined, the allowable deductions were expensed against the entire base, and the tax was then computed
upon the single base. Cf. Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. (1956); Rev. Rul. 74-435, 1974-2 C.B. 204.
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has been earned.' To prevent double taxation, Congress
granted a tax credit.7 Generally, section 901 allows a credit (a
dollar-for-dollar reduction from overall tax liability)' for any
income, war profits, or excess profits taxes paid to a foreign
country.' The major source of contention within section 901
has been over the meaning of the words "income tax"; that is,
when is a particular foreign tax an income tax within the meaning of section 901?
For nearly twenty years after the original enactment of the
foreign tax credit provision in 1918, the Supreme Court allowed
the foreign characterization of the tax as an income tax to
control creditability.'0 However, with the landmark case of
Biddle v. Commissioner," the courts now refuse to allow a foreign characterization of a tax to control. Since Biddle, the
courts have consistently applied the American conception of
"income tax": I" the foreign tax must be the substantial equiva6. For a general discussion of the problems of double taxation, see generally H.R.
REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 1976-3 C.B. 695, 904; Characterization
of an Income Tax for the Purpose of the Foreign Tax Credit, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1469
(1961).
7. "The primary objective . . . [of § 901] is to prevent double taxation and a
secondary objective is to encourage American foreign trade." American Metal Co. v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1955).
8. I.R.C. § 164(a) allows a deduction of such taxes even if the credit is denied.
This is generally less favorable to the taxpayer because the deduction merely reduces
the tax base upon which U.S. income tax is levied, while a credit directly reduces the
amount of the tax liability by the amount of the credit.
9. Taxes which are paid to a political subdivision of a foreign country are also
creditable if they qualify. See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1931);
Havana Electric Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 782 (1936)
(an income tax imposed by the municipality of Havana was creditable under § 901).
10. Eitington Schild Co. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1163 (1931)
(a turnover tax imposed upon all business activity in France was not a qualifying
income tax for purposes of the foreign tax credit, largely because France had imposed
this tax apart from its income tax).
11. 302 U.S. 573 (1938).
12. See New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745
(2d Cir. 1948) (Houduran tax imposed upon liquid profits derived from the mining
enterprise was credited because of its similarity to the United States income tax);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 739 (1943) (Quebec mining tax was noncreditable because the tax base, the value
of ore extracted, did not constitute an income base in the United States sense); accord,
Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Iowa 1961); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1942); Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1233 (1970), nonacq. on another
issue, 1971-2, C.B. 4; Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Colombia v. Commissioner,
26 T.C. 582 (1956).
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lent of an income tax as defined by United States law. 3 The
scant legislative history on the issue of creditability gives implicit approval to this test."
To determine whether a particular tax is the substantial
equivalent of the United States income tax, the courts look
primarily to the tax base. To qualify for a credit, the foreign
tax must be levied on a base that corresponds closely to income
as understood in the United States. This conclusion indicates
that the tax must be imposed on either a gain realized or a
profit derived from capital, labor, or both, 5 since this is the
traditional United States definition of income."
In Rev. Rul. 78-61, the I.R.S. established three requirements that a foreign tax must meet to qualify as a creditable
income tax on a proper tax base: 7
13. See Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942) (Cuban tax
levied upon gross income was credited); Santa Eulalia Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2
T.C. 241 (1943), appeal dismissed, 142 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1944) (Mexican tax upon
gross royalties received was credited because the significant expenses incurred in producing the income were already deducted by the party paying the royalty).
14. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 602. This report concerned the initial enactment of § 903, the "in lieu of" credit, which was
considered necessary by the committee because of the narrow reading given § 901 by
the courts and the I.R.S.
In the interpretation of the term "income tax," the Commissioner, the
Board [B.T.A.], and the courts have consistently adhered to a concept
of income tax rather closely related to our own, and if such foreign tax
was not imposed upon a basis corresponding approximately to net income
it was not recognized as a basis for such credit. . . .Your committee has
deemed it desirable to extend the scope of this section.
The fact that the extension of the credit provision took the form of the "in lieu of'
provision rather than an actual enlargement of § 901, gives implicit approval to the
narrow construction of this section. See Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358
(N.D. Iowa 1961).
15. E.g., Bank of America Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct.
Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
16. Accord, Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894, 897 (3rd Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943); Abbot Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States,
160 F. Supp. 321, 331 (N.D. 111.1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 409, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Lanman & KempBarclay & Co. of Columbia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 582, 587 (1956); Rev. Rul. 69653, 1969-2 C.B. 152.
17. The I.R.S. held that it would determine whether the requirements were met
by referring to the entire class of taxpayers subject to the foreign tax, rather than on
a taxpayer-by-taxpayer or transaction-by-transaction basis. However, in Schering
Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, /1978f Fed. Taxes (P-H) 69.46, at 57,471 (a
decision issued contemporaneously with this Revenue Ruling), the I.R.S. attempted
to persuade the Tax Court to make a determination of the noncreditability of a Swiss
withholding tax by referring solely to the taxpayer, Schering Corp., while at the same
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(1) The foreign tax must be levied on gain actually realized, since our own income tax is limited to realized as opposed
to constructive gain. The I.R.S. requires a "substantially
equivalent degree of realization with respect to foreign taxes."''
(2) The tax will be creditable only if "its purpose is to
reach net gain and it is so structured so as to be almost certain
of doing so." It is properly structured if, in the computation of
the tax base, it is very unlikely that taxpayers will have to pay
the tax if they have no net gain. 9
(3) A credit is denied if the tax is not levied on the receipt
of income but rather on "transactions such as sales or the exercise of a privilege or franchise." A tax that is imposed upon a
transaction or a privilege is denied credit even if measured by
net income. 0
time conceding that the tax in question was creditable when the entire class of taxpayers subject to the tax was considered. The court rejected this argument and granted
the credit. This inconsistency on the part of the I.R.S. may be explained, at least in
part, by the particular facts in the Schering case.
18. No authority directly supports this "three-pronged" test, but the I.R.S. does
seem to be generally true to the judicial interpretation of § 901 in each of the criteria.
The first prong (the tax must be levied upon gain actually realized) is clearly a proper
application of § 901; see Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Iowa 1961)
(credit denied for a Cuban tax levied upon all capital exported from Cuba regardless
of whether or not the capital represented actually realized gain); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1233 (1970), nonacq. on another issue, 1971-2 C.B. 4 (credit
denied for a British tax imposed upon the rental value of all property owned by the
taxpayer, because this tax was imposed even if no rental income was realized from the
property); Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Colombia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 582
(1956) (credit denied for a Colombian patrimony tax imposed upon the appreciation
of all property located in Colombia irrespective of actual realization by the taxpayer
through sale); accord, Abbot Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321
(N.D. IIl. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959).
19. This second criterion (the tax must be designed to reach net gain), while
generally true, seems somewhat restrictive considering Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942) (discussed infra). The I.R.S. seems to be attempting to
restrict the credit to taxes that are structurally identical to our own in this test, an
idea that runs counter to the Seatrain doctrine.
20. This third "test" (a privilege or excise tax is not creditable) actually seems
to be little more than a conclusion to be drawn from the application of the first two
tests. The courts uniformly deny a credit to taxes classified as "privilege" taxes, but
the primary reasons for so classifying a tax are either because the tax is not imposed
upon gain actually realized, or because the tax is not designed or intended to reach
gain. Thus, while this "test" might be helpful in an overall consideration of a tax under
§ 901, it cannot truly stand independently. For decisions in this area, see Keasbey &
Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739
(1943) (discussed infra) (provincial Canadian tax imposed upon the value of extracted
ore was classified as a privilege tax because the value of the extraction taxed included
ore used by the operator, and thus represented gain never actually realized); American
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When the above criteria are applied to the Ontario Mining
severance tax, two principal issues emerge concerning the creditability of taxes that are imposed on only one facet of an operation:
(1) Must a taxpayer be granted all of the "normal" deductions before a tax will be considered an income tax?
(2) Can a tax be limited to income earned from a particular operation, e.g., mining, and still qualify as an income tax?
]II. ANALYSIS
A. Must a taxpayer be grantedall of the "normal" deductions
before a tax will be considered an income tax for purposes of
section 901?
In the Ontario ruling, the mining severance tax was classified as a noncreditable privilege tax largely because the act
disallowed the deduction of "significant operating expenses"
that are deductible in the United States. The issue narrows to
this: When are deductions that are not allowed by the foreign
statute so significant as to deprive the tax of its characterization as an income tax?
The courts uniformly deny credit for any tax imposed upon
gross receipts. 2' The area that is less clear is the amount between gross receipts and net income (as defined by United
States law); this troublesome amount is gross income.Y
While there are indications that some courts will categorically deny credit for a tax based on gross income,2 the weight
of authority is to the contrary. The leading case, Seatrain
Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 879 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Mexican tax on mining output was classified as a privilege tax because it was levied
upon the total value of output without any deductions, and was thus not aimed at gain
or profit actually realized); Mallouck v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 269 (1936) (Phillipine tax upon the value of exported goods was a noncreditable privilege tax both
because it has no relation to gain realized through sale of the goods, and because
nonpayment meant forfeiture of the privilege of doing business in the Phillipines).
21. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn.
1942); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 409 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 540 (1939); I.T. 3429, 1940-2 C.B. 136.
22. Gross income may be defined as gross sales less the direct cost of making the
sales. It is thus distinct from gross receipts which consist of all income including that
which represents direct costs, while gross income excludes only the indirect costs of
generating income (such as fixed and administrative expense). 1 MERTEN, LAw OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON

§ 5.10.

23. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn,
1942).
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Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner,4 indicates that under the proper
circumstances a credit for a gross income tax will be allowed.
Seatrain involved a Cuban tax on the gross income of shipping
businesses. The tax was a flat 3% duty on gross income and was
considered an income tax by Cuba. Furthermore, this 3% duty
had replaced a 6% tax that had clearly been imposed on net
income. The change in rates occurred because of administrative difficulties in determining the amount of expense that had
actually been experienced by the taxpayers. Cuba cut the rate
by 3% as an estimated allowance for the average amount of
gross income consumed by operating expense. The tax was
still intended to reach net income even though it was imposed
on gross income, and the credit was allowed. In this case, the
critical fact was the intent of the Cuban Government in levying the tax to reach net income. Bank of America Trust & Sav.
Ass'n v. United States 5 clarified this perspective. There, the
tax was imposed on the gross income of branch banks in Thailand, the Philippines, and Argentina, but the statutes did not
allow for the deduction of significant operating expenses, such
as indirect bank expenses, rental, or bad debt expense, so the
court denied the credit. The court in Bank of America held that
a direct income tax is creditable even though imposed on gross
income, if it is highly likely, or was reasonably intended, always to reach some net gain in the normal circumstances in
which it applies. The tax failed this test because the court
could not say that the tax would reach, in all probability, net
2
gain. 0
These cases" make clear that a tax may be creditable even
if it does not allow for the deduction of all the "normal" expenses that are allowed under the Internal Revenue Code. The
24. 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942).
25. 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
26. Accord, Bank of America Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 752
(1974).
27. See also Santa Eulalia Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 241 (1943), appeal
dismissed, 142 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1944), where a credit was allowed for a Mexican tax
imposed upon the gross revenue derived from mining operations in Mexico. The tax
in question was withheld from a royalty payment. The court was willing to grant the
credit because the subcontractor, in determining the royalty, had already deducted the
significant direct operating expenses incurred in mining, and the court was certain that
the expenses connected with receiving the royalty were highly unlikely to exceed the
amount of the royalty. Thus, the tax in effect was certain to fall on net gain in the
United States sense.
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courts look beyond the label of a tax to its nature and purpose
in making a determination on its creditability. If the court
finds that the purpose and effect of a tax are to reach net
income, it will allow a credit despite the fact that the foreign
statute does not allow for the deduction of every expense that
is normally deductible in this country.
B. Can a tax be limited to a particularoperation, e.g.,
mining, and still qualify as an income tax?
In the abstract, nothing prevents a tax on a particular
operation, in this case mining, from qualifying for a credit as
long as it meets the judicial criteria of an income tax. 8 This
conclusion is especially true in cases involving severance taxes
on mining output where the activity taxed, the extraction of
minerals, results in marketable ore, a thing of value to the
operator which was not usable before the mining operation took
place. Extracting the ore is somewhat removed from the receipt
of income from the sale of that output, but as long as a tax on
the extraction is designed to, and does, reach the gain attributable to the mining function resulting in the sale of the ore, the
tax on the single operation of mining should be creditable.
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies," one of the leading
decisions on the creditability of severable mining taxes, concerned a 4% mining duty imposed by the province of Quebec
on all "profits" derived from mining ore in Quebec. The tax
was levied on the market value of all output that left the pit's
mouth, including both ore sold and ore used by the operator,
and thus never resulted in actual profit. The profit was determined by deducting any expense directly related to the mining
operation, including the direct salary and material expenses, as
well as indirect costs, such as insurance, depreciation and utilities costs, from the aggregate market value of the output. The
court disallowed the credit because this tax was not intended
or structured to reach any gain from the mining operation, but
28. See, e.g., Havana Electric Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 34
B.T.A. 782 (1936). The Board allowed a credit for a tax imposed by the muncipality
of Havana upon the income earned by the utility within the city, even though the
company's operations included other functions outside of Havana, and even though the
company was also subject to a national income tax. This seems to justify the proposition that as long as the tax in question is an income tax, it makes no difference how
the statute limits its operation, either geographically or functionally.
29. 133 F.2d (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943).
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was rather intended as a tax on the privilege of removing the
minerals from the earth.30
American Metal Co. v. Commissioner" also involved a tax
imposed on the mining operation. The tax was imposed by
Mexico on the market value of all output whether the ore was
sold or utilized by the operator. Further, the tax allowed no
deductions from this total. Under these circumstances (including the fact that the taxpayer had suffered an actual loss for
several years but was still subject to the tax in those years), the
court denied a credit because this tax was independent of any
realized gain that might result from the sale of the minerals.
These cases clarify the creditability of taxes imposed on a
particular operation. To be creditable, the tax on the mining
operation must conform closely to an income tax as the concept
is understood in this country, and cannot be based on the constructive receipt of income fixed at an artificial level such as
the market value of the product, apart from the sale of the ore.2
This concept is developed further by New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner," where a tax on mining operations in Honduras was allowed a section 901 credit.
The tax was imposed on "liquid profits" derived from the sale
of iron ore extracted from mines in Honduras. The act allowed
the deduction of every meaningful expense related to the mining operation, including indirect administrative costs; thus,
the tax was intended to reach the gain resulting from the sale
30. Placing a tax on the privilege of removing natural resources from the earth is
common, especially in the area of mining. This can only serve to increase the difficulty
of classifying an output tax as an income tax within § 901, since the natural place to
impose a mining privilege tax is at the point of the privileged activity, i.e., the extraction of the ore.
31. 19 T.C. 879 (1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955).
32. See also Rev. Rul. 69-653,1969-2 C.B. 152, where the I.R.S. reviewed a mining
tax imposed by Quebec that was much like the tax disallowed in Keasbey. The I.R.S.
denied a credit for this tax because the tax was not properly laid upon income (gain
derived from labor, capital, or from both combined) but rather included in the tax base
nonincome items, such as the market value of ore shipped or consumed by the operator. Nor did it matter that all expenses directly related to the mining function were
deductible, since an income tax cannot be levied on items that do not represent gain.
It is obvious that any attempt to distinguish Keasbey and Rev. Rul. 69-653 from the
Ontario tax will fail, since they involved the same features that identify the noncreditable nature of the Quebec mining taxes (they also were levied upon nonincome items
such as the value of ore consumed by the operator, and allowed for the deduction of
even fewer expenses than were allowed in Keasbey).
33. 168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1948); see also Rev. Rul. 57-62, 1957-1 C.B. 241.
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of the ore. Furthermore, the court recognized that the Honduran tax was distinguishable from the one disallowed in Keasbey
in that the tax in Keasbey was levied on the gross value of
output less direct mining expenses, while the Honduran tax
included as its base only income actually received through
sales, less the total expense needed to generate the sales.34
New York & Honduras Rosario Co. indicates that a tax
upon the separate mining operation will be creditable only if
the tax is imposed on gain actually realized through sale of the
output and only if the foreign statute allows for the deduction
of every significant expense incurred in producing the mining
income. This highlights the importance of the concept of realized gain in section 901. The courts uniformly require that a tax
be levied on a base that represents a gain that the taxpayer has
received in the form of income. 5 When this principle is applied
to the severable mining taxes reviewed here, it becomes clear
that section 901 will only extend to taxes imposed on the mining function if the tax is designed to reach only realized gain
that is attributable to the mining function, and when the statute is restricted in its base to ore that is intended for sale and
not for the operator's use.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Rev. Rul. 78-61, the Internal Revenue Service adopted
a restrictive view of section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code.
When this ruling is applied to the Ontario Mining tax, the
I.R.S. position seems justified, since this tax is nothing more
34. See also Santa Eulalia Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 241 (1943), appeal
dismissed, 142 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1944), where a tax withheld from a royalty payment
was allowed as a § 901 credit. The tax withheld was levied upon the gross income
derived from the mining operation of the company paying the royalty, and the court
allowed the credit because the significant expenses incurred in mining the ore had
already been deducted from the income base on which the royalty was paid.
35. See Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
582 (1956), where the tax in question was a patrimony tax imposed on the value of a
taxpayer's assets, regardless of whether or not the taxpayer actually realized any gain
from the use or sale of the assets. The tax, in effect, was levied on appreciation of all
property in Colombia even if the appreciation had not been realized through sale. The
credit was denied under these circumstances, because
[tihe doctrine that only those increases in value of property which are
actually realized by the owner constitute taxable income is basic to the
income tax system of the United States . . . (citations ommitted). "The
defined concept of income has been uniformly restricted to a gain realized
or a profit derived from capital, labor, or both." (Citing Keasby.)
26 T.C. 582, at 587. See also Motland v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Iowa
1961).
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than a tax on the privilege of extracting ore from the mines of
Ontario. However, the three strict criteria set forth by the
I.R.S. in Rev. Rul. 78-61 may exceed the standards set forth in
some of the decisions reviewed here. For instance, the I.R.S.
would seem to deny creditability to any tax that fails to provide
for the major "normal" expenses that are allowed under the
Internal Revenue Code,"8 while Seatrain,Bank of America, and
Santa Eulalia all indicate that the courts are willing to grant
a credit to such taxes if they are net income taxes in purpose
and effect. Also, the I.R.S. would certainly classify any tax
imposed on a separate operation as a privilege'or excise tax,
while New York & Honduras Rosario Co. and Santa Eulalia
indicate that such a tax should be credited despite its functional limitation if it fulfills the traditional criteria of an income tax.
Looking to the future development of the foreign tax credit
after Rev. Rul. 78-61, the restrictive view of the I.R.S. will
certainly be the cause of litigation by taxpayers seeking a more
generous interpretation of section 901. It is also probable that
as the tax considerations of foreign investment decisions increase in importance, lobbying pressure by U.S. nationals in
foreign legislatures may cause some countries to restructure
their tax laws to conform with this country's Internal Revenue
Code. This result will stimulate investment in such countries
by allowing U.S. nationals to take full advantage of section 901
in their tax considerations. Thus, in the long run, Rev. Rul. 7861 may well be an important force in lessening the strife over
the proper interpretation of section 901, as it will be a strong
impetus toward structural conformity in revenue laws.
36. E.g., in Rev. Rul. 78-61, I.R. Bull. No. 1978-8 11 at 14, the I.R.S. holds that
expenses incurred in producing gross income are not inherently so slight as to insure
that they will never exceed the gross income, and for this reason, a tax on gross income
should not be creditable.

CASE COMMENT
Hard Times for Bounty Hunters: Zenith Radio
Corporation v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441
(1978)
DWIGHT C. SEELEY*

The long-standing doubts surrounding United States
countervailing duties policy were recently unraveled by the
United States Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corporationv.
United States (98 S.Ct. 2441) (1978). Eight years of administrative review and judicial interpretation ended in a denial of
Zenith's appeal for countervailing duties to be assessed against
imported Japanese electronic products.'
Zenith, the large Chicago-based electronics firm,' found its
original complaint for assessment of duties denied by the Customs Bureau of the Treasury Department. The Treasury policy, backed by some eighty years of administrative precedent,
requires a showing that if a foreign producer rebates taxes or
fails to tax products upon export, then that rebate must be
"excessive," that is, more than the item was initially taxed in
the domestic market. If such a rebate is nonexcessive, then it
fails to provide the exporter an unfair competitive advantage
and therefore will not trigger a countervailing duty against it.
The legislative history, economic theories, and prior Supreme
Court pronouncements advanced by Zenith proved insufficient
to override this longstanding Treasury policy and its reasonableness in light of past and present United States countervailing duty laws. The unanimous Supreme Court opinion consequently upheld the Treasury practice and the economic policy
that it reflects.
* B.A., 1970, University of Wisconsin; J.D. candidate, 1980, University of Denver

College of Law.
1. Television receivers, radio receivers, radio-phonograph combinations, radiotelevision-phonograph combinations, radio/tape recorder combinations, tape players,
record players and phonographs complete with amplifiers and speakers, tape recorders,
and parts of television receivers: color television picture tubes, resistors, transformers
(deflection components), and tuners for receivers with integrated circuits. 37 Fed. Reg.
10,087 (1972) as amended by 37 Fed. Reg. 11,487 (1972).
2. Zenith has also been the standard bearer for the industry in litigating dumping
claims against Japanese electronics producers. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251 (1975).
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Background
In the arena of world trade, a manufacturer faced with an
inelastic demand for his product may find that a decrease in
domestic price will not increase demand sufficiently to cover
the loss in revenue of a price decrease. The manufacturer may
well find an elastic demand in a foreign market, where selling
at a lower price will stimulate sales and increase profits as well
as provide him market penetration. By exporting, his "profits
will be maximized by maintaining the high price at home and
selling at a lower price abroad." 3 This is dumping, a practice
which is specifically outlawed in the United States by the Revenue Act of 1916' and the Anti-Dumping Act of 19215 as recently amended by the Trade Act of 1974.
Another practice, sharing an "interlocking conceptual
basis"' with dumping is that of subsidies, usually provided by
a foreign government to promote export. Typically, a government makes a political decision to bolster the economic position of a particular group of industries. Reasoning for this may
vary. Sometimes the intent is to protect a weak domestic industry already glutted by competition; at other times the purpose is to protect the domestic economy through increased foreign exchange earnings and a stable balance of payment position. Whatever the reason and by whatever method the government chooses to provide the subsidy, the recipient industry
becomes more competitive in the world market because of the
subsidy and not because it has produced more efficiently.7 The
Countervailing Duties provision of the Tariff Act of 19308 provides statutory protection for American industries from this
kind of subsidized export. Access to the Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty measures has been expedited through the
recently expanded concept of judicial review of negative decisions,9 resulting in a flurry of legal activity. The dumping stat3. See Meyerson, A Review of CurrentAntidumping Procedures: United States
Law and the Case of Japan, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 168 (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
5. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976).
6. Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax
Adjustments and the Resurgence of Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAw & POL'y INT'L
Bus. 17, 33 (1969).
7. Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Reemerging Issue
in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1968).
8. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. IV 1974).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).

1979

ZENITH RADIO CORP.

V.

UNITED STATES

ute was applied only 77 times between 1954 and 1971, whereas
roughly 65 cases were under review from 1971 to 1974.10 The
major thrust of countervailing duty complaints in the 1960's
was directed against European Economic Community and
Canadian exporters." However, the 1970's have seen Japan assume the position as the leading exponent of dumping. While
countervailing duty determinations have been more infrequent, 2 there too the recent activity has concerned Japan, with
the case of Zenith Radio Corporationv. United States 3 providing the definitive standard for determination of illegal subsidies.
"Japan,Inc."
The pressures of a growing population, racial homogeneity, and a capacity for high productivity have created a business-image of Japan as a monolith, where government and
industry go hand-in-glove to dominate the world's industries.
This image portrays the government as the economic center or
"home office" with each industry a branch or division of the
corporation. Although this image tends to distort the true picture, principally by minimizing the private activity of the
major corporations and the considerable competition between
them," there is no arguing that post-war Japan has seen a
remarkable consensus of national goals where business and
government officials have collaborated to promote economic
growth. ,5
With the dismantling of the huge, family-controlled corporations (the zaibatsu) and the regulation of monopolistic enterprises under the Occupation, new and independent business
initiatives arose. From the beginning, post-war growth was
forged by a unique "participatory partnership" where the government defined the economic priorities of the nation, and industries, assisted by a variety of supports and subsidies, endeavored to fulfill them.'" In the 1950's, the Japanese government's
10. Silbiger, Trade Act of 1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practices in
International Trade, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 77, 80 (1975).
11. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 197.
12. Butler, supra note 7, at 126.
13. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
14. E. Kaplan, Japan: The Government-Business Relationship 15 (1972).
15. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 197.
16. E. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 17. The United States Commerce Department
analogizes this relationship as one similar to the American government's creation of
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Because the U.S. government desired certain national goals and
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goals centered around the "big four" industries (coal, electricity, marine transportation, and iron and steel) which received
top priority and the largest proportion of investment funds.'7
What emerged from that experiment was a rebuilt economy
and a government-industrial relationship that mutually strives
for what the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) has called a "concerted economy":
Out of discussions between the government and private enterprise, mutually determined national targets are worked out. Private enterprise pledges to carry these out. Government, on its
side, pledges special favors . . . such as subsidies and taxation
measures. 8

The economic infrastructure, fueled by large scale concessions
from the U.S. military during the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, grew so rapidly that by 1964 the balance of trade between
the United States and Japan shifted in Japan's favor and has
grown every year thereafter, totaling $3 billion in 1971, just
after Zenith filed its complaint. 9
The rapid expansion of the Japanese economy has not
been entirely smooth, however, and the industrial system has
developed in such a fashion that domestic troubles (such as a
recession) will have international repercussions. For one, a high
equity/debt ratio (20.8% versus 44% in the U.S.)20 has put a
continuing burden on Japanese industries. This, combined
with a system of lifetime employment with a variety of employee benefits, means that Japanese companies have a high
level of fixed costs. These costs encourage a "full capacity policy," which requires each industry to operate at full capacity
to recover high fixed costs. 2 ' Full capacity results in surplus
production which will find its way abroad as exports.
In times of stress the planned oligopolistic structure functions poorly. Each industry has its ranking within the domestic
economy and will receive its commensurate "market share" in
import licensing and borrowing quotas. In a rapid growth pebecause of the large amounts of capital, high technology and high risk involved, only
the government could successfully underwrite such projects.
17. Id. at 73, n.11.
18. MITI, Industrial Research Paper #100, "A discussion of Cooperative Industrial
Organization," quoted in E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST INJAPAN 398 (1970).
19. E. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 6.
20. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 198.
21. Id. at 198-99.
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riod a given industry will grow and invest in production capacity commensurate to its market share and new enlarged credit
capacity. 22 Overproduction results when the economy falters,
thus:
in times of recession or when overcapacity results from the corporation investing to protect its market share, the excess produce is sold abroad (even dumped) by the ubiquitous trading
sibling as long as the variable costs are recovered, since high fixed
costs for debt (interest) and wages (life employment) cannot be
avoided anyway.2

Consumer electronics, like coal and shipbuilding in the
1950's, has been deemed a "high priority growth industry 24 in
the 1970's and no industry has been more responsive to the
need for export marketing." This responsiveness has resulted
in a highly defensive stance by various U.S. industries, which
has resulted in increased complaints and litigation. Where the
decade 1960-1970 saw only six dumping cases lodged against
Japan, aggressive sales. have catapulted that figure to thirtytwo complaints during the four years from 1971 to 1975.26 In
that regard "renewed and continued activity may be anticipated." 27
The Law
A highly competitive world sugar market aroused the protective instincts of the U.S. Congress which passed the first
general countervailing duty statute under the Tariff Act of
1897.2 This act delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the
power to determine the amount of "bounty" or "grant" by
which a foreign government subsidized exports. The Secretary
was required to assess a duty equal to that amount. Subsequent enactments in 1909, 1913, and 1930 altered the act only
slightly.
The Countervailing Duty Law as it stands today provides
22. D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 157 (1975).
23. Id.
24. E. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 7.
25. "Hitachi (a major electronics firm) has traditionally placed great emphasis on

the promotion of exports. The future development of the company's business is based
squarely on export, and this policy is in accord with the requirementsof the nation as
a whole." (Emphasis added.) (1968 annual report.) Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251, 289 (1975).
26. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 197.
27. Silbiger, supra note 10, at 80.
28. 30 Stat. 205 (1897).
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for the assessment of a special duty on imported merchandise
equal to the net amount of any "bounty or grant" paid
"directly or indirectly" by a foreign government or other entity
with respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation of
such merchandise.2 The administration of section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 lies with the Treasury Department"0 which
delegates its authority to the Commissioner of Customs. 3'
Where investigation shows that a "bounty or grant" exists on
dutiable merchandise, the Commissioner is required to assess
a countervailing duty.32
Anyone can invoke the Countervailing Duty Law although
it is a domestic producer who generally initiates the investigation.u If the Commissioner fails to find a bounty and consequently makes no assessment, the U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler may contest the no-bounty determination in
the United States Customs Court.Y Failing there, an appeal
may be filed with the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals,5 and the Supreme Court may grant certiorari.3 The impact of the Trade Act of 1974 was to extend to
American manufacturers the right to contest a no-bounty
determination; conversely, foreign producers had rights to a
judicial review of an assessment from section 514 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. 3
Although in existence for better than eighty years, the
Countervailing Duty statute has been difficult to apply. No
statutory language within the law defines what constitutes a
"bounty or grant." Nor do the implementing regulations shed
any light. 38 Of the two Supreme Court cases before Zenith
39
that had taken countervailing duty assessments on review,
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976).
30. Except for duty free merchandise which will be reviewed by the International
Trade Commission. The standard applied there is consistent with a dumping standard-that the item has caused "injury" to a U.S. industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1976).
31. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47 (1977).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
33. W. STERLING & D. WALLACE, A LAwYER's GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusiNESs
TRANSACTIONS 132 (2d ed. 1977).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1976).
38. 19 C.F.R. § 159.41-47 (1977).
39. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); and Nicholas v. United States,
249 U.S. 34 (1919).
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neither had been explicit enough in its definition to provide reliable precedent for either subsequent court decisions or commentators." A wealth of legislative history can be called upon
to support either the position that a "bounty" means only an
excessive remission or the contrary position that any remission constitutes a bounty. Also, the Customs Court in Zenith
v. United States" accepted the Downs holding as a viable
precedent, while the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
2
with two dissents, ruled to the contrary.
The Tax
The difficulty in deciding whether an indirect tax exemption or remission of the type complained of in the Zenith case
is a bounty or grant lies in the nature of indirect taxes gener-3
ally. In Zenith the tax was a "single stage consumption tax'
levied on goods at the manufacturing level. The tax emanates
from the Japanese Commodity Tax Law (March 31, 1962, Law
No. 48) which sets a consumer tax on items such as television
sets." It also provides that previously paid taxes on exempt
products (e.g., exports) are refunded.' 5 As such it is merely an
excise or consumer-type indirect tax, not unlike those of the
United States, some of which are remitted upon export."
The classical theory of taxation holds that indirect taxes
differ from direct ones in that direct taxes (production and
materials taxes, income taxes, etc.) will be absorbed by the
manufacturer whereas indirect taxes are fully shifted forward
to the consumer in the price of the product. It is thought that
a seller will raise his prices by the equivalent amount of his
indirect tax burden, and the consumer becomes the de facto
taxpayer." If the tax were not rebated on export, the exported product would be taxed by the exporting country and
40. See e.g., that the Supreme Court definition of "bounty" in the Downs case
is dictum: Butler, supra note 7, at 119; and Feller, supra note 6. But see, e.g., that
the bounty definition is a holding: American Express v. United States, 332 F. Supp.
191, 197-99 (Cust. Ct. 1971); and King, CountervailingDuties-An Old Remedy with
New Appeal, 24 Bus. L. 1179, 1182-83 (1969).
41. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
42. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp. 562 F. 2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
43. 430 F. Supp. at 242.
44. Way, Brockman & Otsuka, 51-6th T.M., Business Operations in Japan A-44
(1978). On television sets the tax is 15%.

45. Id.
46. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4221(a)(2), 6416(b)(2)(A) (1976).
47. Feller, supra note 6, at 51.
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the importing country, making it noncompetitive when marketed against the importing country's product."5 Both the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
Treasury Department/Customs Bureau are apprised of this potential double taxation. Both hold that a countervailing duty
will not be imposed merely because the exporting country has
rebated a domestic tax upon export of the product. In fact, if
the principles of GATT had been applied to the Zenith case,
there would have been no appeal since the statutory language
of GATT (in Article VI(3)) makes it clear that neither the
exemption nor the refund of an indirect tax by the exporting
country will trigger a countervailing duty. " However, Article
II of GATT recognizes the superiority of prior inconsistent
domestic legislation under the protocol arrangement. 0 Thus,
since the Tariff Act's Countervailing Duty provision precedes
GATT, it is the interpretation of that statutory language along
with the Supreme Court decisions that provide the resolution
to the Zenith case.
The above analysis of indirect taxes is no longer absolute
under the modern view, which holds that the forward shifting
on indirect taxes is incomplete. Thus a $100 production-cost
Japanese television which is assessed at 15% tax would sell for
$115 in Japan if the tax were fully shifted forward. However, if
the producer sold the item for $110 in the foreign market, the
$15 he would receive in remitted tax from exporting his product
would be in excess of his indirect tax liability by $5 per unit.
Thus, his exports would be subsidized by the government tax
remission. In response to the above situation, the U.S. position
has been that a countervailing duty will be imposed to the
extent that the rebated, indirect tax is not shifted forward in
the cost of the item. 51
Since Zenith was neither argued from a factual transcript, 52 nor did it evidence the extent to which the Japanese
tax was shifted, no economic guidelines were set by any of the
48. See generally ExEcuTivE BRANCH GATT SlTrDis, SENATE CoM&rrrFN ON
FINANCE, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1974).

49. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A24, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
50. The "grandfather clause." Protocol of Provisional Application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1(b), 61 Stat. A 2051, T.I.A.S. No.

1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
51. Butler, supra note 7, at 116.
52. The Customs determinations generate no formal hearing record.
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three courts which heard the Zenith case. It is safe to say,
however, that the weight of modem authority supports the
theory that indirect taxes are not fully shifted forward and
direct taxes are not fully shifted backward." To the degree that
an indirect tax is even partially shifted backward (that is, absorbed by the manufacturer) a full refund of an indirect tax
becomes a subsidy for exports. 54 Also, there is no generally
agreed-upon method for determining the degree of discrimination that results from this indirect/direct tax problem." Complex economics, coupled with the divergent goals and methods
of economists, have caused the courts to adopt neither of these
competing points of view. This is not to say that the courts are
not aware of these complexities. There are ample indications
that both the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals" and the
Supreme Court" are fully apprised of the negative commentary
directed against the economic principles on which the Treasury
has based its policy.
Zenith Radio Corporationv. United States (430 F. Supp. 242)
(1977)
The Zenith case shows the countervailing duty determination procedures through each stage of review. Zenith Radio
Company first petitioned the Treasury Department in 1970,
alleging that the remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax (on
various consumer electronic items) constituted a bounty or
grant and asked for an imposition of countervailing duties. The
Customs Bureau began an investigation and solicited information from all parties, which ultimately resulted in publication
of preliminary findings on February 5, 1975.58 The notice distinguished three export-inducing programs under which "benefits
had been received" which constituted "bounties or grants"
within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act. The Commissioner of Customs further stated that the amounts consid53. Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjustments: Problems and Proposals, 2 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L

Bus. 85, 109 (1970). See also K.

DAM,

THE GATT-LAw

AND INTERNATIONAL

214 (1970).
54. Rosendahl, supra note 53, at 110; and K. Dam, supra note 53, at 215.
55. Rosendahl, supra note 53, at 112. See also, McNamara, Tax Adjustments in
InternationalTrade; The Border Tax Dispute, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 339, 361 (1972).
56. 562 F. 2d 1209, 1219 n. 19.
57. 98 S. Ct. 2441, 2449 n, 14.
58. See 37 Fed. Reg. 10,087 (1972) (notice of proceedings) and 40 Fed. Reg. 5,378
(1975) (preliminary determination).
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION,
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ered were de minimis, that is, not excessive and therefore not
to be countervailed. Because the program providing the benefits was available to firms capitalized at less than one billion
yen, the Commissioner prolonged the investigation in order to
determine whether "significant" benefits would accrue to a few
smaller firms. On January 7, 1976, a final negative determination was made. 5 The findings showed that two export-inducing
programs had been abandoned by the Japanese government.
The third involved an aggregate amount considered de minimis
per dollar value of the exported product. Thus, no countervailing duty was assessed.
Zenith chose to contest the determination, resulting in a
plea before the Customs Court for a summary judgment on the
matter. 0 Plaintiff Zenith, arguing directly from Downs v.
United States, said that the Supreme Court's decision as well
as that of special customs tribunals had repeatedly held that a
remission of taxes on exportation constituted a bounty or grant.
They buttressed this argument with reference to the legislative
history of section 303. The defendant averred that the countervailing duty provision was intended to apply only to "excessive
remission of taxes directly related to the imported product."'"
Furthermore, because the Congress had been apprised of the
Treasury practice (countervailing only "excessive" remissions), this amounted to a legislative approval of the administrative practice."
The court found for plaintiff Zenith and ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to assess countervailing duties equal
to the
6' 3
"net amounts of bounty or grant paid or bestowed.

The court's reading of the 1903 Downs case is at the center
of the argument. In Downs the Supreme Court addressed itself
to a tax rebate on sugar exported from Russia. Exporters were
not only relieved of the 1.75 rubles per pood 4 domestic excise
tax, but received a certificate upon export. This certificate
could then be sold to other sugar producers entitling them to
the same excise rebate on sugar they sold domestically. The
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

41 Fed. Reg. 1,298 (1976).
430 F. Supp. at 242.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 265.
36.113 pounds avoirdupois. T.D. 22,814, 4 TRAS. DEc. 184 (1901).
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critical language of the Supreme Court's decision was straightfoward:
[Tiwo facts . . .appear clearly . . . that no sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise tax of R. 1.75
per pood, and that sugar exported pays no tax at all.

.

.

. When

a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon
all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever
manner, or under whatever name, it is disguised, it is a bounty
upon exportation."

The unequivocal language, taken literally, supports the
Custom Court's reading. However, it remains unclear whether
the Court in Downs condemned the mere excise remission or
whether the sugar certificate was the object of the countervailing duty. The literal reading was cited in a subsequent (1903)
Board of General Appraisers (predecessor to the Customs
Court) decision and in a House Ways and Means Committee
document (1908) where it was understood to mean that an
6 However,
excise remission on exported goods was a bounty.1
the Secretary of the Treasury never interpreted Downs in that
fashion and subsequent determinations have consistently denied that a tax remission on exports is always a bounty.
United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation(562 Fed. 2d 1209)
(1977)
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
in a case the majority called "first impression," would not accept the Customs Court's reading of Downs and reversed the
decision. The lower court's reading, said the majority opinion,
was to take the straightforward language of the Downs decision
out of the context of the facts-that there was a dual benefit
in the Russian remission-and-certificate scheme. The original
Board of General Appraiser's opinion had noted the combination of the two benefits. The Board and the appellate courts
were faced with a "decision resting not on either of two independent grounds but on a single ground having at least two important elements.""8 Therefore, there was no need for the
court to decide whether a nonexcessive remission was a per se
65. 187 U.S. at 515.
66. 430 F. Supp. at 245.
67. Butler, supra note 7, at 120 n. 188. The Secretary interpreted the Downs case
as requiring a refund plus something else of cash value in order to trigger countervailing
duties.
68. 562 F. 2d at 1213.
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bounty or grant. In the context of the entire opinion, then, the
strong language cited by the Customs Court was not necessary
to the decision and was not the ratio decidendi.6 1 Additional
findings of the majority included: (1) that Congress has not
required that every remission constitute a bounty, as demonstrated by the refusal to define "bounty" or "grant" in the
statute; (2) that while legislative history can be cited for either
position, there is nothing to indicate a congressional intent
that countervailing duties be imposed in response to "nonexcessive remissions";" and (3) that a long-continued administrative practice is entitled to great weight, particularly when
Congress has failed to revise the statute while on notice of the
administrative practice."
That Congress has acquiesced to the administrative practices of the Treasury was, in the opinion of dissenting Judges
Miller and Baldwin, a myth. Moreover, (1) the case was not one
of first impression because the key language has been dealt
with by the Supreme Court before; (2) the interpretation of the
Court in Downs was holding, not dictum; and (3) judicial interpretation prevails over any long-continued administrative
practice.7
As the Customs Court decision had done before, the dissenters zeroed in on the unequivocal language cited in Downs
but referred to by the majority as "unnecessary." To bolster
the argument that either the remission or the certificate would
classify as a bounty the dissenters quote the language in the
Downs decision referring to the export certificate as an
additionalbounty:
If the additional bounty paid by Russia upon exported sugar were
the result of a higher protective tariff upon foreign sugar, and a
further enhancement of prices by a limitation on the amount of
free sugar put upon the market, we should regard the effect of
such regulations as being simply a bounty on production, al69. Id. at 1215.
70. Id. at 1217.
71. The government argued that if the Downs case held as Zenith claimed it did,
the Secretary's interpretation nevertheless emerged supreme. Because the Secretary
did not change his interpretation after either the Downs or Nicholas cases and because
Congress-with full knowledge of the Secretary's practice-continued to re-enact the
statute without substantive change, Congress in effect "overruled" Downs and
Nicholas insofar as they conflicted with the Secretary's practice. Reply Brief for Appellant at 6-7, United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F. 2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
72. 562 F. 2d at 1223.
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though it might incidentally and remotely foster an increased
exportation of sugar; but where in addition to that these regulations exempt sugar exported from excise taxation altogether,we
think it clearly falls within the definition of an indirect bounty
upon exportation.7 3 (Emphasis added.)

The dissenters concluded that both the remission and the
certificate were bounties. Also referred to is the definition provided by the Supreme Court itself in the 1919 countervailing
duty case Nicholas & Co. v. United States. There, bounties
were determined to have been granted on whiskey and gin exported from Great Britain and countervailing duties were assessed. In interpreting the relevant statute the Court wrote:
If the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word "grant" has
not. A word of broader significance than "grant" could not have
been used. Like its synonyms "give" and "bestow" it expresses a
concession, the conferring of something by one person on another.
And if the "something" be conferred by a country "upon the
exportation of any article or merchandise" a countervailing duty
is required . ..

In the Nicholas case as well as other subsequent decisions7 5
the courts relied on the broad language used in Downs to justify
assessment of duties. Likewise, the majority in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals was mindful of the "subsequent
references to broad statements"76 made in Downs. Nevertheless, the majority was not swayed by this line of interpretation.
The court's decision left to the Secretary of the Treasury that
"lawfully permissible ' 7 discretion which the Secretary has
exercised since-and perhaps despite-the Downs decision.
Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States (98 S. Ct. 2441)
(1978)
The Supreme Court decision wholly embraced the thinking of the C.C.P.A. majority on the three contested issues: (1)
the correct interpretation of the statutory language and legislative history of section 303; (2) the Downs holding; and (3) the
economic effects of the remission of the Japanese tax. As the
Supreme Court's findings parallel those of the C.C.P.A. on
73. 187 U.S. at 513.
74. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. at 39.
75. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct.
1971), aff'd on other grounds 472 F. 2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
76. 562 F. 2d at 1215.
77. Id. at 1223.
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both law and policy, the lower court's decision is unanimously
affirmed.
The opinion of Justice Marshall clearly delineates two
principles that govern the Court's thinking. First, because of
the long-standing Treasury interpretation of the statute and
congressional "acquiescence" to this interpretation, the
C.C.P.A. had correctly affirmed the interpretation as "lawfully
permissible"" within the language of section 303. Second,
the Court found no rule emanating from Downs which explicitly decided the question whether "nonexcessive remission of
taxes, standing alone, would have constituted a bounty on
exportation."79 The Court went on to rule on a third issue, that
the Treasury's interpretation was "reasonable" in light of the"economic result" of the Japanese tax remission. Actually, as
petitioner Zenith had based its cause of action squarely on its
interpretation that Downs declared a tax remission, upon
exportation, as a per se bounty or grant, this third issue as to
the reasonableness or arbitrariness of the Treasury policy was
never put into contention."0 The fact that the Supreme Court
sought to identify it (as had the C.C.P.A.) as fundamental to
the resolution of the issue, shows that the decision also had
strong roots in economic policy.
Statutory Interpretation
The Court noted that the Treasury had adopted its interpretation of the 1897 statute the following year and that that
interpretation has been both unchanged and consistent in application since that time. Such a long-standing statutory interpretation by an administrative agency is entitled to
"considerable weight." 2 That interpretation has "particular
weight" when the administrative practice involves a
''contemporaneous construction of a statute" by those
"charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in
motion. 83 Additionally, as the Department's interpretation
78. Id.
79. 98 S. Ct. at 2451.
80. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11 n. 9, Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
81. May 6, 1898 in T.D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of Decisions 696 (1898). See Brief for
the United States in Opposition at 6 n. 4.
82. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).
83. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933);
see, e.g., Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
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was "sufficiently reasonable," it was acceptable to a reviewing
court."4 In summary the Court finds:
Our examination of the language, the legislative history, and the
overall purpose of the 1897 provision persuades us that the Department's initial construction of the statute was far from unreasonable; and we are unable to find anything in the events
subsequent to that time that convinces us that
the Department
5
was required to abandon this interpretation .

Petitioner Zenith's claim that the statute is clear and unambiguous by a plain meaning approach to the language is implicitly rejected by the Court's broader view of the legislative activity that forged the statute.
Legislative History
The Marshall opinion zeroed in on two critical periods in
the murky legislative history of this act. The first target of
analysis concerned the subtle changes brought about when the
first act, an exclusively sugar-protecting provision in 1890, '
was expanded to cover general imports in 1897. While no definition of "bounty or grant" was provided by any of the measures as enacted, there is evidence that supporters 7 of the measure intended to countervail only against "net" bounties
(where monies rebated upon export exceeded the domestic excise tax). Such subsidization schemes were then practiced by
"several" European governments. 8 This concept was more
explicitly covered in the 1894 Act which excepted American
importers from duties on bounty-fed exports where those importers could produce a certificate from the exporting government that "no indirect bounty has been received upon said
sugar in excess of the tax collected upon the beet or cane
84, Train v. Natural Resources Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975).
85. 98 S.Ct. at 2445.
86. Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 584.
87. Appellant U.S. Government maintained in its reply brief before the C.C.P.A.
that "Statements of sponsors are to be accorded substantial weight in the interpretation of a statute." Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
562 F. 2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The Government advanced a similar argument before
the Supreme Court. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11 n.8, Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (1978). This point was contested by Zenith, but
the Supreme Court did not address it in the opinion. Instead, the Court relied on
statements made by both sides in the floor debates insofar as both sides were in accord
as to the amounts of countervailing duties discussed. This obviated the need to rely
on the sponsor's intentions.
88. 98 S.Ct. at 2446.
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from which it was produced."'" (Emphasis added.) Although
the same provision was not incorporated into the 1897 Act,
the term "net amount of such bounty or grant" 0 was incorporated. By that phrase the concept of "net bounty" was
transposed from the 1894 to the 1897 Act, and in so doing the
intent was "to incorporate the prior rule that nonexcessive
remission of indirect taxes would not trigger the countervailing
requirement at all.""
Second, the Court studied the Senate floor debates surrounding the passage of the 1897 Act. The Senate debate makes
clear the intention to countervail only against excess remissions and provides an illustration of the concept through a
German export scheme then under scrutiny. The House version
of the 1897 Act had in fact utilized explicit language concerning
countervailing against only "net" bounties on exported sugar.
That language was deleted in the Senate (and final) version
because the Senate wished to expand the coverage of the act
to all imports, not merely sugar." The offending German
scheme concerned a "bounty" on exported raw and refined
sugar. The "bounty" figures used in the debates were 38t per
hundred pounds of refined sugar and 27t per hundred pounds
of raw sugar. Consequently, the countervailing duties under
discussion were in the same amounts. But the crucial fact revealed in the debates was that the full amount remitted from
domestic consumption tax upon export from Germany was
$2.16 per hundredpounds. It follows from this discrepancy that
the figures of 38 and 27 cents must have been what the Treasury had determined to be the "excess" or "net" bounty; otherwise if remission of the entire indirect tax were regarded as the
"bounty," the necessary duty would have to have been the full
$2.16.11

Downs Revisited
Ultimately, the resolution to the Zenith case rests upon

the Downs decision. The Court acknowledges that "this would
be a very different case"9 " if the Secretary's interpretation were
89. Paragraph 182 V2 of the Act of August 27, 1894. Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat.
521.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Section 5 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 205.
98 S. Ct. at 2446.
30 CONG. REc. 1635 (1897).
98 S. Ct. at 2447.
Id. at 2449.
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contrary to the Court's holding in Downs.
The facts in that case revealed two relevant tax adjustments: (1) the remission of excise taxes on sugar exported from
Russia, and (2) receipt of a valuable certificate upon export,
this certificate relieving the exporter of excise taxes on his
sugar sold domestically. The issue that came before the Downs
Court was whether a nonexcessive remission of indirect tax
together with the granting of an additional benefit (the certificate) constituted a "bounty or grant.' 5 Because petitioner
Downs, the importer, did not challenge the amount of the duty
assessed on the sugar by the Treasury, the Court's attention
was not concentrated on the distinction between the mere remission of the tax and the certificate. Thus, Zenith arrived at
court arguing that a mere remission alone was sufficient to
trigger a countervailing duty. They bolstered their argument
with the same broad language used in Downs that had proven
persuasive in the Customs Court."
The modern Court finds this passage wholly incompatible
with language in Downs both preceding and subsequent to the
general language in Downs. The Downs Court understood the
"bounty" to refer to the certificates, as had the Board of
General Appraisers 7 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals"
before it. The Downs Court, equally concerned with the
"economic effect" of the disputed activity as the modem
Court, noted:
"The amount he [the exporter] receives for his export
certificate, say, R. 1.25, is the exact amount of the bounty he
receives upon exportation, and this enables him to sell at a
profit in a foreign market."" (Emphasis added.) Further, the
Downs Court went on to specifically concur with the conclusion
of the Fourth Circuit, which it incorporated verbatim into its
own opinion:
We find that the Russian exporter of sugar obtains from his government a certificate, solely because of such exportation, which
is worth in the open markets of that country from R. 1.25 to R.
1.64 per pood, or from 1.8 to 2.35 cents per pound. Therefore we
95. Id. at 2450.
96. See note 65 supra.

97. T.D. 22,984, 4 TnA~s. DEC. 405, 410-11,413 (1901).
98. Downs v. United States, 113 Fed. 144, 145.
99. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 515.
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hold that the government of Russia does secure to the exporter
of that country, as the inevitable result of its action, a money
reward or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia.N

The occurrence within the same page of the same opinion
of statements that have given rise to legal arguments for the
opposing sides in the Zenith case is what makes Downs an
"admittedly opaque opinion."''1 Nevertheless, the weight of
the evidence does not allow the modern Court to take the broad
statements relied upon by Zenith as the holding of the Downs
decision. Because no one argued in Downs that a mere remission by itself constituted a bounty, and because the Court did
in fact support the Secretary's decision countervailing only as
against the excess remission,102 the Court finds that "the isolated statement in' 0 3Downs relied upon by petitioner cannot be
dispositive here.'

Economic Effects
Both petitioner Zenith and respondent U.S. Government
supported their legal points with economic and policy arguments. The Court was much less definitive in its discussion of
these issues than in its clean-cut resolutions to the interpretation of the legislative history and the Downs holding. While the
Court did not deny the validity of Zenith's position, it did not
alter its affection for the reasonable nature of the Treasury
policy.
The main thrust of Zenith's economic argument was that
the Treasury policy is based on outdated economic theory
which favors foreign tax structures. The Supreme Court acknowledged that remissions of indirect taxes may be in fact an
incentive to export.1'0 Additionally, such remissions as sanctioned by GATT may work to the detriment of those countries
relying primarily on direct taxes (as the United States) and to
the advantage of those dependent on indirect taxes (as Japan).
Thus, where indirect taxes are a primary revenue source, foreign exporters "are able to receive tax rebates on exportation
far greater than U.S. exporters, without fear of countervailing
under either the GATT rules, or the countervailing duty law as
100. Id. at 516.
101. 98 S. Ct. at 2450.

102. T.D. 22,814, 4 TxAs. Dac. 184 (1901). The final sums assessed against the

Russian sugar ranged from .38 ruble per pood to .50 ruble per pood.
103. 98 S. Ct. at 2451.
104. Id. at 2449.
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it traditionally has been construed by the Treasury Department."' 5 The possible competitive advantage gained by foreign
producers has been fully debated in Congress. Legislative dissatisfaction with present policy has resulted, inter alia, in some
6
protectionist language from the Senate Finance Committee'
and promulgation of Section 121(a) (5) of the Trade Act of 1974,
which mandates presidential action on a revision of GATT
articles "with respect to the treatment of border adjustments
for internal taxes to redress the disadvantages to countries
07
relying primarily on direct rather than indirect taxes."'
Although cognizant of the dissatisfaction, the Court bows to
the complexity of the economic situation and states that "given
the present state of economic knowledge" it would be difficult
to measure the effect of the remission of indirect taxes. 0 8 Nor
does the Court think it wise to substitute its judgment for that
of the Secretary in economic matters.' Clearly the Court feels
the economics of the issue are too nebulous for judicial resolution and therefore does not defeat Zenith's arguments so much
as side-step them.
Economics aside, the Court feels the successful application
of the Treasury policy over eight decades has been reasonable.
That policy has sought to analyze a tax remission or other
subsidy in terms of its economic effect on the United States.
The policy is best encapsulated in the C.C.P.A. analysis:
"Neither form nor nomenclature being decisive in determining
whether a bounty or grant has been conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign government's action which controls."" 0 In fact, the analysis is a balancing test; measuring the
effect of the offending practice against the purpose of countervailing duty legislation. Indeed the history of judicial review of
countervailing duty cases contains both of these themes."'
105. Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Non-tariff Distortions to Thade, 7 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 352 (1975).
106. "[T]he United States can no longer stand by and expose its markets, while
other nations shelter their economies . . . with . . . export subsidies . ; . and a host
of other practices which effectively discriminate against U.S. trade and production."
S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
107. Trade Act of 1974, § 121(a)(5), adding 19 U.S.C. § 2131. See generally, Marks
& Malmgren, supra note 105, at 354-355.
108. 98 S. Ct. at 2449.
109. Id.
110. 562 F.2d at 1216.
111. See, e.g., T.D. 22,984 at 414; and Downs, 187 U.S. at 514-515.
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The modern Court notes that while the legislative history
might not be such as to compel a Treasury policy against only
"net" bounties, there is no question of the reasonable nature
of the policy "in light of the statutory purpose.""' The statutory purpose of countervailing duties is to control and negate
the competitive advantage gained through export subsidization. In holding that nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes
did not sponsor the competitive advantage that the legislation
was enacted to prevent, the Treasury acted "in accordance
with the shared assumptions of the day as to the fairness and
economic effect of that practice." ' Thus the Secretary's policy, based on assumptions still current if not fully subscribed
to by all observers, remains as permissible today as it was in
1898.
The Future of CountervailingDuty Policy
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court decision is
twofold: (1) to lend judicial sanction to the "lawfully permissible" countervailing duties policy of the Treasury Department,
and (2) to distinguish Downs as not holding that all remissions
of indirect taxes are bounties or grants. While the latter result
would certainly deny future petitioners their strongest legal
precedent in cases with similar facts, it does not necessarily
follow that countervailing duty complaints will decrease. Indeed, as the last decade has seen a marked increase in countervailing duty reviews, there is the strong likelihood that the
combination of economic pressures and the increased accessibility of the courts will result in a commensurate upsurge in
litigated complaints. This trend may focus needed light on
the Treasury's review procedures, which have often been
criticized for delay and secrecy.
The Zenith case was a pointed illustration of agency footdragging. Eight years elapsed between the filing of Zenith's
complaint and the rendering of the Supreme Court decision;
nearly six years was spent in administrative investigation and
review. Fortunately, Congress addressed that situation directly
in the Trade Act of 1974 while Zenith was still under review.
The Secretary of the Treasury is now obligated to decide if a
112. 98 S. Ct. at 2448.
113. Id.
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foreign country has bestowed a bounty or grant within twelve
months of the filing of a complaint."'
Certain to come under renewed scrutiny is the wide range
of Treasury discretion, uninhibited by the need to produce a
factual record to justify bounty or no-bounty determinations.
As it stands today, when the Treasury imposes or denies a
countervailing duty claim, only the fact of the bounty or grant
is published along with the amount assessed against it, if any.
As noted by the C.C.P.A., this profoundly circumscribes judicial review as there are no transcripts from which a reviewing
court can determine whether the Secretary's findings were supported by the evidence or if they were in fact arbitrary or capricious. The Administrative Procedure Act" 5 allows for such a
review and Congress does provide for hearings in antidumping
cases," ' but in countervailing duty review the Treasury is not
reached by either."7 This deficiency leads to the incongruous
situation faced by the C.C.P.A. in the Zenith case where it
acknowledged, on the one hand, that it is the economic effects
of a foreign government's action that determine whether a
subsidy has been bestowed, and on the other hand, that in the
Zenith case "the record is silent regarding the economic result
of the mere remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax.""' This
says, in effect, that the court maintains a standard of judgment
but receives no facts to apply to the standard. In the Zenith
case, the C.C.P.A. presumed" 9 that the economic result of the
Japanese tax did not confer a subsidy, and then went on to
decide whether the Treasury policy was justifiable as a matter
of law. Faced with the same lack of data, the Supreme Court
merely notes that the debate over the economic effects of remitted indirect taxes is far from over, 20 and faced with the complexity of the issues it is "not the task of the judiciary to substitute its views as to fairness and economic effect for those of the
Secretary."'' It would seem improbable that this "it's-fairbecause-the-Secretary-says-it's-fair" reasoning will stand
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Trade Act of 1974 § 331(a), adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4).
5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (1976).
19 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1976).
562 F.2d at 1216, n.13.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
98 S. Ct. at 2449.
Id.
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without challenge. Such a challenge would likely emerge in the
situation where a complainant wished to contest the data
which forms the basis of the final judgment whether a remission was "excessive" or not.
From the point of view of a prospective litigator, Zenith
provides little guidance to the standard of what constitutes a
bounty or grant. True, this very definition is a major policy
decision and should be the responsibility of congressional legislation and executive (Treasury) interpretation and application. However, as Congress has avoided a fixed definition,
and the facts and pleadings of the Zenith decision are hazy as
to how the Treasury determinations are made, it would follow
that it is the responsibility of the courts to provide some standards against which the petitioner can measure his chances for
successful review.
On the other hand, it can be strongly argued that the effect
of an arbitrary standard defined by statute would be detrimental to U.S. trading flexibility. This line of reasoning would
allow the Treasury the widest discretion possible in its determinations so as to strike a better balance between the changing
economics and politics of international trade and U.S. interests. The judicial support that the Zenith decision lends to the
Treasury's practices has at its base a very compelling policy
rationale. The entire countervailing duties area is undermined
by a haunting specter, which like the Treasury policy is a legacy of 1898-the fear of economic retaliation leading to a protective tariff war.
Because the imposition of countervailing duties is required
by the statute upon a finding of a bounty or grant; because
there need be no factual showing of "injury" to a domestic
industry; and because judicial review is subject to the aforementioned limitations, some would view the imposition of
countervailing duties as a "sleeping giant"'' 22 with a dangerous
potential to disrupt the flow of world trade. In a 1971 countervailing duties case the C.C.P.A. cautioned: "Countervailing
duties are strong medicine, well calculated to arouse violent
resentment in countries whose trade practices are branded by
122. Davis, The Regulation and Control of ForeignTrade, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1428,
1446 (1966).
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the court as unethical.' 23 The desire to avoid incitement of
"violent resentment" from one of America's foremost trading
partners is the overriding theme of the government's policy
arguments in Zenith. In its brief before the Supreme Court, the
government urged the Court to view the facts and policies in
the same light as the Secretary in order to avoid a "significant
breakdown" in American trading relations and "retaliatory
actions" from trading partners. It also pleaded for favorable
review so as not to undermine the government's "negotiating
flexibility" in the 1978 Multilateral Trade Negotiations (under
the auspices of the GATT).124 Additionally, any decision which

would encourage a wider application of countervailing duties
(in response to a worsening balance of payments deficit or import glut) as has been predicted" 5 would certainly be contrary
to the spirit and language of GATT and likely put a severe
strain upon that system. 2 ' There is a strong inference to be
drawn from the decision in the Zenith case that a factor in the
Court's approval of the Treasury practice was the Secretary's
restraint in applying the duties pursuant to the congressional
grant of the discretion to determine what constitutes a bounty
or grant. It is for this reason that "bounty" or "grant" have no
statutory definition, indicating Congress' intent to refrain
"from calling all the countervailing duty plays in advance."'
Conclusion
In refusing to grant Zenith's request for reversal of a negative determination on Japanese electronic goods, the Supreme
Court has established two significant guidelines. Future complainants who contest a no-bounty determination will no longer
have the broad language of the Downs decision to cite as precedent. Also, potential litigators are on notice that the Treasury policy that refuses to assess duties against nonexcessive
remissions has been given full approval by a unanimous Court.
What remains to be clarified is a Treasury standard for
"bounty" or "grant" which is sufficiently well-defined to pro123. United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
124. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 7-8, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
125. King, supra note 40, at 1192.
126. Rosendahl, supra note 53, at 122.
127. 562 F.2d at 1217.
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vide guidance for potential complainants as well as to reviewing courts.
Most significant in Zenith is the lack of evidence in the
language of the statute, or in eighty years of legislative history,
judicial review, and administrative practice, that could convince the Court that the broad powers of countervailing duty
determinations should not be left to Treasury discretion.
Holding that the Treasury policy is "lawfully permissible"
under the statute is little more than saying that this discretionary power has been reasonably exercised. The Congress,
long aware of the Treasury practices, has made no effort to
overrule them. The Treasury practice is also compatible with
the GATT system. The Zenith decision merely adds the
judicial imprimatur to the Treasury policy.
In so doing, the Court puts the countervailing duties problem in a broad international perspective. Countervailing duties
come to us from the late 19th century, a time when protective
tariffs were commonplace and retaliatory legislation was the
first response called for by U.S. industries, particularly a nascent one as was the sugar industry at the turn of the century.
Similarly, massive imports of highly competitive Japanese consumer electronic goods had the U.S. industry reeling in the
early 1970's. Continuing problems of a similar nature require
constant bilateral negotiations at the highest executive level
between the United States and Japan. The Zenith decision,
more than just another comment on Downs, lends judicial
backing to the Secretary's attempts to balance the anger of
domestic industry against the export necessities of a major
trading partner and ally. The Court's decision minimizes the
effect an arbitrary standard might have on world trade and
continues the discretionary license the Treasury has exercised
since the creation of the statute.
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